David-Hillel Ruben

Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science

* Introduction Models Of Explanation * Causal Analysis * Rational Choice Theory * Interpretation Theory Variations And Elaborations * Functional and Structural ExplanationMaterialismEconomic AnthropologyStatistical Analysis Current Controversies * Methodological IndividualismRelativismToward Methodological Pluralism

W.B. Gallie and Essentially Contested Concepts

In an article published over fifty years ago, followed by a chapter in his book in which he elaborated and developed, but did not alter in any fundamental way, the main ideas of the earlier article, W. B. Gallie discussed what he called ‘essentially contested concepts’. The question he was interested in was how different parties to a dispute can each claim, with justification, to be the true or authentic successor or later representative for some earlier point of view in aesthetics, history, politics or religion, or which of the later disputing parties stands in the same authentic tradition as the earlier one. Gallie’s conclusion was very strong and somewhat surprising: ‘... I shall try to show that there are disputes ... which are perfectly genuine: which, although not resolvable by argument of any kind, are nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence. This is what I mean by saying that there are concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’ (PAS, p. 169, PHU, p. 158).

A counterfactual theory of causal explanation

We commonly explain certain occurrences in the natural world, on the basis of a shared stock of information available to the non-specialised layman as well as to the natural scientist. That shared stock of information is our folk physics. The snow melted because spring had finally come; the car was wrecked because it was hit by a bus; the match lit because it was struck. Such explanations are, or appear to be, causal explanations. Many of our other folk explanations may be noncausal explanations, but I consider only the former sort. I assume, following Davidson, that laws are strict, i.e., exceptionless. If it is a deterministic law that Fs are Gs, then every F without exception must be a G. If it is a stochastic law that Pr(G, F)=p, where O<p<1, then, for any finite sample, s, it may well be that the proportion of Fs in s which are Gs may not be exactly p. However, as one examines Fs indefinitely, the proportion which are found to be Gs will tend to p, and in the limit, the proportion of Fs which are Gs will be

Traditions and True Successors

How can different parties to a dispute in aesthetics, history, politics or religion, either individuals or groups, each claim, apparently with at least some justification, that it, but not its rival(s), is the true or authentic successor or later representative for some earlier group or individual, or that it, but not its rival(s), stands in the same authentic tradition as the earlier one? Such social disputes seem essentially endless and interminable. Is this so? Can the disputes receive a rational resolution? I try and illustrate these disputes with numerous specific examples. I focus on the two concepts of tradition and true succession for my analysis. The idea of qualitative similarity of beliefs and practices can illuminate social disputes over true succession or membership of a tradition. (Causal connexion has a necessary role to play.) Other analyses frequently identify the vagueness or ambiguity in the concepts of the specific traditions as the source of dispute. On the contrary, I argue that the vagueness inherent in the question of how similar beliefs and practices need to be is what explains these apparently endless disputes that social groups have with one another over these questions.

Trying in some way

Most discussions about trying assume that the expression ‘person Ps trying to ϕ’ refers to a particular of some sort. These discussions then differ amongst themselves about to which metaphysical type these particulars belong: mental particulars, brain states, or physical actions are three of the most obvious candidates. This paper examines that assumption and in particular considers an argument of Davidsonian inspiration that might be used in its favour, which is based on the fact that the verb ‘try’ appears to take adverbial modification. Reasons are offered for rejecting this Davidsonian line of argument. A further argument for rejecting the assumption that ‘Ps trying to ϕ’ is a genuinely referring expression is modelled on Jonathan Bennetts discussion of event names.

Con-reasons as Causes

An agent’s having of a reason for an action (hereafter, simply ‘a reason’) is often said to be amongst the causes or causal conditions of the action for which it is a reason (in this wide sense, ‘action’ includes many cases of inaction)?1 Hereafter, this view is referred to as (1).

The Physical Action Theory of Trying

I introduce the idea that an act of trying is identical to some physical action. Identity requires (at least) one-one correspondence: for each token trying act, there would have be one and only one token physical act (of course, namely itself) with which it is identical. There are two obstacles to the physical action theory of trying that are the opposite of one another: first, the availability of too many particular physical action tokens, and second, the lack of any. My discussion of the too-many-tokens problem leads me into a consideration of what I call the ‘mereological strategy’. I argue that that strategy fails but I leave it open whether or not some non-mereological parallel strategy might succeed. Finally, I look at the lack-of-any-physical-tokens problem, sometimes called ‘naked trying’. I sharpen the argument from the premiss that there are naked tryings to the conclusion that the physical identity theory fails. I believe that it is a scientifically established fact that there are such cases (it’s not just a matter about one’s ‘philosophical intuitions’ about such cases) and I examine two attempts to circumvent the naked trying argument and I conclude that they are unsuccessful.

The Limits of Realism in the Philosophy of Social Science

There is an old Russian proverb, quoted in Vladimir Medem’s autobiography, that says: “an individual in Russia was composed of three parts: a body, a soul, and a passport”. It isn’t only that there are these three aspects of a person, but moreover that somehow the three are connected or related in some way.

Social Properties (Facts and Entities): Philosophical Aspects

Social ontology is the study of what kinds of things discourse and thought about society is committed to, in order to be true. The article considers various candidates: social entities, social properties (and hence social actions), social facts, and evaluates the case for the existence of things of each kind.

Doing Without Happenings: Three Theories of Action

There seems to be a distinction of some sort between my actions on the one hand, like my bending my finger and my raising my arm, and mere ‘passive’ events that occur to my body on the other, like my finger’s bending and my arm’s rising. My finger can bend without my bending it; my arm can rise without me raising it. What are actions, if not events?