David H. Koehler

Inequality in the Delivery of Urban Services: A Reconsideration of the Chicago Parks

The literature on urban services delivery supports the conclusion that the distribution of services is a function of bureaucratic norms and professionalism, and is largely impervious to political forces. A recent study (Mladenka, 1980) of the distribution of park facilities in Chicago showed essentially no relationship to city politics, in terms of race. Some feel that this study provides the evidence necessary to finalize the conclusion that the distribution of urban services is independent from political considerations. In this paper, we reexamine the Chicago Parks case study. First, it is shown that using a similar research design it is possible to replicate the 1980 findings. Next, it is shown that the results are equally attributable to exogenous variables which were not considered in the earlier study, and which have generally been overlooked in research on this subject. Finally, a regression model is estimated to test several competing explanations of urban services distribution. The results show that efficiency and politics are independently significant explanatory factors in the distribution of park facilities, while equity is not. At least in Chicago, there is impressive evidence that some urban service delivery is highly responsive to political considerations as well as bureaucratic professionalism.

The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees

The yolk is an important new concept for analysis of the instability of majority choice by committees. This paper reports a generalization of the definition of the yolk which extends its applicability to even-numbered committees and to supramajority choice. It also reports the results of computation of the location and size of the yolk for committees of different sizes. The results confirm earlier conjectures and findings that majority choice is likely to be confined to a centrally located subset of an issue space which is small and which decreases in size with increases in committee membership.

Committee choice and the core under supramajority rule: Results from simulation of majority choice in 2-dimensional space

While simple-majority choice by committees is generally unstable, supramajority rule has been demonstrated to yield nonempty sets of stable outcomes: outcomes in the core. This paper reports results of a computer simulation of majority choice by committees under supramajority rule. The object is to explore the transition from unstable to stable committee choice with increasing supramajority rules.The findings are that supramajority rule limits the instability of committee choice; that stable committee choice is no more predictable than unstable committee choice; and that an optimal supramajority rule can be specified which minimizes instability and maximizes the predictability of committee choice. In all of the results, simple-majority rule plays virtually no role.

Limiting median lines frequently determine the yolk

In two-dimensional Euclidean spatial voting models the yolk is the smallest circle which intersects all median lines. It has been assumed that limiting median lines, which intersect two voter ideal points, are sufficient to determine the yolk but recently counter examples have been reported. This note describes the impact of those findings on the results of computation of the location and size of yolk.

Instability and Convergence Under Simple-Majority Rule: Results from Simulation of Committee Choice in Two-Dimensional Space

Nondeterministic models of collective choice posit convergence among the outcomes of simple-majority decisions. The object of this research is to estimate the extent of convergence of majority choice under different procedural conditions. The paper reports results from a computer simulation of simple-majority decision making by committees. Simulation experiments generate distributions of majority-adopted proposals in two-dimensional space. These represent nondeterministic outcomes of majority choice by committees. The proposal distributions provide data for a quantitative evaluation of committee-choice procedures in respect to outcome convergence. Experiments were run under general conditions, and under conditions that restrict committee choice to several game-theoretic solution sets. The findings are that, compared to distributions of voter ideal points, majority-adopted proposals confined to the solution sets demonstrate different degrees of convergence. Second, endogenous agenda formation is a more important obstacle to convergence than the inherent instability of simple-majority rule. Third, if members maximize preferences in respect to agenda formation, a committee choice that approximates the central tendency of the distribution of voter preferences is unlikely. The conclusion is that the most effective way to increase the convergence of majority choice is to restrict the role of individual preferences in agenda formation: identification of proposals to be voted up or down by a committee.

Ordinal Preference Games: An Analysis of Legislative Coalition Formation Without Transferable Utility

Two important findings from n-person game theory are that coalition formation is superadditive if and only if a game possesses an empty core, and Rikers size principle. Up to the present, both theorems have been proved and critiqued under the assumption of transferable cardinal utility. This analysis eliminates the cardinal utility assumption on the grounds that it is generally inconsistent with the conditions that characterize collective choice on political issues. Instead, a model of collective decision making is set forth in terms of ordinal preferences, and the two theorems are reconsidered. The superadditivity theorem survives intact, whereas the size principle is weakened. Circumstances are identified in which there is no incentive to reduce an oversized winning coalition; however, under no condition is there an incentive to increase the size of a winning coalition. A number of coalition-size hypotheses are tested using roll-call data from the U.S. Senate. The results raise new questions about the role of coalition formation in legislative voting strategy.

Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: Rejoinder

In my paper, additivity is implicit in the analysis of utilities in Table 2, and it is assumed explicitly in the appendix where preference orderings over outcomes are derived from individual preferences on motions. Bernholzs interesting example clearly violates additivity as he instead specifies complementarity among issues. Taking the utilities in his Matrix 1, VIs ordering of the social states is as follows: