David Kosař

Lustration and Lapse of Time: ‘Dealing with the Past’ in the Czech Republic

One of the most important challenges for the rule of law in the Czech Republic in the period of transition has been the so-called Lustration Acts. The Czech Lustration Acts have been widely acknowledged as one of the most far-reaching among the postcommunist countries in the CEE region. As a result, they were met with fierce criticism, not only from foreign and Czech scholars but also from dissidents themselves. However, this paper does not intend to reopen the early debate on the legitimacy of the introduction of the Czech Lustration Acts. Instead, it screens the Czech Lustration Acts against the contemporary jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. This paper concludes that the Czech Lustration Acts might still survive the scrutiny of the European Court of Human Rights, but it argues that they should be repealed by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic as they violate the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms.

Domestic Judicial Design by International Human Rights Courts

Regional human rights courts in Europe and the Americas came into being in the wake of World War II. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) were established in order to adjudicate on alleged violations of the rights of individuals. Yet, since their inception these courts have also influenced other areas of international law. A part from their impact on general international law, their case law has had significant spill over effects on international criminal law, international refugee law, international environmental law, the law of armed conflicts, and the law of the sea.

Policing Separation of Powers: A New Role for the European Court of Human Rights?

I showed that the ECtHR has within the last decade increasinglynintervened in the signatory states’ separation of powers andnthat this goes to a large extent unnoticed. Through the twoncase studies (parliamentary immunity and the incompatibility ofnjudicial office with other tasks) I also revealed that thenECtHR’s involvement in domestic separation of powers issues isnfar broader than generally thought.

Politics of Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountabilityin Czechia: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law between CourtPresidents and the Ministry of Justice

When the communist regimes in Central Eastern Europe collapsednin the late 1980s, each state in this region was faced with thentasks of restoring judicial independence and reforming thensystem of the administration of justice. Most countries in thenCEE initially returned to the pre-communist model of courtnadministration, in which the executive plays the central role.nSo did the Czech Republic too. However, this model was subjectnto the increasing criticism from judges as well as from variousninternational and supranational bodies. The European Commissionnteamed up with the Council of Europe and eventually came upnwith the new template, the “EU/CoE Judicial Council Model”. Thencentral feature of this model was a new institution – anjudicial council that should be granted most “personalncompetences” regarding a career in the judiciary. The EU/CoEnJudicial Council Model was then endorsed as the only “right”nsolution that should eradicate the vices of the post-communistnjudiciaries. As a result of this joint pressure, most countriesnin CEE adopted the EU/CoE Judicial Council Model. Not the CzechnRepublic. It became the “outlier case” in the CEE region, thenonly post-communist country in the process of transition tondemocracy without a judicial council. Hence, it is particularlyninteresting to discern how judicial independence and judicialnaccountability are ensured there. This paper shows that thenCzech Ministry of Justice model has underwent significantndevelopment and, in doing so, it focuses on the most importantnphenomenon since the Velvet Revolution – the rise of courtnpresidents to power. It argues that the court presidents stepnby step eroded the Minister’s sphere of influence and managednto enlarge their own powers. As a result they became the mostnpowerful players in the Czech judiciary with broad powersnvis-a-vis individual judges. This development in turn calls fornnew safeguards of internal independence against the abuse ofnpower by court president.

Přinesla „Pospíšilova“ reforma kárného řízení skutečně zpřísnění kárného postihu českých soudců?

Cilem tohoto clanku je posoudit důsledky zavedeni noveho modelu karneho řizeni se soudci prosazenou ministrem spravedlnosti Jiřim Pospisilem v roce 2008. „Pospisilova reforma“ (zakon c. 314/2008 Sb.) přenesla karne řizeni na Nejvyssi spravni soud, zavedla jednoinstancni karne řizeni se soudci, zakotvila smisene složeni karných senatů s paritnim zastoupenim soudců a nesoudců a v mnoha ohledech zpřisnila karne řizeni (např. zvýsenim sankci, prodlouženim subjektivnich i objektivnich lhůt pro podani karne žaloby a zakotvenim institutu „třikrat a dost!“). Na ceske poměry se jednalo o revolucni změnu. Nebylo tedy překvapenim, že soudci okamžitě Pospisilovu reformu karneho řizeni oznacili za „sankcni“ novelu a napadli ji před Ustavnim soudem. Ustavni soud jim vsak nevyhověl a Pospisilův model přetrval bez výrazne změny dodnes. Můžeme tak posoudit, zda Pospisilova reforma skutecně přinesla ocekavane zpřisněni karneho postihu ceských soudců ci nikoliv. Za timto ucelem tento clanek porovnava výsledky karných řizeni se soudci zahajených před Pospisilovou reformou v letech 2003-2008 s výsledky karných řizeni se soudci zahajených po Pospisilově reformě v letech 2009-2014. Hlavnim zavěrem nasi kvantitativni studie je, že v rozporu s ocekavanim tvůrců Pospisilovy reformy, ke zpřisněni karneho postihu ceských soudců ve střednědobem horizontu v drtive větsině ukazatelů nedoslo. Po implementaci Pospisilově reformy totiž poklesl pocet karných navrhů, nominalně i percentualně poklesl pocet karných navrhů, v nichž bylo uloženo karne opatřeni, poklesl pocet soudců „donucených k odloženi talaru“ (tj. soucet soudců odvolaných z funkce soudce karným soudem a soudců, jež na funkci soudce rezignovali v průběhu karneho řizeni) a poklesla i celkova uspěsnost karných navrhovatelů.