David D. Loschelder

“€14,875?!”: Precision Boosts the Anchoring Potency of First Offers

In negotiations, higher first offers from sellers drive up sale prices—reversely, buyers benefit from lower first offers. Whereas abundant research has replicated this robust anchoring effect of opening offers, little is known about the impact of anchors’ precision or the interplay of extremity and precision. We propose that precision moderates the effect of anchor extremity, in that precise anchors gain in plausibility and thereby magnify the first-mover advantage. Two experiments tested this assumption. Study 1 shows that increasing precision strengthens the anchoring potency of first offers—sellers assimilate more to strong and precise anchors, which ultimately results in a particularly pronounced first-mover advantage. Study 2 replicates this moderating effect for buyers and indicates that an increased plausibility of precise anchors accounts for the findings. Implications for anchor theorizing, negotiation research, and the first minutes at a bargaining table are discussed.

The first-mover disadvantage: the folly of revealing compatible preferences.

The current research establishes a first-mover disadvantage in negotiation. We propose that making the first offer in a negotiation will backfire when the sender reveals private information that an astute recipient can leverage to his or her advantage. In two experiments, we manipulated whether the first offer was purely distributive or revealed that the sender’s preferences were compatible with the recipient’s preferences (i.e., the negotiators wanted the same outcome on an issue). When first offers contained only distributive issues, the classic first-mover advantage occurred, and first offers predicted final prices. However, a first-mover disadvantage emerged when senders opened with offers that revealed compatible preferences. These effects were moderated by negotiators’ social value orientation: Proself negotiators were more likely to take advantage of compatible information than were prosocial negotiators. Overall, the key factor that determined whether the first-mover advantage or disadvantage emerged was whether the offer revealed compatible preferences. These results demonstrate that first offers not only provide numerical value but also convey qualitative information.

Does self-control training improve self-control? A meta-analysis

Self-control is positively associated with a host of beneficial outcomes. Therefore, psychological interventions that reliably improve self-control are of great societal value. A prominent idea suggests that training self-control by repeatedly overriding dominant responses should lead to broad improvements in self-control over time. Here, we conducted a random-effects meta-analysis based on robust variance estimation of the published and unpublished literature on self-control training effects. Results based on 33 studies and 158 effect sizes revealed a small-to-medium effect of g = 0.30, confidence interval (CI95) [0.17, 0.42]. Moderator analyses found that training effects tended to be larger for (a) self-control stamina rather than strength, (b) studies with inactive compared to active control groups, (c) males than females, and (d) when proponents of the strength model of self-control were (co)authors of a study. Bias-correction techniques suggested the presence of small-study effects and/or publication bias and arrived at smaller effect size estimates (range: gcorrected = .13 to .24). The mechanisms underlying the effect are poorly understood. There is not enough evidence to conclude that the repeated control of dominant responses is the critical element driving training effects.

When yielding pieces of the pie is not a piece of cake: Identity-based intergroup effects in negotiations

The present research intends to shed light on an identity-based intergroup effect in negotiations by demonstrating that the mere perception of the negotiation as an instance of intergroup interaction suffices to impair the negotiation process and to deteriorate its outcomes. It was predicted that negotiators’ salient group identities increase their competitive perceptions, reduce their concession behavior, and consequently lead to inferior negotiation outcomes. Study 1 revealed that solo negotiators with salient group identities achieved lower joint outcomes than negotiators with salient individual identities. Study 2 systematically explored the underlying mechanisms of this identity-based intergroup effect by analyzing negotiators’ concession-making behaviors over the course of the negotiation. The results of the second experiment replicate the findings of the first study and further show that the detrimental effect of an identity-based intergroup context will occur in distributive as well as integrative negotiations. The findings of the present research are discussed with respect to their contribution to future research on intergroup negotiation.

Overcoming the competitiveness of an intergroup context: Third-party intervention in intergroup negotiations

The present research addresses the specific impairments of an intergroup negotiation context with respect to intergroup competitiveness and partial impasses. We examined whether mediation-arbitration (med-arb), a hybrid form of third-party intervention, is conducive to overcoming the detrimental effect of an intergroup negotiation context. Study 1 demonstrated the detrimental effect of an intergroup negotiation context and showed that mediation-arbitration is an effective means to overcome this detrimental effect in a distributive negotiation task. The findings of Study 1 further suggest that the beneficial effect of med-arb on negotiation outcomes can be explained in terms of an alleviation of intergroup competitiveness. Study 2 replicated the beneficial effect of mediation-arbitration in an integrative intergroup negotiation and, by means of comparing mediation-arbitration to straight mediation, corroborated the notion that the anticipated arbitration in med-arb is a necessary precondition to alleviate the competitiveness throughout the mediated negotiation process. Study 2 further revealed that the beneficial effect of med-arb on intergroup competitiveness can be explained in terms of the perceived decision control that disputants ascribed to the third party. The findings of the present research are discussed with respect to their contribution to future research on intergroup negotiation and third-party intervention.

