David E. Leary

Telling likely stories: the rhetoric of the New Psychology, 1880-1920.

This is a story about the New Psychologists who strove at the turn of the century to institutionalize a new science and to create a new set of professional roles. More particularly, it is about the rhetorical fabric they wove around the nascent science of psychology. The article focuses, one by one, on different strands of this fabric – on (1) what persuaded the first generation of American psychologists to take an interest in the New Psychology; (2) the arguments these aspiring psychologists presented to presidents and trustees to insure that they could pursue their interest within particular institutional settings; (3) the arguments they put forth against the rights of other persons to engage in similar, competing pursuits; (4) the arguments they laid before various administrators, officials, interest groups, and the general public to guarantee continued and even increased support; and (5) the arguments they presented in the form of theories and practices developed between approximately 1880 and 1920. In this way, it attempts to construct a likely story about the establishment of the New Psychology in America.1

The philosophical development of the conception of psychology in Germany, 1780–1850

Although it is generally acknowledged that the modern science of psychology was produced in the mid-nineteenth century by the cross-fertilization of philosophy and physiology, few historians have tried to specify the exact role of philosophers in the evolution of modern psychology. The purpose of this article is to identify one important line of development from within early-nineteenth-century German philosophy toward the conception of psychology as an independent, experimental, and mathematical science. The thesis it proposes is that Immanuel Kants criticism of the psychological tradition and his articulation of a specific philosophy of science provided the negative and positive foundations upon which Jakob Friedrich Fries, Johann Friedrich Herbart, and Friedrich Eduard Beneke developed the conceptualization of scientific psychology.

The historical foundation of Herbart's mathematization of psychology.

Herbarts mathematization of psychology is an important landmark in the history of psychology. The purpose of this article is to describe the general landscape within which this landmark was created and the specific foundation upon which it was erected. Besides Kants classic statements on the nature of science, the “external” landscape included other landmarks in the historical quest for a mathematical science of man, while the “internal” foundation was composed of four basic concepts which Herbart received primarily from Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant. Herbarts unique contribution was his novel use of this foundation in creating a mathematical psychology.

Wundt and after: psychology's shifting relations with the natural sciences, social sciences, and philosophy.

Over the past one hundred years psychology has evolved into a major scientific discipline. Nonetheless, psychology is presently in a state of considerable turmoil regarding its proper subject matter and methods. Is psychology a natural science, a social science, or a hybrid of the two?What relation should psychology maintain with philosophy? These general questions, currently under debate, were addressed by Wilhelm Wundt, one of the founders of modern experimental psychology. This article is an attempt to specify Wundts conceptualization of psychology and to place it in its historical context. Secondarily it also traces certain major developments since the time of Wundt. The conclusion that is reached is that the apparent contemporary “crisis” in psychology is really nothing new and that, in fact, the present condition of psychology does not necessarily constitute a crisis. In its broad outline at least, present-day psychology reflects the program which Wundt espoused one hundred years ago.

German Idealism and the Development of Psychology in the Nineteenth Century

THE BIRTH OF MODERN SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY is generally placed in Germany around 1850. This birth is credited by the standard historiography to the dual parentage of the empirical school of philosophy and the experimental study of sensory physiology. There is also a tradition of giving a nod toward Kant and Herbart as predecessors, for varying reasons, of the rise of scientific psychology. ~ Almost completely overlooked in the literature is the influence of post-Kantian German idealism upon the development of the concepts, subject matter, and methods of psychology. This is somewhat surprising since idealism was the dominant philosophical movement in Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century. The purpose of this article will be to present a general survey of the relationship between German idealism and the development of psychology in the nineteenth century. The article will be divided into three sections: (1) the idealistic conception of the science of psychology; (2) a survey of idealistic psychology; and (3) the contributions of idealistic psychology.

The Intentions and Heritage of Descartes and Locke: Toward a Recognition of the Moral Basis of Modern Psychology

Summary Given the recent discussions about the proper stance of the American Psychological Association vis-a-vis a wide range of moral issues, it might be useful to reflect upon the historical foundations of contemporary psychology. This article reviews this history from the seventeenth century to the present, placing special emphasis upon the role that moral concerns played in the development of all the modern sciences of man, including psychology. It presents evidence in support of the thesis that the intentions or concerns of Descartes and Locke were largely moral and that similar intentions underlay the work of virtually all of the subsequent proponents of “the science of Man” up to the turn of the twentieth century. It then discusses the twentieth-century conflict between this heritage of moral concern and the ideal of a “value-free,” logically “justified,” and “pure” science of psychology. While acknowledging the lively debate surrounding this conflict, it argues that the conflict itself is more app...

William James, the psychologist's dilemma and the historiography of psychology: cautionary tales

William James, one of the major founders of modern scientific psychology, spoke often about ’the psychologist’s fallacy’ (e.g. James, 1983a [1884]:161-7; James, 1983b [1890] : 195-6). This fallacy resulted (and still results) from the tendency of psychologists to confuse their analyses of subjective experience with the nature of reality. A related, though less attended, problem revolved for James (and still revolves) around what I shall call ’the psychologist’s dilemma’. Although other psychologists have been sensitive to this dilemma, both in James’s time and more recently, perhaps no other thinker has felt and pondered it

One hundred years of experimental psychology: An American perspective

SummaryAt the 1979 annual meeting of the American Psychological Association a special series of twenty-two symposia and lectures was devoted to the theme of ‘A Century of Psychology as Science: Retrospections and Assessments.’ The speakers in this series, including many major psychologists, were charged with giving historical overviews and critical evaluations of various aspects of the first century of experimental psychology. This article, written by one of the organizers of this centennial program, presents an analysis of and commentary on the views expressed by these speakers.

Instead of Erklären and Verstehen: William James on Human Understanding

Perhaps more than any other American psychologist and philosopher, William James (1842-1910) was intimately familiar with contemporary European thought and debate, including the discussion of Erklaren and Verstehen advanced by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) and others around the turn of the twentieth century. Even before this discussion was initiated, James had been dealing with related issues, pondering alternative solutions, and formulating his own original views on human understanding. These views coalesced in a distinctive approach to cognition. Fundamental to this approach was a belief in possibility and probability as innate features of the physical as well as mental manifestations of the universe. Also fundamental was a conviction that understanding is understanding, regardless of its viewpoint, object, or label as either “descriptive” or “explanatory.”

G. Stanley Hall, a man of many words: The role of reading, speaking, and writing in his psychological work.

The place of G. Stanley Hall within the history of psychology is both assured and problematic. While he is credited with significant contributions, those contributions are predominantly institutional rather than intellectual or scientific in nature. Further compounding the issue is the fact that those who focus on the development of psychology qua science have emphasized psychologys increasing reliance on empirical observations, its use of quantitative measures, and its subordination of language to objective referents. This has obscured the significance of Halls work, including his massive, two-volume Adolescence (1904), which is typically criticized for falling short in these regards. A more accurate appreciation can be gained through understanding his intentions and the practices of reading, speaking, and writing that were associated with them.