David Estes

Security of infant-mother, -father, and -metapelet attachments among kibbutz-reared Israeli children.

Although the Strange Situation procedure was developed two decades ago, it was until recently used exclusively in the United States. Only in the late 1970s did researchers begin using the procedure in other countries, notably, Sweden (Lamb, Hwang, Frodi, & Frodi, 1982), West Germany (Grossmann et al., 1981; Grossmann et al., in this vol.), andJapan (Miyake et al., in this vol.). What follows is a report of our attempt to use the Strange Situation procedure to explore the effects of kibbutz rearing practices on

Individual differences in children's developing theory of mind and implications for metacognition

Abstract For readers interested in metacognition broadly, this review article introduces some of the recent research and theory concerning childrens developing understanding of mental states, focusing particularly on attempts to understand individual differences in development. We contend that the conceptual developments investigated by “theory of mind” researchers constitute a foundation for later metacognition. We examine studies that have focused on individual differences in childrens developing understanding of mental states, particularly those investigating its antecedents in early social interactions. Implications from theory-of-mind research for an understanding of metacognition are articulated.

The effect of contact with natural environments on positive and negative affect: A meta-analysis

A growing body of empirical research suggests that brief contact with natural environments improves emotional well-being. The current study synthesizes this body of research using meta-analytic techniques and assesses the mean effect size of exposure to natural environments on both positive and negative affect. Thirty-two studies with a total of 2356 participants were included. Across these studies, exposure to natural environments was associated with a moderate increase in positive affect and a smaller, yet consistent, decrease in negative affect relative to comparison conditions. Significant heterogeneity was found for the effect of nature on positive affect, and type of emotion assessment, type of exposure to nature, location of study, and mean age of sample were found to moderate this effect. The implications of these findings for existing theory and research are discussed, with particular emphasis placed on potential avenues for fruitful future research examining the effects of nature on well-being.

Harmonizing Discordant Notes: A Reply to Waters.

THoMPSON, Ross A.; LAMB, MICHAEL E.; and EsTEs, DAvm. Harmonizing Discordant Notes: A Reply to Waters. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1983, 54, 521-524. The major concerns raised in Waterss commentary on our earlier report on attachment stability are discussed and shown to be incorrect. First, studies showing high stability in attachment classifications have employed a range of sampling and scoring procedures that may help explain why they obtained high stability estimates. Thus, attachment stability in the secondyear is not a well-replicated finding. Second, changes in attachment status were systematically related to changing family circumstances that directly affect mother-infant interaction, such as maternal employment and nonmaternal care. Bidirectional changes in attachment status are reasonable considering the range of possible reactions to these events in middle-class families. Events occurring prior to the first assessment may also have affected stability by introducing short-term, transient changes in the security of attachment. Third, measurement error is unlikely to be a problem with our study, since there is good reason for confidence in the accuracy of our scoring procedure. In sum, our findings affirm the importance of viewing mother-infant attachment as a dynamic relationship, responsive to family conditions, and these findings are consistent with those of other researchers.

Young children's talk about learning events

Abstract In order to understand children’s conception of knowledge acquisition better, everyday uses of the terms “learn” and “teach” were examined. Longitudinal data obtained from CHILDES (MacWhinney & Snow, 1990) included 329 target term uses and related references by children (N=5, aged 2;4–7;3) and 431 by adults talking with them. Each reference was coded for mention of what was learned, when, how, and where learning occurred, who learned, and who taught/told, among other topics. Children and adults referred most frequently to what was learned and who learned/taught, and less frequently to when, how, and where learning occurred, a pattern that did not change as children aged. Consistent with earlier experimental reports, children talked mostly about their own learning, rarely mentioning sources of knowledge besides other people (e.g., teachers). Behavior learning was mentioned more than fact learning. Implications for characterizations of children’s developing conceptions of knowledge acquisition, for past and future experimental research, and for education were discussed.

American and British college students' epistemological beliefs about research on psychological and biological development

Epistemological beliefs about the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge are often assumed to be similar across different domains of knowledge. This assumption was tested by comparing beliefs about scientific research on psychological and biological development. Undergraduates from the United States and the United Kingdom responded to a set of epistemologically relevant statements about each field and then compared the two fields directly in terms of their confidence in the conclusions and advice of experts. On all measures, more negative beliefs were expressed about research on psychological development. Although U.S. students were more skeptical about both fields, U.S. and U.K. students displayed similar response patterns. To justify their skepticism toward scientific research as a valid source of knowledge about psychological development, students in both countries gave similar reasons (e.g., the difficulty in accurately measuring psychological variables). These results demonstrate that epistemological beliefs can differ substantially between two closely related fields. They also highlight issues that must be addressed to make education about the validity of research in developmental psychology more effective.

Young children's understanding of the mind: Imagery, introspection, and some implications

Abstract This article summarizes a program of research demonstrating that early in the pre-school years children already have both a basic understanding of the ontological distinction between the mind and the external world and some capacity for introspection. Three-year-olds understand that mental phenomena such as visual images are subjective and immaterial. They can also engage in a rudimentary form of introspection, as shown by their ability to reflect on and discuss mental images. By 5 years of age, some children not only spontaneously use mental rotation on a mental-rotation task, but they also are conscious of this mental process. These findings sharply contrast with traditional accounts of development, in which such accomplishments were believed to occur only much later. This research supports both a more positive view of young childrens understanding of the mind and a greater emphasis on metacognition in early childhood education.

Evidence for early dualism and a more direct path to afterlife beliefs

Ample evidence for dualism in early childhood already exists. Young children have explicit knowledge of the distinction between mental and physical phenomena, which provides the foundation for a rapidly developing theory of mind. Belief in psychological immortality might then follow naturally from this mentalistic conception of human existence and thus require no organized cognitive system dedicated to producing it.

Why we assume it's all good: the role of theory of mind in early inherent feature inferences.

Cimpian & Salomons (C&Ss) characterization of a domain-general inherence heuristic, available to young children, underplays the importance of our early interest in and recognition of agency, intentionality, and mental life. A consideration of the centrality of desires, goals, and agency in our earliest reasoning suggests an alternative, perhaps complementary, account of our tendency to be satisfied with the status quo.

Constraining the brain: The role of developmental psychology in developmental cognitive neuroscience

Developmental psychology should play an essential constraining role in developmental cognitive neuroscience. Theories of neural development must account explicitly for the early emergence of knowledge and abilities in infants and young children documented in developmental research. Especially in need of explanation at the neural level is the early emergence of meta-representation.