David Bakhurst

Reflections on activity theory

It is sometimes suggested that activity theory represents the most important legacy of Soviet philosophy and psychology. But what exactly is activity theory? The canonical account in the West is given by Engeström, who identifies three stages in the theory’s development: from Vygotsky’s insights, through Leontiev’s articulation of the fundamental structure of activity, to a still‐emerging third generation incorporating difference, discourse and dialogue into the framework. This paper argues that the resulting position is in fact in tension with the concerns of the Russian founders of the tradition. While the latter saw the concept of activity as a fundamental category to address profound philosophical questions about the possibility of mind, activity theory in the West has principally become an empirical method for modeling activity systems. The paper explores the strengths and weaknesses of views on both sides of the contrast and examines its consequences for the future of the activity‐theoretical tradition.

The meshcheryakov experiment: Soviet work on the education of blind-deaf children

Abstract By its very nature, the predicament of the blind-deaf child invites debate about the course of human development and its contributing forces. From the time they are born, blind-deaf children are seen as grievously lacking in even the most basic of human characteristics. How and on what basis should training and intervention be undertaken? Alexander Meshcheryakov, one of Lev Vygotskys successors within the Soviet tradition of sociohistorical psychology, embarked on an educational program for blind-deaf children which had at its core a theory of mind rooted in the concept of human activity. Meshcheryakovs theories and methods contrast with those in which the processing of sensory information is seen as the primary motor of the childs psychological development. After his death in 1974, Meshcheryakovs work was widely acclaimed by Soviet psychologists. However, it has recently been challenged within the Soviet Union, providing a window on academic and political debate in the era of glasnost.

Lessons from Ilyenkov

This paper examines the views of Russian philosopher Evald Ilyenkov (1924–1979) on the relation between culture and mind, and argues that his philosophy offers a distinctive rationale for interdisciplinary studies in communication. Ilyenkovs life and work are described, with particular attention to his analysis of Marxs “method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete”; and his account of the nature of “ideal”; (nonmaterial) phenomena. Ilyenkov exploits Marxs concept of “objectification”; to argue that, by transforming nature in activity, human beings write meaning and value into the very structure of their world, creating objectively existing “spiritual cultures.”; It is, he maintains, only through the appropriation of culture that the human child becomes a thinking being. The paper then explores five “lessons”; from Ilyenkovs philosophy relevant to the development of communication as an “interdiscipline”;: (1) on interdisciplinarity, (2) on the nature and role of philosophy, (3) on the relation o...

On the social constitution of mind: Bruner, Ilyenkov, and the defence of cultural psychology

The focus of this paper is “strong culturalist theories of mind”, i.e., those that argue that culture is constitutive of mind and thus that the nature and content of an individuals mental life cannot be understood independently of the culture of which that individual is a part. While such theories can be advanced on empirical grounds, it is tempting for the culturalist to seek some broad philosophical arguments that will show that the opposing positions (e.g., reductionism, eliminitivism) rest on fatal conceptual confusions. But how realistic is it to look to philosophy for a vindication of strong culturalism? The paper setsout Jerome Bruners recent defence of a strong culturalist position and, after exploring ambiguities and unclarities in Bruners view of the status of the mental, considers whether his position can be strengthened by appeal to the writings of Russian philosopher Evald Ilyenkov. It is argued that, although Ilyenkovs work nicely complements Bruners, it falls short of conclusively reso...

Learning from Others

John McDowell begins his essay ‘Knowledge by Hearsay’ (1993) by describing two ways language matters to epistemology. The first is that, by understanding and accepting someone elses utterance, a person can acquire knowledge. This is what philosophers call ‘knowledge by testimony’. The second is that children acquire knowledge in the course of learning their first language—in acquiring language, a child inherits a conception of the world. In The Formation of Reason (2011), and my writings on Russian socio-historical philosophy and psychology, I address issues bearing on the second of these topics, questions about the childs development through initiation into language and other forms of social being. In this article, I focus on the first: the epistemology of testimony. After expounding a view of testimony inspired by McDowell, and supplemented by ideas from Sebastian Rodl, I consider how such an account illuminates two issues in philosophy of education: the extent of an individuals epistemic dependence upon others, and the nature of teaching.

Freedom and Second Nature in The Formation of Reason

This article elaborates and defends a thesis prominent in my recent book, The Formation of Reason; namely, that a human being gets to be free in the distinctive way that human beings are free through the acquisition of second nature. My treatment of this thesis in The Formation of Reason is much influenced by the philosophy of John McDowell. McDowell himself, however, is notoriously reluctant to offer a theory of second nature. In this article, I explain his reasons for taking this stance and show how, for all that, his work contains much that illuminates the idea of second nature and its relation to freedom. I make this argument by focusing on a number of McDowells papers on Aristotle and Wittgenstein that I do not discuss in detail in my book. Finally, I consider the objection that although McDowell recognizes second nature as a property of individuals, he mistakenly rejects the idea of second nature in external form. I argue that his works do in fact contain resources to countenance second nature externalized, so long as we keep that idea insulated from the constructivist theories of normativity that McDowell rightly rejects. Understanding our thesis aright is, I maintain, a necessary condition of a compelling conception of the social dimensions of mind and of the end of education.

Training, Transformation and Education

In Mind and World , John McDowell concludes that human beings ‘are born mere animals’ and ‘are transformed into thinkers and intentional agents’, principally by their initiation into language. Such ‘transformational views’ of human development typically represent first-language learning as a movement from a non-rationally secured conformity with correct practice, through increasing understanding, to a state of rational mastery of correct practice. Accordingly, they tend to invoke something like Wittgensteins concept of training to explain the first stage of this process. This essay considers the cogency of this view of learning and development. I agree with Sebastian Rodl that the idea of training (as developed, say, by Meredith Williams) is inadequate to the nature of infancy and child-parent interaction, and I draw on the work of Lev Vygotsky and Michael Tomasello to offer McDowell a richer picture, which acknowledges the childs active role in fostering the second-personal relations that underlie the possibility of language learning. Such considerations force us to revise the transformational view, but do not refute it outright as Rodl believes. I conclude by considering the relevance of McDowells view of second nature to two striking ideas: Ian Hackings suggestion that the development of autistic children is ‘non-Vygotskian’ and Derek Parfits claim that persons are not human beings.

Particularism and moral education

Some opponents of ethical particularism complain that particularists cannot give a plausible account of moral education. After considering and rejecting a number of arguments to this conclusion, I focus on the following objection: Particularism, at least in Jonathan Dancys version, has nothing to say about moral education because it lacks a substantial account of moral competence. By Dancys own admission, particularists can tell us little more than that a competent agent ‘gets things right case by case’. I respond by reflecting on how we want our children to turn out, morally speaking. I argue that we can present a compelling story about our aspirations for our childrens moral development that is consistent with particularism and that provides the beginnings of a plausible account of the competence we look to moral education to instil.

Political emancipation and the domination of nature: The rise and fall of Soviet Prometheanism

Abstract Frolov, I. T. (1990) Man, Science, Humanism: A New Synthesis (Buffalo, NY, Prometheus Books), 342 pp. Graham, L. R. (Ed.) (1990) Science and the Soviet Social Order (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press), ix + 443 pp. Understanding the place of science in Soviet culture is essential if we are to understand the distinctive character of the Soviet Union, its failings and contradictions, and its prospects for the future. This paper examines Soviet conceptions of the role of science in the socialist project. Focusing on Loren Grahams collection Science and the Soviet Social Order, the article critically assesses the claim that science and technology have been liberalizing influences on Soviet political culture. The paper concludes by considering Ivan Frolovs, Man, Science, Humanism, which attempts to reform Soviet conceptions of science by establishing a Marxist ‘scientific humanism’. Although Frolov challenges the idea of science as a means to subordinate nature, his approach is belied by hi...

Activity, Action and Self-Consciousness.

Abstract This paper is a response to the author’s 2009 article “Reflections on Activity Theory”. It begins by briefly outlining the themes and aims of that article, and considering developments in the theory and practice of activity theory that have occurred since its publication. Thereafter, the paper embarks on a philosophical exploration of ideas central to the activity approach, including the concept of activity itself, in a way that aspires to bring the insights of its Russian originators into dialogue with recent developments in the philosophy of action. The paper argues that understanding how intentional human action is self-conscious action is essential to understanding the character of the human life form (or human life-activity) in its socio-historical reality. With both Marx and Ilyenkov in mind, the paper examines and refines Leontiev’s distinction between action and activity, arguing that some activities have ends that are infinite (that is, ends that are not exhausted by their realisation) and internal (that is, intelligible only to those immersed in the activity itself). Educating and philosophising, it is argued, are, in the ideal, such activities.