David Copp

Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism *

Moral realism and antirealist-expressivism are of course incompatible positions. They disagree fundamentally about the nature of moral states of mind, the existence of moral states of affairs and properties, and the nature and role of moral discourse. The central realist view is that a person who has or expresses a moral thought is thereby in, or thereby expresses, a cognitive state of mind; she has or expresses a belief that represents a moral state of affairs in a way that might be accurate or inaccurate. The view of antirealist-expressivism is that such a person is in, or expresses, a conative state of mind, one that consists in a certain kind of attitude or motivational stance toward something, such as an action or a person. Realism holds that moral thoughts have truth conditions and that in some cases these truth conditions are satisfied so that our moral thoughts are true. Antirealist-expressivism holds, to a first approximation, that the distinctive moral content of a moral thought does not have truth conditions.

Rational Choice and Moral Agency

Preface and AcknowledgmentsPt. IRational Choice1Ch. 1Why Be Rational?6Ch. 2Choosing Strategies28Ch. 3Choosing Ends58Ch. 4Comparing Ends80Ch. 5Reasons for Altruism98Pt. IIMoral Agency121Ch. 6Because Its Right126Ch. 7Social Structure and Moral Constraint155Ch. 8Moral Dualism186Ch. 9Objections and Replies213Pt. IIIReconciliation241Ch. 10Why Be Moral?243References265Index273

Morality and virtue: An assessment of some recent work in virtue ethics

These are boom years for the study of the virtues. Several new books have recently appeared that bring to the literature new ways of understanding virtue and new ways of developing virtue theoretical approaches to morality. This new work presents a richly interesting cluster of views, some of which take virtue to be the central or basic normative ethical notion, but some of which merely amend familiar consequentialist or deontological approaches by incorporating into them an articulated conception of the moral significance of virtue. We will focus on the more distinctive and ambitious recent theories of the former kind, theories that purport to exhibit virtue as the central or basic moral notion. This essay therefore focuses on Michael Slote’s Morals from Motives, Rosalind Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics, and, to a lesser extent, Philippa Foot’s Natural Goodness.

The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and The Unity of Reason

Does morality override self-interest? Or does self-interest override morality? These questions become important in situations where there is conflict between the overall verdicts of morality and self-interest, situations where morality on balance requires an action that is contrary to our self-interest, or where considerations of self-interest on balance call for an action that is forbidden by morality. In situations of this kind, we want to know what we ought simpliciter to do. If one of these standpoints over-rides the other, then there is a straightforward answer. We ought simpliciter to act on the verdict of the overriding standpoint. For purposes of this essay, I assume that there are possible cases in which the overall verdicts of morality and self-interest conflict. I will call cases of this kind “conflict cases.” The verdict of morality in a conflict case would be a proposition as to what we ought morally to do, or as to what we have the most moral reason to do; the verdict of self-interest would be a proposition as to what we ought to do in our self-interest, or as to what action is best supported by reasons or considerations of self-interest. These propositions are action-guiding or normative in a familiar sense. The conflict between morality and self-interest in conflict cases is there-fore a normative conflict; it is a conflict between the overall verdicts of different normative standpoints. I take it that the question of whether morality overrides self-interest is the question of whether the verdicts of morality are normatively more important than the verdicts of self-interest. In due course, I will explain the idea of normative importance as well as the ideas of a normative proposition and of a reason.

What Collectives Are: Agency, Individualism and Legal Theory

An account of the ontological nature of collectives would be useful for several reasons. A successful theory would help to show us a route through the thicket of views known as “methodological individualism”. It would have a bearing on the plausibility of legal positivism. It would be relevant to the question whether collectives are capable of acting. The debate about the ontology of collectives is therefore important for such fields as the theory of action, social and political philosophy, the philosophy of law and the philosophy of social science. I hope to contribute to the debate by proposing an account of collectives, and by showing its theoretical soundness and utility. In its essentials, my proposal is that collectives are “mereological sums” of “stages” of persons linked by a “unity relation”. The influence on this account of some theories of personal identity will perhaps be obvious. But the motivation is different, for it lies at least as much in the ability of the theory to help us deal with the issues already mentioned as in problems concerning the identity of collectives over time. I acknowledge that my proposal is not commonsensical; however, I believe that no account could be both commonsensical and adequate. I will begin by introducing some constraints on a theory of collectives.

