David H. Bearce

Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments

This paper argues that foreign aid can promote economic growth in recipient countries by facilitating economic reform, but only when the strategic benefits associated with providing aid are small for donor governments. When the strategic benefits are large, foreign aid becomes ineffective because Western governments cannot credibly enforce their conditions for economic reform. This paper presents evidence consistent with both the cause and effect of this argument. Based on the understanding that Western aid was driven more (less) by strategic factors during the Cold War era (post-Cold War era), it shows that aid has been positively associated with economic reform, but only after 1990 when Western governments could more credibly threaten to curtail their aid if such reform was not forthcoming. It also shows that aid has promoted economic growth, but only after 1990 when the strategic benefits associated with aid provision declined for most Western donors.

Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy Outcomes

If different producer groups have divergent interests concerning macroeconomic policies, how do societal preferences translate into state policy outcomes? I develop and test a party-as-agent framework for understanding the importance of societal preferences with regard to monetary policy under capital mobility. Following the principal-agent model, political parties function as agents for different societal principals. Rightist parties tend to represent internationally oriented business groups with preferences for monetary convergence, while leftist parties do the same for domestically oriented groups preferring monetary autonomy under capital mobility. I present statistical evidence showing that OECD leftist governments have been associated with more monetary autonomy and currency variability than their rightist counterparts, even after controlling for basic economic indicators such as inflation. The statistical evidence also shows that societal group size tends not to explain either autonomous monetary policy choices or exchangerate stability. Thus even large and wealthy societal groups may be unable to obtain their preferred policy outcome when their respective partisan agents do not hold government power.

How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace

The commercial institutional peace research program has provided empirical evidence that such regional institutions help reduce the incidence of militarized interstate conflict. But it remains unclear how regional commercial institutions produce their observed pacific effect. This article examines three different causal arguments to explain the commercial institutional peace. First, commercial institutions simply increase the economic opportunity costs of war for the state. Second, some commercial institutions provide information to member-states about the military capabilities of other institutional participants, which may make their bargaining for peace more efficient. Third, many commercial institutions bring high-level state leaders together on a regular basis, building trust to overcome certain commitment problems in international bargaining. The statistical results show empirical support for only the third explanation. Commercial institutions with more organs for high-level state leaders demonstrate a substantively strong and statistically significant effect in reducing the outbreak of military conflict. But commercial institutions with deeper economic integration and nested military–security structures are not associated with less military conflict. Together, these results suggest that the observed commercial institutional peace does not stem from economic integration per se, but rather from certain institutional structures that often accompany the regional integration process. Thus, the commercial institutional peace appears more related to the third leg of the Kantian tripod (international organizations) than to the second leg (international commerce).

End-Times Theology, the Shadow of the Future, and Public Resistance to Addressing Global Climate Change

The authors examine U.S. public attitudes regarding global climate change, addressing the puzzle of why support for governmental action on this front is tepid relative to what existing theories predict. Introducing the theoretical concept of relative sociotropic time horizons, the authors show that believers in Christian end-times theology are less likely to support policies designed to curb global warming than are other Americans. They then provide robustness checks by analyzing other policy attitudes. In so doing, the authors provide empirical evidence to suggest that citizens possessing shorter “shadows of the future” often resist policies trading short-term costs for hypothetical long-term benefits.

Economic Geography, Trade, and War

An agent-based model in which economic exchange and military conflict are emergent processes is used to explore the relationship between trade and war. The model of exchange is an applied analysis of the economics of trading networks. The model of conflict treats war as a breakdown in interstate bargaining due to incomplete information. The simulations explore how initial economic geography, state revisionism, defensive advantage, and technological advancement akin to globalization affect both trade and war. The results show that the relationship between trade and war depends on third factors, and an inverse relationship between trade and war emerges from compact geographies with revisionist states.

