David M. Clarke

Cross-industry safety lessons of the Chernobyl disaster

Abstract To mark the 25th anniversary of Chernobyl, this article identifies the generic, cross-industry safety lessons of the accident. These are supported by descriptions of contributing deficiencies (shortfalls in design, human factors, management, regulation and safety culture) and an account of the accident itself. The lessons are amplified by making links to other accidents with related features. A series of questions is developed to assist managers and engineers reexamine their organizational and technical systems in the light of the experience at Chernobyl. “As we approached the nuclear power plant by car, I could not have imagined that we were approaching a situation of what I term planetary scale, in that it will never be forgotten in world history: as, for instance, the eruption of the volcano which destroyed the city of Pompeii.”

Cognition and Safety: An Integrated Approach to Systems Design and Assessment

are designed, assessed and innovated throughout time. Sträter addresses the gap between the design of safety systems, on the one hand, and operation, on the other. Methods and models for human behavior in design focus on system workload or situational awareness, while operation relates to human error. A homogeneous approach towards notions like human error, workload and situational awareness is aimed at being integrated in this book by making use of existing knowledge of human cognition without, as the author claims, ‘reinventing the wheel’.

Special issue on human reliability

The treatment of operator error is an important facet of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). Better quality human reliability modelling and data will therefore increase the usefulness of PSA with respect to its many applications. Error reduction can make important contributions to the improvement of safety, reliability and availability. All this points to the need to continue development of human reliability methods and, where necessary, enhance deployment of those methods.

Talking About Safety—An Interview with Trevor Kletz, Part 2: Hazop, Hazan and the Attitude of the Public to Technological Risk

This is the second part of an interview with the safety specialist and writer Dr Trevor Kletz. The first part of the interview was concerned with inherently safer design and the uptake of the concept. Part 2 addresses hazard identification and quantitative risk assessment. Hazop is contrasted with inherently safer design in that its value was quickly recognised and use of the technique spread rapidly. An historical account of the development of Hazop is provided, including the origins of the technique and the challenges that arose for hazard identification when computer control was introduced into chemical plants. The discussion of quantitative risk assessment focuses on the contrasting views about technological risk held on the one hand by many members of the public and on the other by safety experts in industry.

Learning Safety Lessons from Mistakes: The Role of Trust

Trust is a complex feature of human interaction. It provides a coherent framework for understanding and solving many of the most difficult problems associated with learning safety lessons from mistakes. Organisations can improve their ability to learn from mistakes and manage safety by pursuing measures that promote a climate of trust.