Social Unity and the Identity of Persons

A PERSON’S citizenship, gender, and ethnicity can be part of her ‘‘identity,’’ as can her language, her religion, life projects, ethical commitments, and the like. This idea of ‘‘identity’’ is important both to moral and to political philosophy, but it has not been given an adequate philosophical explication. Indeed, it might be that there is not a single idea of ‘‘identity,’’ but that instead there is a family of ideas that have not been well distinguished from one another. My goal in this paper is to explicate an idea of ‘‘identity’’ and to illustrate its usefulness in political philosophy. I believe the idea I will introduce is important to a proper understanding of the bases of social unity, both the unity that is forged by shared commitments and friendships, and the political unity of multinational and multicultural states. The metaphysics of ‘‘personal identity’’ is not at issue in this context. It is a familiar fact that people continue to exist as time passes, despite the many physical and psychological changes that they undergo. The metaphysical problem of personal identity is to explain what is necessarily involved in the continued existence of a person over time. A proposed solution to this problem is a proposal about the nature of the metaphysical glue that joins the various stages in a person’s life into a single life.1 But whatever view we take about the nature of this metaphysical glue, there is the quite different issue in moral psychology that is my topic here. The idea is that some facts about a person are central to her personality, her character, or her view of herself, such that understanding what these facts are is crucial in some important way to understanding her. I will propose an account of this idea of identity in terms of self-esteem. I do not claim that my account is a fully accurate analysis of a clear pre-theoretical concept, but I do claim that it captures important central features of our thinking about the issues in moral psychology that I will be addressing. In addition, I claim that the account is theoretically useful in a wide variety of contexts. In this paper I will focus on issues in political theory. I will suggest that the concept of identity as I explicate it—self-esteem identity—can help to explain the phenomena of nationalism and patriotism and the difficult problem of social unity faced by multinational states.2

The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living: Justice, Autonomy, and the Basic Needs

Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.” I shall refer to the right postulated here as “the right to an adequate standard of living” or “The Right.”

International Law and Morality in the Theory of Secession

In order responsibly to decide whether there ought to be an international legal right of secession, I believe we need an account of the morality of secession. I propose that ’’territorial‘‘ and ’’political‘‘ societies have a moral right to secede, and on that basis I propose a regime designed to give such groups an international legal right to secede. This regime would create a procedure that could be followed by groups desiring to secede or by states desiring to resolve the issue of secession. It would give territorial political societies a legally recognized liberty to conduct a plebiscite on secession, and, assuming such a plebiscite is won by the secessionist side, a qualified right in international law to create a state without interference. Alan Buchanan has argued that proposals of this sort would create “perverse incentives.” I argue that there is no good reason to believe this. The point is to allow the legal regulation of secession in cases where there are active secessionist movements with legitimate moral claims, and to attempt to dampen the desire for secession in cases where secessionist sentiment is not well grounded in social and geographic reality.

Morality, Reason, and Management Science: The Rationale of Cost-Benefit Analysis

The Problem Economic efficiency is naturally thought to be a virtue of social policies and decisions, and cost-benefit (CB) analysis is commonly regarded as a technique for measuring economic efficiency. It is not surprising, then, that CB analysis is so widely used in social policy analysis. However, there is a great deal of controversy about CB analysis, including controversy about its underlying philosophical rationale. The rationales that have been proposed fall into three basic, though not mutually exclusive categories. There are moralist views to the effect that an acceptable CB analysis would provide, or contribute to, an ethical appraisal of proposed policies or projects. There are rationalist views to the effect that an acceptable CB analysis would contribute to the selection of social policies and projects that are “socially rational.” Finally, there are so-called management science views to the effect that the purpose of CB analysis is to promote the achievement of objectives held by the policy maker, whatever they may be. Different positions are available within each of these categories. But there is also the possibility that CB analysis lacks any viable rationale. I will examine some of the major rationales for CB analysis in this paper, and I will suggest that the last view is close to the truth.

Reasonable Acceptability and Democratic Legitimacy: Estlund’s Qualified Acceptability Requirement*

In his recent book, David Estlund argues that democratic states can be legitimate while epistocracy cannot be legitimate. His argument rests on his “Qualified Acceptability Requirement,” according to which a state is legitimate only if its coercive enforcement of law can be justified on a basis that is acceptable to all possible qualified points of view. This principle may seem to express a Rawlsian liberal ideal, but I claim it is undermined by Rawlsian arguments. I argue that Estlund’s position faces a dilemma. I discuss objections grounded in the notions of truth, consent, and reasonableness. I conclude that Estlund’s Requirement is untenable.