David J. Gunkel

Second Thoughts: Toward a Critique of the Digital Divide

This article introduces critical perspective into the discussion of the digital divide, which is commonly defined as the gap separating those individuals who have access to new forms of information technology from those who do not. The analysis is distinguished from other undertakings addressing this matter, insofar as it does not document the empirical problems of unequal access but considers the terminology, logical structure, and form that define and direct work on this important social and ethical issue. The investigation employs the tools of critical theory and targets extant texts, reports, and studies. In this way, the analysis does not dispute the basic facts gathered in recent empirical studies of computer usage and internet access. On the contrary, its purpose is to assist these and other endeavors by making evident their common starting point, stakes, and consequences.

Virtual Geographies: The New Worlds of Cyberspace.

This article embarks on an exploration of what recent technical and popular discourses have called “the new world of cyberspace.” Employing a cultural studies approach, it investigates the legacy, logic, and consequences of this appellation that appear to connect cyberspace to the Columbian voyages of discovery and the larger network of European expansionism. It therefore engages in a critical investigation of the colonial logic implied by this seemingly innocent taxonomy, examines its deployment in and significance for current research, and inquires about its position in the future of discourses written in and about cyberspace.

The real problem: avatars, metaphysics and online social interaction:

It is often assumed that the problem with ‘virtual reality’ — the concept, its various technological deployments and the apparently oxymoronic phrase itself — has been our understanding, or perhaps misunderstanding, of the virtual. The real problem, however, is not with the virtual; it is with the real itself. This article investigates the undeniably useful but ultimately mistaken and somewhat misguided concept of the real that has been routinely operationalized in investigations of new media technology. The specific point of contact for the examination is the avatar. What is at issue here is not the complicated structures and articulations of avatar identity but the assumed ‘real thing’ that is said to be its ultimate cause and referent. In addressing this subject, the article considers three theories of the real, extending from Platonism to the recent innovations of Slavoj Žižek, and investigates their effect on our understanding of computer-generated experience and social interaction.

Terra Nova 2.0*The New World of MMORPGs

The dominant metaphor used to describe and situate MMORPGs, or massively multiplayer online role playing games (e.g. Ultima Online, EverQuest, World of Warcraft, Second Life, etc.), has been “new world” and “new frontier.” By deploying this powerful imagery, game developers, players, the popular media, and academic researchers draw explicit connections between the technology of MMORPGs and the European encounter with the Americas and the western expansion of the United States. Although providing a compelling and often recognizable explanation of the innovations and opportunities of this new technology, the use of this terminology comes with a considerable price, one that had been demonstrated and examined by scholars of the Internet, cyberspace, and virtual reality over a decade ago. This essay explores the impact and significance of the terms “new world” and “frontier” as they have been deployed to explain and describe MMORPGs.

Thinking otherwise: Ethics, technology and other subjects

Ethics is ordinarily understood as being concerned with questions of responsibility for and in the face of an other. This other is more often than not conceived of as another human being and, as such, necessarily excludes others – most notably animals and machines. This essay examines the ethics of such exclusivity. It is divided into three parts. The first part investigates the exclusive anthropocentrism of traditional forms of moral␣thinking and, following the example of recent innovations in animal rights philosophy, questions the mechanisms of such exclusion. Although recent work in animal- and bio-ethics has successfully implemented strategies for the inclusion of the animal as a legitimate subject of moral consideration, its other, the machine, has remained conspicuously excluded. The second part looks at recent attempts to include these machinic others in moral thinking and critiques the assumptions, values, and strategies that have been employed by these various innovations. And the third part proposes a means for thinking otherwise. That is, it introduces an alternative way to consider these other forms of otherness that is not simply reducible to the conceptual order that has structured and limited moral philosophy’s own concern with and for others.

