David A. Love

What can the life-cycle model tell us about 401(k) contributions and participation?

This paper solves and simulates a stochastic life-cycle model of an economy with 401(k) plans. We use the model to establish a benchmark for patterns of contributions and participation and show how these patterns depend on such features as employer matching, vesting policies, and the ability to make early withdrawals. Consistent with empirical studies, the model predicts relatively low participation rates among younger workers and shows that these rates tend to rise with more generous matching, lower vesting periods, and improved liquidity.

A New Look at the Wealth Adequacy of Older U.S. Households

We examine the current wealth adequacy of older U.S. households using the 1998-2006 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). We find that the median older U.S. household is reasonably well situated, with a ratio of comprehensive net wealth to present value poverty- line wealth of about 3.9 in 2006. About 18 percent of households, however, have less wealth than would be needed to generate 150 percent of poverty-line income over their expected future lifetimes. We see similar patterns of wealth adequacy when we examine ratios of annualized comprehensive wealth to pre-retirement earnings. Comparing the leading edge of the baby boomers in 2006 to households of the same age in 1998, we find that the baby boomers show slightly less wealth, in real terms, than their elders did, but still have appear to have adequate resources at the median. Moreover, we find a rising age profile of annualized wealth, even within households over time and after controlling for other factors, suggesting that older households are not spending their wealth as quickly as their survival probabilities are falling.

Optimal Rules of Thumb for Consumption and Portfolio Choice

Conventional rules of thumb represent simple, but inefficient, alternatives to dynamic programming solutions. This article seeks an intermediate ground by developing a framework for selecting optimal rules of thumb, where rules of thumb are defined as simple functions of state variables. In the case of portfolio choice, optimal linear age rules lead to only modest welfare losses relative to the dynamic programming solution, while a linear rule based on the ratio of financial wealth to total lifetime resources performs even better. Consumption rules generate larger welfare losses but an effective rule is to consume 70–80% of annuitised lifetime wealth.

Do Households Have Enough Wealth for Retirement

Dramatic structural changes in the U.S. pension system, along with the impending wave of retiring baby boomers, have given rise to a broad policy discussion of the adequacy of household retirement wealth. We construct a uniquely comprehensive measure of wealth for households aged 51 and older in 2004 that includes expected wealth from Social Security, defined benefit pensions, life insurance, annuities, welfare payments, and future labor earnings. Abstracting from the uncertainty surrounding asset returns, length of life and medical expenses, we assess the adequacy of wealth using two expected values: an annuitized value of comprehensive wealth and the ratio of comprehensive wealth to the actuarial present value of future poverty lines. We find that most households in these older cohorts can expect to have sufficient total resources to finance adequate consumption throughout retirement, taking as given expected lifetimes and current Social Security benefits. We find a median annuity value of wealth equal to

Why Do Firms Offer Risky Defined-Benefit Pension Plans?

32,000 per person per year in expected value and a median ratio of comprehensive wealth to poverty-line wealth of 3.56. About 12 percent of households, however, do not have sufficient wealth to finance consumption equal to the poverty line over their expected lifetimes, even after including the value of Social Security and welfare benefits, and an additional 9 percent can expect to be relatively close to the poverty line.

Measuring Dissaving Out of Retirement Wealth

Even risky pension sponsors could offer essentially riskless pension promises by contributing a sufficient level of resources to their pension trust funds and by investing those resources in fixed-income securities designed to deliver their payoffs just as pension obligations are coming due. However, almost no firm has chosen to fund its plan in this manner. We study the optimal funding choice for plan sponsors by developing a simple model of pension financing in which the total compensation offered to workers must clear the labor market. We find that if workers understand the implications of pension risk, they will demand greater compensation for riskier pension promises than for safer ones, all else equal. Indeed, in our model, pension sponsors maximize their value by making their pension promises free of risk. We close by positing some explanations for why no real-world firm follows the prescription of our model.

Should Risky Firms Offer Risk-Free DB Pensions?

The approaching retirement of the baby boomers, accelerating trend from DB to DC pension plans, and growing uncertainty over the solvency of Social Security all raise important questions about the ability of households to finance their retirement years with liquid assets, rather than annuities. We use data from four waves of the HRS to investigate how households spend down their retirement wealth, and, in particular, whether they appear to run down their retirement accounts too quickly. We find no evidence of excessive dissaving over the period 1998 to 2004. Indeed, the annuitized value of total wealth rose for most households over this period, suggesting that households are not running down their assets too fast, given their remaining life expectancies.

Comprehensive Wealth of Immigrants and Natives

We develop a simple model of pension financing to study the effects of pension risk on shareholder value. In the model, firms minimize costs, total compensation must clear the labor market, and a government pension insurer guarantees a portion of promised benefits. We find that in the absence of mispriced pension insurance, the optimal pension strategy under most specifications is to immunize all sources of market risk. Mispriced pension insurance, however, gives firms the incentive to introduce risk into their pension promises, offering an explanation for some of the observed prevalence of risky pensions in the real world.

Hyperbolic Discounting and Life-Cycle Portfolio Choice

The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act had a profound impact on the demographic and skill composition of immigrants arriving in the U.S. A large literature has investigated the relative earnings of immigrants and natives, but much less is known about relative wealth accumulation and the preparation of immigrants for retirement. This paper compares the retirement preparation of older immigrants to that of native-born households using an annualized comprehensive measure of available resources. We find that immigrants have less wealth overall, but that they appear to be drawing down resources at a slower rate. We attempt to make sense of the trends in annualized wealth with the help of a lifecycle framework that incorporates uncertain longevity, bequests, risk in retirement resources, as well as endogenous housing wealth. Simulations from the model indicate that it is difficult to match the observed patterns in annualized wealth without the combination of both an explicit bequest motive and an explicit treatment of housing choice. These patterns mask a good deal of heterogeneity, however, in terms of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Some of the largest differences within immigrants occur along the margins of race and ethnicity, as well as the number of years since arrival. The evidence suggests that the typical immigrant is relatively well situated in retirement, but that more recent immigrants have low levels of total resources and are likely to have difficulty maintaining adequate levels of spending in retirement.

Risky Pensions and Household Saving over the Life Cycle

This paper studies how hyperbolic discounting affects stock market participation, asset allocation, and saving decisions over the life cycle in an economy with Epstein-Zin preferences. Hyperbolic discounting affects saving and portfolio decisions through at least two channels: (1) it lowers desired saving, which decreases financial wealth relative to future earnings; and (2) it lowers the incentive to pay a fixed cost to enter the stock market. We find that hyperbolic discounters accumulate less wealth relative to their geometric counterparts and that they participate in the stock market at a later age. Because they have lower levels of financial wealth relative to future earnings, hyperbolic discounters who do participate in the stock market tend to hold a higher share of equities, particularly in the retirement years. We find that increasing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, holding risk aversion constant, greatly magnifies the impact of hyperbolic discounting on all of the models decision rules and simulated levels of participation, allocation, and wealth. Finally, we introduce endogenous financial knowledge accumulation and find that hyperbolic discounting leads to lower financial literacy and inefficient stock market investment.