David Baelde
École Normale Supérieure
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Featured researches published by David Baelde.
international conference on concurrency theory | 2015
David Baelde; Stéphanie Delaune; Lucca Hirschi
Security protocols are concurrent processes that communicate using cryptography with the aim of achieving various security properties. Recent work on their formal verification has brought procedures and tools for deciding trace equivalence properties (e.g., anonymity, unlinkability, vote secrecy) for a bounded number of sessions. However, these procedures are based on a naive symbolic exploration of all traces of the considered processes which, unsurprisingly, greatly limits the scalability and practical impact of the verification tools. nIn this paper, we overcome this difficulty by developing partial order reduction techniques for the verification of security protocols. We provide reduced transition systems that optimally eliminate redundant traces, and which are adequate for model-checking trace equivalence properties of protocols by means of symbolic execution. We have implemented our reductions in the tool Apte, and demonstrated that it achieves the expected speedup on various protocols.
ieee symposium on security and privacy | 2016
Lucca Hirschi; David Baelde; Stéphanie Delaune
In this paper, we consider the problem of verifying anonymity and unlinkability in the symbolic model, where protocols are represented as processes in a variant of the applied pi calculus notably used in the ProVerif tool. Existing tools and techniques do not allow one to verify directly these properties, expressed as behavioral equivalences. We propose a different approach: we design two conditions on protocols which are sufficient to ensure anonymity and unlinkability, and which can then be effectively checked automatically using ProVerif. Our two conditions correspond to two broad classes of attacks on unlinkability, corresponding to data and control-flow leaks. This theoretical result is general enough to apply to a wide class of protocols. In particular, we apply our techniques to provide the first formal security proof of the BAC protocol (e-passport). Our work has also lead to the discovery of new attacks, including one on the LAK protocol (RFID authentication) which was previously claimed to be unlinkable (in a weak sense) and one on the PACE protocol (e-passport).
computer science logic | 2016
David Baelde; Amina Doumane; Alexis Saurin
Infinitary and regular proofs are commonly used in fixed point logics. Being natural intermediate devices between semantics and traditional finitary proof systems, they are commonly found in completeness arguments, automated deduction, verification, etc. However, their proof theory is surprisingly underdeveloped. In particular, very little is known about the computational behavior of such proofs through cut elimination. Taking such aspects into account has unlocked rich developments at the intersection of proof theory and programming language theory. One would hope that extending this to infinitary calculi would lead, e.g., to a better understanding of recursion and corecursion in programming languages. Structural proof theory is notably based on two fundamental properties of a proof system: cut elimination and focalization. The first one is only known to hold for restricted (purely additive) infinitary calculi, thanks to the work of Santocanale and Fortier; the second one has never been studied in infinitary systems. In this paper, we consider the infinitary proof system muMALLi for multiplicative and additive linear logic extended with least and greatest fixed points, and prove these two key results. We thus establish muMALLi as a satisfying computational proof system in itself, rather than just an intermediate device in the study of finitary proof systems.
principles of security and trust | 2014
David Baelde; Stéphanie Delaune; Lucca Hirschi
Many privacy-type properties of security protocols can be modelled using trace equivalence properties in suitable process algebras. It has been shown that such properties can be decided for interesting classes of finite processes (i.e. without replication) by means of symbolic execution and constraint solving. However, this does not suffice to obtain practical tools. Current prototypes suffer from a classical combinatorial explosion problem caused by the exploration of many interleavings in the behaviour of processes. Modersheim et al. [18] have tackled this problem for reachability properties using partial order reduction techniques. We revisit their work, generalize it and adapt it for equivalence checking. We obtain an optimization in the form of a reduced symbolic semantics that eliminates redundant interleavings on the fly.
computer science logic | 2016
David Baelde; Simon Lunel; Sylvain Schmitz
We investigate the proof theory of a modal fragment of XPath equipped with data (in)equality tests over finite data trees, i.e. over finite unranked trees where nodes are labelled with both a symbol from a finite alphabet and a single data value from an infinite domain. We present a sound and complete sequent calculus for this logic, which yields the optimal PSPACE complexity bound for its validity problem.
ieee computer security foundations symposium | 2017
David Baelde; Stéphanie Delaune; Steve Kremer
In symbolic verification of security protocols, process equivalences have recently been used extensively to model strong secrecy, anonymity and unlinkability properties. However, tool support for automated analysis of equivalence properties is limited compared to trace properties, e.g., modeling authentication and weak notions of secrecy. In this paper, we present a novel procedure for verifying equivalences on finite processes, i.e., without replication, for protocols that rely on various cryptographic primitives including exclusive or (xor). We have implemented our procedure in the tool AKISS, and successfully used it on several case studies that are outside the scope of existing tools, e.g., unlinkability on various RFID protocols, and resistance against guessing attacks on protocols that use xor.
logic in computer science | 2016
Amina Doumane; David Baelde; Lucca Hirschi; Alexis Saurin
Modal µ-calculus is one of the central languages of logic and verification, whose study involves notoriously complex objects: automata over infinite structures on the model-theoretical side; infinite proofs and proofs by (co)induction on the proof-theoretical side. Nevertheless, axiomatizations have been given for both linear and branching time µ-calculi, with quite involved completeness arguments. We come back to this central problem, considering it from a proof search viewpoint, and provide some new completeness arguments in the linear time µ-calculus. Our results only deal with restricted classes of formulas that closely correspond to (non-alternating) ω-automata but, compared to earlier proofs, our completeness arguments are direct and constructive. We first consider a natural circular proof system based on sequent calculus, and show that it is complete for inclusions of parity automata expressed as formulas, making use of Safra’s construction directly in proof search. We then consider the corresponding finitary proof system, featuring (co)induction rules, and provide a partial translation result from circular to finitary proofs. This yields completeness of the finitary proof system for inclusions of sufficiently deterministic parity automata, and finally for arbitrary Büchi automata.
Logical Methods in Computer Science | 2017
David Baelde; Stéphanie Delaune; Lucca Hirschi
Many privacy-type properties of security protocols can be modelled using trace equivalence properties in suitable process algebras. It has been shown that such properties can be decided for interesting classes of finite processes (i.e., without replication) by means of symbolic execution and constraint solving. However, this does not suffice to obtain practical tools. Current prototypes suffer from a classical combinatorial explosion problem caused by the exploration of many interleavings in the behaviour of processes. Modersheim et al. have tackled this problem for reachability properties using partial order reduction techniques. We revisit their work, generalize it and adapt it for equivalence checking. We obtain an optimisation in the form of a reduced symbolic semantics that eliminates redundant interleavings on the fly. The obtained partial order reduction technique has been integrated in a tool called APTE. We conducted complete benchmarks showing dramatic improvements.
european symposium on research in computer security | 2018
David Baelde; Stéphanie Delaune; Lucca Hirschi
Formal methods have proved effective to automatically analyse protocols. Recently, much research has focused on verifying trace equivalence on protocols, which is notably used to model interesting privacy properties such as anonymity or unlinkability. Several tools for checking trace equivalence rely on a naive and expensive exploration of all interleavings of concurrent actions, which calls for partial-order reduction (POR) techniques. In this paper, we present the first POR technique for protocol equivalences that does not rely on an action-determinism assumption: we recast trace equivalence as a reachability problem, to which persistent and sleep set techniques can be applied, and we show how to effectively apply these results in the context of symbolic execution. We report on a prototype implementation, improving the tool DeepSec.
computer science logic | 2015
David Baelde; Amina Doumane; Alexis Saurin
Various logics have been introduced in order to reason over (co)inductive specifications and, through the Curry-Howard correspondence, to study computation over inductive and coinductive data. The logic µMALL is one of those logics, extending multiplicative and additive linear logic with least and greatest fixed point operators. In this paper, we investigate the semantics of µMALL proofs in (computational) ludics. This framework is built around the notion of design, which can be seen as an analogue of the strategies of game semantics. The infinitary nature of designs makes them particularly well suited for representing computations over infinite data. We provide µMALL with a denotational semantics, interpreting proofs by designs and formulas by particular sets of designs called behaviours. Then we prove a completeness result for the class of essentially finite designs , which are those designs performing a finite computation followed by a copycat. On the way to completeness, we establish decidability and completeness of semantic inclusion.