David French

Spy Fever in Britain, 1900–1915 *

Historians have spilt much ink in explaining the diplomatic machinations which led to war in 1914, but rather less ink in accounting for the bitterness which the war aroused. The answer to that question probably lies outside the realm of diplomatic documents. For Britain at least, a tiny part of the answer can be found in a myth which became increasingly virulent in the decade or so before the war: the myth of the evil and ubiquitous German spy.

Doctrine and Organization in the British Army, 1919-1932

It is widely assumed that after 1918 the British general staff ignored the experience it had gained from fighting a first-class European enemy and that it was not until the establishment of the Kirke committee in 1932 that it began to garner the lessons of the Great War and incorporate them into its doctrine. This article demonstrates that in fact British military doctrine underwent a continuous process of development in the 1920s. Far from turning its back on new military technologies, the general staff rejected the manpower-intensive doctrine that had sustained the army in 1914 in favour of one that placed modernity and machinery at the very core of its thinking. Between 1919 and 1931 the general staff did assimilate the lessons of the First World War into the armys written doctrine. But what it failed to do was to impose a common understanding of the meaning of that doctrine throughout the army.

Toads and Informers: How the British Treated their Collaborators during the Cyprus Emergency, 1955–9

ABSTRACT During the Cyprus Emergency the British administration made considerable use of both Cypriot and Turkish collaborators as policemen and civil servants. Most were able to sink back into the safety of their own ethnic community after the Emergency, but some had become pariahs and had to look to the departing British for succour. They were the small group of Greek Cypriots who actively collaborated with the British against EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), and the even smaller group of Turkish Cypriots who worked with them against the Turkish underground organisation, TMT. This article uses newly released archival materials to explore the history of these collaborators, asking questions about their recruitment, their actions, and the risks and dangers they faced. Evidence emerges as to how the British rewarded and subsequently treated these collaborators, how those who applied for asylum fared, and what happened to them once they arrived in Britain.