David L. Rosenhan

On Being Sane in Insane Places

It is clear that we cannot distinguish the sane from the insane in psychiatric hospitals. The hospital itself imposes a special environment in which the meanings of behavior can easily be misunderstood. The consequences to patients hospitalized in such an environment—the powerlessness, depersonalization, segregation, mortification, and self-labeling—seem undoubtedly countertherapeutic. I do not, even now, understand this problem well enough to perceive solutions. But two matters seem to have some promise. The first concerns the proliferation of community mental health facilities, of crisis intervention centers, of the human potential movement, and of behavior therapies that, for all of their own problems, tend to avoid psychiatric labels, to focus on specific problems and behaviors, and to retain the individual in a relatively non-pejorative environment. Clearly, to the extent that we refrain from sending the distressed to insane places, our impressions of them are less likely to be distorted. (The risk of distorted perceptions, it seems to me, is always present, since we are much more sensitive to an individuals behaviors and verbalizations than we are to the subtle contextual stimuli that often promote them. At issue here is a matter of magnitude. And, as I have shown, the magnitude of distortion is exceedingly high in the extreme context that is a psychiatric hospital.) The second matter that might prove promising speaks to the need to increase the sensitivity of mental health workers and researchers to the Catch 22 position of psychiatric patients. Simply reading materials in this area will be of help to some such workers and researchers. For others, directly experiencing the impact of psychiatric hospitalization will be of enormous use. Clearly, further research into the social psychology of such total institutions will both facilitate treatment and deepen understanding. I and the other pseudopatients in the psychiatric setting had distinctly negative reactions. We do not pretend to describe the subjective experiences of true patients. Theirs may be different from ours, particularly with the passage of time and the necessary process of adaptation to ones environment. But we can and do speak to the relatively more objective indices of treatment within the hospital. It could be a mistake, and a very unfortunate one, to consider that what happened to us derived from malice or stupidity on the part of the staff. Quite the contrary, our overwhelming impression of them was of people who really cared, who were committed and who were uncommonly intelligent. Where they failed, as they sometimes did painfully, it would be more accurate to attribute those failures to the environment in which they, too, found themselves than to personal callousness. Their perceptions and behavior were controlled by the situation, rather than being motivated by a malicious disposition. In a more benign environment, one that was less attached to global diagnosis, their behaviors and judgments might have been more benign and effective.

Effects of the 1989 San Francisco earthquake on frequency and content of nightmares.

In a systematic evaluation of the effects of a natural disaster on nightmares, nightmare frequency was found to be about twice as high among 92 San Francisco Bay area college students as among 97 control subjects in Tucson, Arizona, after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Subjects in California had not only more nightmares in general but substantially more nightmares about earthquakes. Over a 3-week period, about 40% of those in the San Francisco Bay area reported one or more nightmares about an earthquake, as compared with only 5% of those in Arizona. However, nightmares about earthquakes were not more emotionally intense than other nightmares. These findings support the long-held view that the experience of a potentially traumatic event can result in more frequent nightmares, particularly about the event itself, but contradict the common opinion that nightmares about such events are unusually intense.

Notetaking Can Aid Juror Recall

Mock jurors were permitted to take notes during a trial simulation and to have those notes available during an individualized test of recall. Compared to non-notetakers, those who took notes showed superior recall and were more involved in the trial proceedings. The quantity of notes taken, their accuracy, and their organization all correlated positively with accuracy of recall.

Power and intergroup perception between public defenders and district attorneys

This paper proposes a theoretical framework for understanding intergroup perception differences between public defenders and district attorneys. Social psychological research is reviewed to outline the role of power in intergroup perception differences between high and low status groups. These power differences as well as perception differences are then applied to public defenders and district attorneys, who themselves represent low and high status groups, respectively. To help substantiate this theoretical framework, a qualitative field study is presented in which public defenders and district attorneys of the juvenile justice system were interviewed regarding their perceptions of the youth they process, themselves, and each other. While this field study is a first step and supports the theoretical claim that power underpins intergroup perception differences between public defenders and district attorneys, more quantitative and qualitative empirical research is necessary. The implications of this research are discussed in the terms of the welfare of juvenile offenders.