David J. Hardisty

Discounting Future Green: Money Versus the Environment

In 3 studies, participants made choices between hypothetical financial, environmental, and health gains and losses that took effect either immediately or with a delay of 1 or 10 years. In all 3 domains, choices indicated that gains were discounted more than losses. There were no significant differences in the discounting of monetary and environmental outcomes, but health gains were discounted more and health losses were discounted less than gains or losses in the other 2 domains. Correlations between implicit discount rates for these different choices suggest that discount rates are influenced more by the valence of outcomes (gains vs. losses) than by domain (money, environment, or health). Overall, results indicate that when controlling as many factors as possible, at short to medium delays, environmental outcomes are discounted in a similar way to financial outcomes, which is good news for researchers and policy makers alike.

A Dirty Word or a Dirty World? Attribute Framing, Political Affiliation, and Query Theory

We explored the effect of attribute framing on choice, labeling charges for environmental costs as either an earmarked tax or an offset. Eight hundred ninety-eight Americans chose between otherwise identical products or services, where one option included a surcharge for emitted carbon dioxide. The cost framing changed preferences for self-identified Republicans and Independents, but did not affect Democrats’ preferences. We explain this interaction by means of query theory and show that attribute framing can change the order in which internal queries supporting one or another option are posed. The effect of attribute labeling on query order is shown to depend on the representations of either taxes or offsets held by people with different political affiliations.

Good or Bad, We Want it Now: Fixed-Cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational-economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover they interact: while large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed-cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses, where it describes a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains, but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, since present bias feelings do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains, but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses, and also the first to offer a theory (extending present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future-oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses.

Diffusion of Treatment Research: Does Open Access Matter?

Advocates of the Open Access movement claim that removing access barriers will substantially increase the diffusion of academic research. If successful, this movement could play a role in efforts to increase utilization of psychotherapy research by mental health practitioners. In a pair of studies, mental health professionals were given either no citation, a normal citation, a linked citation, or a free access citation and were asked to find and read the cited article. After 1 week, participants read a vignette on the same topic as the article and gave recommendations for an intervention. In both studies, those given the free access citation were more likely to read the article, yet only in one study did free access increase the likelihood of making intervention recommendations consistent with the article.

The Value of Nothing: Asymmetric Attention to Opportunity Costs Drives Intertemporal Decision Making

This paper proposes a novel account of impatience: People pay more attention to the opportunity costs of choosing larger, later rewards than to the opportunity costs of choosing smaller, sooner ones. Eight studies show that when the opportunity costs of choosing smaller, sooner rewards are subtly highlighted, people become more patient, whereas when the opportunity costs of choosing larger, later rewards are highlighted this has no effect. This pattern is robust to variations in the choice task, to the participant population, and to whether the choices are incentivized or hypothetical. We argue that people are naturally aware of the opportunity costs of delayed rewards but pay less attention to those associated with smaller, sooner ones. We conclude by discussing implications for theory and policy. Data, as supplemental material, are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2547. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, judgment and decision making.

Intertemporal Uncertainty Avoidance: When the Future Is Uncertain, People Prefer the Present, and When the Present Is Uncertain, People Prefer the Future

Three studies explored the effects of uncertainty on people’s time preferences for financial gains and losses. In general, individuals seek to avoid uncertainty in situations of intertemporal choice. While holding the expected value of payouts constant, participants preferred immediate gains and losses if the future was uncertain, and preferred future gains and losses if the present was uncertain. This pattern of preferences is incompatible with current models of intertemporal choice, in which people should consistently prefer to have gains now and losses later. This pattern of uncertainty avoidance is also not explained by prospect theory models, which predict risk seeking for losses. We discuss these findings in relation to previous literature. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2349. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, judgment and decision making.