Democracy and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes

This paper explores the relationship between a countrys political regime type and its de facto exchange rate fixity. It argues that more democratic regimes should be associated with less de facto fixity because the median voter is likely to be a domestically oriented producer with a monetary preference for domestic policy autonomy, requiring more a more flexible exchange rate regime. Focusing on a broad sample of country–years in the post‐Bretton Woods era defined by international capital mobility, the statistical results show that not only are more democratic regimes negatively associated with de facto fixity using three different operational measures for this dependent variable, but that this negative relationship gets stronger as the median voter is more likely to be a domestically oriented producer and as societal groups are more able to influence public policy.

Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict Among Member-States

We offer a theory explaining how alliances as international security regimes reduce military conflict between member-states through their internal provision of information concerning national military capabilities. Bargaining models of war have shown that a lack of information about relative military capabilities functions as an important cause of war. We argue that alliances provide such information to internal participants, and greater knowledge within the alliance about member-state military capabilities reduces certain informational problems that could potentially lead to war. This internal information effect, however, is a conditional one. We posit that the information provided within the alliance matters most for dyads at or near power parity: the cases where states are most uncertain about who would prevail if a military conflict did emerge. In power preponderant dyads where the outcome of a potential military conflict is relatively certain, the internal information provided by military alliances becomes less important. Our statistical results provide strong support for these theoretical arguments.Our greatest thanks go to Ashley Leeds, who made available an advance copy of the ATOP 3.0 data set. This article also benefited from presentations at the University of Wisconsin and at ISA-South in Columbia, S.C. Finally, we thank Lisa Martin, two anonymous reviewers, Scott Gehlbach, Chuck Gochman, Zaryab Iqbal, George Krause, Pat McDonald, Jon Pevehouse, Bill Reed, Kevin Sweeney, and Harrison Wagner for their detailed comments and/or suggestions.

Toward an Alternative Explanation for the Resource Curse: Natural Resources, Immigration, and Democratization

Why do many resource-rich countries maintain autocratic political regimes? The authors’ proposed answer focuses on the causal effect of labor imports, or immigration. Using the logic offered by Acemoglu and Robinson’s democratization model, the authors posit that immigration makes democratization less likely because it facilitates redistributive concessions to appease the population within an autocratic regime. This immigration argument applies directly to the political resource curse since many resource-rich countries tend to also be labor scarce, leading them to import foreign laborers. Consistent with this understanding, the authors find a statistically significant negative relationship between net immigration per capita and democratization in future periods. Their results also show that when controlling for this immigration effect, the standard resource curse variables lose significance in a democratization model. This latter result suggests that much of the so-called resource curse stems not from resource endowments per se but rather from the labor imports related to resource production.

The Shadow of the Future and International Bargaining: The Occurrence of Bargaining in a Three-Phase Cooperation Framework

This paper seeks to answer an important question in international cooperation theory: if cooperation requires successful bargaining among states, then what factors bring these states to the negotiation table in the first place? It presents a game-theoretic model of the “prebargaining” phase of the international cooperation problem, positing that states are more likely to enter a bargaining phase when the shadow of the future is long. This hypothesis is then tested in statistical models that explore how different shadow of the future indicators affect the probability of negotiations over territorial, river, and maritime claims in the Western Hemisphere.

Monetary Divergence Domestic Political Institutions and the Monetary Autonomy—exchange Rate Stability Trade-off

Under capital mobility, governments face a political choice: hold an autonomous monetary policy with currency instability or stabilize exchange rates with the sacrifice of policy autonomy. This article examines what domestic political factors led the advanced industrial democracies to choose an autonomous monetary policy and what factors led them instead to choose stable exchange rates in the post-Bretton Woods era. Leftist-led governments have opted for an autonomous loose fiscal-tight monetary policy mix associated with exchange rate instability. Rightist-led governments have chosen a tight fiscal-loose monetary policy mix associated with exchange rate stability. These results are important because they help reestablish partisan agency in terms of monetary-exchange rate policy making, even under the structural constraint of international capital mobility.