Procedural frames in negotiations: how offering my resources versus requesting yours impacts perception, behavior, and outcomes.

Although abundant negotiation research has examined outcome frames, little is known about the procedural framing of negotiation proposals (i.e., offering my vs. requesting your resources). In a series of 8 experiments, we tested the prediction that negotiators would show a stronger concession aversion and attain better individual outcomes when their own resource, rather than the counterparts, is the accentuated reference resource in a transaction. First, senders of proposals revealed a stronger concession aversion when they offered their own rather than requested the counterparts resources-both in buyer-seller (Experiment 1a) and in classic transaction negotiations (Experiment 2a). Expectedly, this effect reversed for recipients: When receiving requests rather than offers, recipients experienced a stronger concession aversion in buyer-seller (Experiment 1b) and transaction negotiations (Experiment 2b). Experiments 3-5 investigated procedural frames in the interactive process of negotiations-with elementary schoolchildren (Experiment 3), in a buyer-seller context (Experiments 4a and 4b), and in a computer-mediated transaction negotiation void of buyer and seller roles (Experiment 5). In summary, 8 experiments showed that negotiators are more concession averse and claim more individual value when negotiation proposals are framed to highlight their own rather than the counterparts resources.

How self-regulation helps to master negotiation challenges: An overview, integration, and outlook

En route to crafting profitable deals, negotiators face abundant challenges—from overcoming anger, to dealing with low power, to seeking hidden integrative opportunities. Here, we argue that self-regulation can help to master these negotiation challenges and improve negotiation outcomes. To this end, we provide a review of the literature on negotiation challenges and integrate it with self-regulation research. Based on the cybernetic feedback model of self-regulation and the phase model of negotiations, we structure the literature and argue how and why prominent self-regulation techniques such as specifying goals, mental contrasting, and if–then plans help to master negotiation challenges. In addition, we expand on the less researched self-regulation technique of self-monitoring and how it may help to achieve negotiation goals. We conclude that self-regulation provides a powerful toolbox to master the challenges that negotiators face at the bargaining table, identify limitations of the extant literature, and suggest avenues for future research.

Is Ego Depletion Real?: An Analysis of Arguments

An influential line of research suggests that initial bouts of self-control increase the susceptibility to self-control failure (ego depletion effect). Despite seemingly abundant evidence, some researchers have suggested that evidence for ego depletion was the sole result of publication bias and p-hacking, with the true effect being indistinguishable from zero. Here, we examine (a) whether the evidence brought forward against ego depletion will convince a proponent that ego depletion does not exist and (b) whether arguments that could be brought forward in defense of ego depletion will convince a skeptic that ego depletion does exist. We conclude that despite several hundred published studies, the available evidence is inconclusive. Both additional empirical and theoretical works are needed to make a compelling case for either side of the debate. We discuss necessary steps for future work toward this aim.

Using self-regulation to successfully overcome the negotiation disadvantage of low power

A plethora of studies has demonstrated that low-power negotiators attain lower outcomes compared to high-power negotiators. We argue that this low-power disadvantage can be conceptualized as impaired goal attainment and that self-regulation can help to overcome it. Three experiments tested this assertion. In Study 1, low-power negotiators attained lower profits compared to their high-power opponents in a face-to-face negotiation. Negotiators who set themselves goals and those who additionally formed if-then plans prior to the negotiation overcame the low-power disadvantage. Studies 2 and 3 replicated these effects in computer-mediated negotiations: Low-power negotiators conceded more than high-power negotiators. Again, setting goals and forming additional if-then plans helped to counter the power disadvantage. Process analyses revealed that negotiators’ concession-making at the start of the negotiation mediated both the low-power disadvantage and the beneficial effects of self-regulation. The present findings show how the low-power disadvantage unfolds in negotiations and how self-regulatory techniques can help to overcome it.

Precious Property or Magnificent Money? How Money Salience but Not Temperature Priming Affects First-Offer Anchors in Economic Transactions

The present study aims for a better understanding of how individuals’ behavior in monetary price negotiations differs from their behavior in bartering situations. Two contrasting hypotheses were derived from endowment theory and current negotiation research to examine whether negotiators are more susceptible to anchoring in price negotiations versus in bartering transactions. In addition, past research found that cues of coldness enhance cognitive control and reduce anchoring effects. We attempted to replicate these coldness findings for price anchors in a distributive negotiations scenario and to illuminate the potential interplay of coldness priming with a price versus bartering manipulation. Participants (N = 219) were recruited for a 2 × 2 between-subjects negotiation experiment manipulating (1) monetary focus and (2) temperature priming. Our data show a higher anchoring susceptibility in price negotiations than in bartering transactions. Despite a successful priming manipulation check, coldness priming did not affect participants’ anchoring susceptibility (nor interact with the price/bartering manipulation). Our findings improve our theoretical understanding of how the focus on negotiation resources frames economic transactions as either unidirectional or bidirectional, and how this focus shapes parties’ susceptibility to the anchoring bias and negotiation behavior. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.