David Heyd

The Intractability of the Nonidentity Problem

The author, in this paper and elsewhere, defends a person-affecting appro-ach to morality, according to which an act that harms no one cannot be wrong, together with the argument from the nonidentity problem that any act that adversely affects only those future persons who owe their existence to that act’s being performed cannot properly be said to harm those future persons. Extending the logic of the nonidentity problem to cases involving not just strict numerical identity but “biographical identity” as well, the author argues that agents do nothing wrong when they raise a child under, or return a child to, a particular biographical identity, since a new biographical identity, even if more advantageous, would not make the one child better off but instead replace the one child with another child—a biographically nonidentical child—altogether.

Male or Female, We Will Create Them

The article examines the arguments for and against the practice of sex selection for non-medical reasons (e.g. parental preferences, family balancing, religious reasons) in the light of the new technology of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD). It distinguishes between arguments about the risks to the future child, the mother and society, on the one hand, and the inherent wrongness of the practice as an illegitimate interference in the natural course of reproduction, on the other. The article tries to show that at least in the well defined context of sex selection by PGD, when IVF was performed for independent medical reasons, there is no danger to either the child or the mother and hence that the practice should be permitted. Furthermore, the alleged dangers to society are demonstrated to be mostly illusory. On the one hand, the demographic danger is usually overstated and lacks historical support. On the other hand, the feminist claim that sex selection is necessarily discriminatory is found to be both theoretically and empirically groundless. The article’s conclusion is that despite widespread intuitive objection to the practice of sex selection, it can be justified in terms of parental autonomy and falls within the value of family planning. This liberal view does not, however, imply that having a child of the desired sex is the parents’ right, nor does it apply to sex selection in later phases of gestation (abortions and, obviously, infanticide).

Democratically elected aristocracies

The article suggests a formal model of a two-tier voting procedure, which unlike traditional voting systems does not presuppose that every vote counts the same. In deciding a particular issue voters are called in the first round to assign categories of their fellow-citizens with differential voting power (or weights) according to the special position or concern individuals are perceived to have with regard to that issue. In the second stage, voters vote on the issue itself according to their substantive view and their votes are counted in the light of the differential weights assigned in the first round. We analyze formal and philosophical reasons that support the model.

Cultural diversity and biodiversity: a tempting analogy

What makes diversity valuable? The axis of the discussion will be the analogy between cultural diversity and biological diversity, an analogy which may prove enlightening in exposing some of the deep reasoning behind the value of diversity as well as point to the fallacies and dangers in the attempt of proponents of both types of diversity to draw support from the analogy itself. There is an extensive literature on cultural diversity on the one hand and on biodiversity on the other, but very little on the relations between the two. The paper analyzes the difficulties in the conception of diversity as an intrinsic value, especially in non‐essentialist and non‐teleological views of the natural and the social world. The issue of diversity also raises the deep divide between a ‘person‐affecting’ and an impersonal conception of value and the logical problem in the idea of ‘a right to an open future’ (especially in deciding how open it should be). It is doubtful whether ‘reservations’ (both biological and cultural) can be thought of as preservations of diversity.

Prenatal diagnosis: whose right?

The question who is the subject of the right to prenatal diagnosis may be answered in four ways: the parents, the child, society, or no one. This article investigates the philosophical issues involved in each of these answers, which touch upon the conditions of personal identity, the principle of privacy, the scope of social responsibility, and the debate about impersonalism in ethics.

Tact: Sense, sensitivity, and virtue∗

The concept of tact has so far received only little theoretical attention. The present article suggests three levels on which the idea of tact may be approached: (1) The epistemological problem: the etymology of the term ‘tact’ is taken seriously, namely its relation to the sense of touch and tactility. An analysis of the position of touch in the ranking of the five senses according to various parameters is shown to be highly relevant to the understanding of the idea of tact. (2) The logical problem: tact is described as a skill which cannot be exhausted in the knowledge of principles or general rules. Like ‘judgment’ it is concerned with the particular, with sensitivity (analogical to that of the sense of touch) to the uniqueness of a human situation. (3) The ethical problem: tact is shown to lie between ethics and etiquette, that is to say it is more than just a rule of politeness or good manners, but it is ‘less’ than a fully fledged moral duty or principle. Its position between the obligatory and the ...

Parfit on the Non-identity Problem, Again

Abstract In his recent work, Parfit returns to the examination of the non-identity problem, but this time not in the context of a theory of value but as part of a Scanlonian theory of reasons for action. His project is to find a middle ground between pure impersonalism and the narrow person-affecting view so as to do justice to some of our fundamental intuitions regarding procreative choices. The aim of this article is to show that despite the sophisticated and challenging thought experiments and conceptual suggestions (mainly that of a “general person”), Parfit’s project fails and that we are left with the stark choice between personalism and impersonalism.

Is There Anything Unique in the Ethics of Synthetic Biology

Synthetic biology does not create any ethical dilemmas that have not already been raised in the development of practices such as genetic screening, genetic engineering, and other interventions in the evolutionary processes. The issue is, nevertheless, ethically serious. Two different angles are examined: the philosophical legitimacy of human intervention in the shaping of human nature, and the more pragmatic (though by no means less important) question of the risks involved in such a novel line of research. As for the first, the claim made here is that in principle there is no constraint in human intervention in the world, since ultimately the source of any value lies in human interests, welfare, and values. This is an approach that is opposite to Habermass. As for the practical problem of risk, research in synthetic biology calls for particular caution, since in at least the first stages of a new research or program, there is no social regulation, and society is wholly dependent on the scientists ethical integrity.

Are We Our Descendants’ Keepers?

In one of the earliest uses of the metaphor of guardianship, Socrates tries to convince his interlocutors that taking one’s own life is wrong since life itself is not one’s “possession” but rather belongs to the gods. Furthermore, human beings have a positive duty to guard life, not to let it go. The gods are our keepers in the sense of ownership, but we are their delegates or trustees in the role of guardians of the property they own, namely life. Running away from this duty is a violation of trust. Typically, Plato, the rationalist with the deep sense of the mystical, appeals to the Orphic tradition and to the allegorical rendering of the idea of responsibility for one’s own life. He describes the doctrine as “high” (which could be interpreted as both “noble” and “mysterious”) and cautions us of its difficult implications.

Supererogation and Social Responsibility: A Response to Chris Durante

In this comment I suggest that the Parable of the Good Samaritan should be understood as distinguishing between three levels of normative guidance: the legal, the moral, and the supererogatory. The distinction between the obligatory and the supererogatory is taken as objective and independent of the kind of motivation or virtue underlying both kinds of actions. However, it is argued that states, as political institutions committed to justice and impartiality, cannot be agents of supererogatory action. Charity, in contrast, may be ascribed to institutions (like charities!) which act by the intention to do more than is strictly required. The final part of the comment examines the Jewish tradition with regard to acts held by the Catholic doctrine as supererogatory.