David L. Malec

Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling

We study the makespan minimization problem with unrelated selfish machines under the assumption that job sizes are stochastic. We design simple truthful mechanisms that under different distributional assumptions provide constant and sublogarithmic approximations to expected makespan. Our mechanisms are prior-independent in that they do not rely on knowledge of the job size distributions. Prior-independent approximations were previously known only for the revenue maximization objective [13, 11, 26]. In contrast to our results, in prior-free settings no truthful anonymous deterministic mechanism for the makespan objective can provide a sublinear approximation [3].

Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing

We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. In single-parameter settings (i.e., where each agents preference is given by a single private value for being served and zero for not being served) this problem is solved. Unfortunately, these single parameter optimal mechanisms are impractical and rarely employed, and furthermore the underlying economic theory fails to generalize to the important, relevant, and unsolved multi-dimensional setting (i.e., where each agents preference is given by multiple values for each of the multiple services available). In contrast to the theory of optimal mechanisms we develop a theory of sequential posted price mechanisms, where agents in sequence are offered take-it-or-leave-it prices. We prove that these mechanisms are approximately optimal in single-dimensional settings. These posted-price mechanisms avoid many of the properties of optimal mechanisms that make the latter impractical. Furthermore, these mechanisms generalize naturally to multidimensional settings where they give the first known approximations to the elusive optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem.

Approximate Deadline-Scheduling with Precedence Constraints

We consider the classic problem of scheduling a set of n jobs non-preemptively on a single machine. Each job j has non-negative processing time, weight, and deadline, and a feasible schedule needs to be consistent with chain-like precedence constraints. The goal is to compute a feasible schedule that minimizes the sum of penalties of late jobs. Lenstra and Rinnoy Kan [Annals of Disc. Math., 1977] in their seminal work introduced this problem and showed that it is strongly NP-hard, even when all processing times and weights are 1. We study the approximability of the problem and our main result is an O(logk)-approximation algorithm for instances with k distinct job deadlines.