Editorial: introduction to hacking and hacktivism

The activity of hacking constitutes one of the more contested and misunderstood aspects of network culture. Initially the word denoted a kind of obsessive commitment to creative and innovative computer programming, especially the re-engineering of systems that pushed the relatively new technology of the computer in interesting directions which were oftentimes not anticipated or recognized by their designers. For this reason, hackers have been celebrated as the heroes of the computer revolution, the visionaries of the internet and the principle architects of cybersociety. However, shortly thereafter the word came to be employed to name various forms of computer crime, network intrusion and even cyberterrorism. Under this denotation, hackers have been routinely characterized as a threat to network security and are determined to constitute one of the more pernicious problems faced by societies which are becoming increasingly dependent on new media and digital information systems. Recently, this ominous image of the hacker itself has been re-engineered into what many find to be an unlikely but potent hybrid of computer technology and social activism. ‘Hacktivism’, as it is called, draws on the creative use of computer technology for the purposes of facilitating online protests, performing civil disobedience in cyberspace and disrupting the flow of information by deliberately intervening in the networks of global capital. This special section of New Media & Society investigates the contended and contested meaning of hacking and hacktivism. The three articles that comprise it re-evaluate the history and social significance of hacking, trace the complex genealogy that connects earlier generations of hackers to the recent development of hacktivism and investigate some of the mechanisms of resistance that have been employed by hackers and hacktivists to intervene in social networks which have become increasingly obsessed with new media & society

Communication and Artificial Intelligence: Opportunities and Challenges for the 21st Century

This essay advocates for a significant reorientation and reconceptualization of communication studies in order to accommodate the opportunities and challenges introduced by increasingly intelligent machines, autonomous decision making systems, and smart devices. Historically the discipline of communication has accommodated new technology by transforming these innovations into a medium of human interaction and message exchange. With the computer, this transaction is particularly evident with the development of computer-mediated communication (CMC) in the later half of the 20th century. In CMC, the computer is understood and investigated as a more-or-less neutral channel of message transfer and instrument of human interaction. This formalization, although not necessarily incorrect, neglects the fact that the computer, unlike previous technological advancements, also occupies the position of participant in communicative exchanges. Evidence of this is already available in the science of AI and has been explicitly described by some of the earliest writings on communication and the computer. The essay therefore 1) demonstrates that the CMC paradigm, although undeniably influential and successful, is insufficient and no longer tenable and 2) argues that communication studies needs to rework its basic framework in order to address and respond to the unique technological challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.

Rethinking virtual reality: Simulation and the deconstruction of the image

From its beginnings, virtual reality has been proposed as the apex of image production, completing, as many scholars and artists have argued, the search for the ultimate visual display medium. This essay examines the technology and possibilities of virtual reality by investigating these conceptual maneuvers that connect computer simulated environments to the history of mediated communication and the logic of representation. The essay examines the conceptual history of image production in mediated communication, locates contemporary discussions of virtual reality within this tradition, and offers a deconstructive critique of representation, proposing alternative visions of virtual reality and computer simulation.

The other question: can and should robots have rights?

This essay addresses the other side of the robot ethics debate, taking up and investigating the question “Can and should robots have rights?” The examination of this subject proceeds by way of three steps or movements. We begin by looking at and analyzing the form of the question itself. There is an important philosophical difference between the two modal verbs that organize the inquiry—can and should. This difference has considerable history behind it that influences what is asked about and how. Second, capitalizing on this verbal distinction, it is possible to identify four modalities concerning social robots and the question of rights. The second section will identify and critically assess these four modalities as they have been deployed and developed in the current literature. Finally, we will conclude by proposing another alternative, a way of thinking otherwise that effectively challenges the existing rules of the game and provides for other ways of theorizing moral standing that can scale to the unique challenges and opportunities that are confronted in the face of social robots.

Mind the gap: responsible robotics and the problem of responsibility

The task of this essay is to respond to the question concerning robots and responsibility—to answer for the way that we understand, debate, and decide who or what is able to answer for decisions and actions undertaken by increasingly interactive, autonomous, and sociable mechanisms. The analysis proceeds through three steps or movements. (1) It begins by critically examining the instrumental theory of technology, which determines the way one typically deals with and responds to the question of responsibility when it involves technology. (2) It then considers three instances where recent innovations in robotics challenge this standard operating procedure by opening gaps in the usual way of assigning responsibility. The innovations considered in this section include: autonomous technology, machine learning, and social robots. (3) The essay concludes by evaluating the three different responses—instrumentalism 2.0, machine ethics, and hybrid responsibility—that have been made in face of these difficulties in an effort to map out the opportunities and challenges of and for responsible robotics.