David I. Rosenbaum

Multimarket contact and pricing: Evidence from the U.S. cement industry

Abstract We empirically examine the effect of multimarket contact on pricing in the U.S. cement industry. A model of price and quantity formation is estimated for a panel of 25 regional cement markets over 16 years. The results indicate that the divergence of price from marginal cost in a particular market is directly related to the extent of multimarket contact among firms in that market.

Entry, barriers, exit, and sunk costs: an analysis

The relationship between entry rates,,entry barriers and sunk costs are examined across a set of four–digit industry data.Results indicate that product differentiation barriers reduce entry rates and sunk capital costs reduce exit rates.Whether entry and exit are truly simultaneous, however, is not clear.

The determinants of entry and exit rates into U.S. manufacturing industries

Entry and exit rates are examined across a fairly large sample of 4-digit U.S. manufacturing industries. Market growth significantly increases (reduces) entry (exit) rates. Profits increase entry rates. Advertising clearly acts as an entry barrier. Sunk capital costs seem to deter exit. While entry and exit rates are related in the sample, whether they are simultaneously determined is unclear.

Profit, entry and changes in concentration

Abstract The simultaneity between profit, entry, and changes in concentration is examined. The sample includes 481 observations on 4-digit industries over the years 1972–1977 and 1977–1982. Results show that profits respond positively to entry barriers and initial concentration. Net entry responds positively to initial profits and responds negatively to entry barriers. Concentration moves toward its steady-state level, but the rate of adjustment is very slow. The competitive process, left on its own, does not seem to move quickly toward equilibrium.

An empirical test of the effect of excess capacity in price setting, capacity-constrained supergames

Abstract In a multi-period game, industry excess capacity may act to deter firms from cheating on a non-cooperative oligopoly price. A model is developed that translates the deterrrent influence of excess capacity into predictions about the relationship between excess capacity and oligopoly price-cost margins. The model is tested with time-series data from the U.S. aluminum industry. Results are consistent with those predicted by the model.

Oligopolistic pricing over the deterministic market demand cycle: some evidence from the US Portland cement industry

Abstract Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) [Haltiwanger, J., Harrington, J.E. Jr., 1991. The impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior. Rand Journal of Economics 22, 89–104.] formulated a theory of self-enforcing collusion assuming a deterministic demand cycle. They predicted that under a self-enforcing non-cooperative pricing scheme, for any level of demand, the price in the rising part of the cycle would always be greater than the price in the falling part of the cycle. They also predicted that the path of collusive profits should reach its peak before market demand. We test their predictions using data from the Portland cement industry. The hypotheses are tested using a multi-equation system, differentiating the boom and the bust periods from 1974 to 1989. The results support both of Haltiwanger and Harrington’s hypotheses.

A 2015 Survey of Forensic Economists: Their Methods, Estimates, and Perspectives

In January 2012, 583 e-mail invitations to complete an electronic survey were sent to National Association of Forensic Economics (NAFE) members, with libraries and attorneys excluded. The return rate was 32.42p, which is almost 9 percentage points higher than the last paper survey in 2003. The survey covered many of the major topics included in earlier surveys, such as values of important economic variables (e.g., discount rates), trends in the practice of forensic economics (e.g., personal sources of earnings), and open-ended questions concerning ethics and reactions to the survey instrument. There were several new questions. Very few respondents have estimated damages in such categories as pain and suffering, companionship, and guidance; few add agency fees to household services estimates; and it is uncommon for respondents to estimate worklife expectancy differently for self-employed persons versus employees.

Efficiencyv. collusion: Evidence cast in cement

Through the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. portland cement industry experienced a significant increase in average plant size and market concentration. A simultaneous equation model is developed to examine the effects of plant size and concentration on costs, prices and margins in that industry. The results indicate the presence of significant scale economies, but also show that prices and margins are increasing in concentration. Further analysis shows that almost one third of the cost savings associated with larger plants are passed on to producers through higher margins resulting from concomitant increases in concentration, rather than to consumers as lower prices.

Differential efficiency, market structure and price

A persistent question in industrial economics is the underpinning of the link between market concentration and price. How much of the link can be attributed to market power and how much to market efficiency? This paper develops a theoretical model to address that question. Applied to the US portland cement industry, the model indicates that both impacts matter. In relative terms, however, the market power effect is twice as large as the efficiency effect. An implication for merger policy is that the beneficial efficiency effects of mergers may not be obtained without the detrimental market power effects as well.

Price discrimination and economics journals

An analysis of pricing by economics journal publishers shows that most publishers initially charge libraries and individual subscribers the same price. Over time, however, almost all eventually engage in price discrimination. The few publishers that never price-discriminate seem to be purchasing an explicit non-profit-maximizing pricing strategy. Once discrimination occurs, library prices rise faster than individual subscriber prices. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions.