David L. Eckles

Insurer Reserve Error and Executive Compensation: Insurer Reserve Error and Executive Compensation

This article investigates incentives of insurance firm managers to manipulate loss reserves in order to maximize their compensation. We find that managers who receive bonuses that are likely capped or no bonuses tend to over-reserve for current-year incurred losses. However, managers who receive bonuses that are likely not capped tend to under-reserve for current-year incurred losses. We also find that managers who exercise stock options tend to under-reserve in the current period.

An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of Growth on Short-Term Changes in Loss Ratios

Given the use of premium growth as a risk measure in regulatory and private risk assessment models, the impact of growth on underwriting profitability is an important question. Our results show a negative relationship between premium growth and changes in loss ratios, suggesting that premium growth alone does not necessarily result in higher underwriting risk. Further, there is a positive relationship between claim count growth and changes in loss ratios, suggesting that claim count growth may be a preferred measure of underwriting risk.

Loss Aversion and the Framing of the Health Care Reform Debate

The high-stakes debate over health care reform captured the publics attention for nearly a year. Options ranging from fully nationalized insurance to maintaining the status quo were considered, though little consensus as to the appropriate solution emerged. Most surveys indicated an agreement that a problem existed with the current health care system and a clear and consistent majority favored taking some action on health care reform. However, clear public support for any specific reform proposal was difficult to muster since most individuals also indicated satisfaction with their own health care. This paper explores this disconnect in public opinion within the context of loss aversion. We note that even as elites actively attempted to frame the issue to counteract the publics loss averse tendencies, these strategies met with little success in generating support for Obamas reform plan. However, we also argue that these loss averse tendencies will now work against any Republican efforts to repeal the health reform legislation.

Information Risk and the Cost of Capital

This article applies a unique accruals measure to empirically test whether accruals quality affects the cost of capital for property–liability insurers. We utilize insurer loss reserve errors to accurately measure the quality of accruals. This measure, as well as conventional accruals measures, is used to investigate the extent to which accruals quality is priced into both debt and equity capital. We find that accruals quality is priced into debt capital; however, we find virtually no evidence that accruals quality is priced into equity capital. Our results should be of particular interest to insurers as it affects pricing ability. Specifically, insurers who provide primary debtholders (i.e., policyholders) less information risk are able to command higher prices. Furthermore, our results suggest that insurance is not a diversifiable asset.

The Problem of Asymmetric Information: A Simulation of How Insurance Markets Can Be Inefficient

The concept of adverse selection is discussed in virtually all academic insurance textbooks. However, undergraduate students have rarely had the experience of purchasing insurance which may limit their ability to fully comprehend the market inefficiencies created by asymmetric information. We provide a classroom simulation of an insurance market that highlights the concept of adverse selection and its impact on the insurance industry. Participants are asked to make insurance decisions in pursuit of their own interests under different market conditions. In the absence of perfect information, participants actively observe that a socially optimal outcome does not occur.

Does national flood insurance program participation induce housing development

We estimate the effects on county-wide housing development in Florida of community-level participation in the National Flood Insurance Program using panel data methods and observed variation in the timing of the decision to join the program. We find that program participation increased housing starts and permits in non-coastal counties, while coastal counties with average flood-zone acreage saw signi ficant declines in housing activity. We conjecture that loss-mitigating regulatory costs, an obligation of obtaining insurance, might explain these findings.

Does National Flood Insurance Program Participation Induce Housing Development?: Does National Flood Insurance Program Participation Induce Housing Development?

We estimate the effects on county-wide housing development in Florida of community-level participation in the National Flood Insurance Program using panel data methods and observed variation in the timing of the decision to join the program. We find that program participation increased housing starts and permits in non-coastal counties, while coastal counties with average flood-zone acreage saw signi ficant declines in housing activity. We conjecture that loss-mitigating regulatory costs, an obligation of obtaining insurance, might explain these findings.

The Theory of Optimal Stochastic Control as Applied to Insurance Underwriting Cycles

We use the theories of optimal stochastic control and engineering process control to analyze the well-known phenomenon of insurance underwriting cycles in continuous time. We show in a continuous time framework that underwriting cycles can be explained with a model where premiums are set rationally, but where there are various reporting and regulatory lags. We find that the observed cycle length depends on the length of these underlying lags. Our result can be seen as consistent with previous empirical work showing underwriting cycles varying across countries and lines of insurance. In the event that no lags exist, our result is also consistent with more recent literature suggesting that insurance cycles may not exist.