David Owens

Minimax on the Gridiron: Serial Correlation and Its Effects on Outcomes in the National Football League

We examine whether the predictions of minimax in zero-sum games holds under highly incentivized conditions with highly informed informed decision makers. We examine data from 3455 National Football League (NFL) games from the 2000 season through the 2012 season. We categorize every relevant play as either a rush or a pass. We find that, despite the predictions of minimax, the pass-rush mix exhibits negative serial correlation. In other words, given the conditions of the play, teams employ an exploitable strategy in that play types alternate more frequently than implied by an independent stochastic process. We also find that the efficacy of plays are affected by previous actions and previous outcomes in a manner that is not consistent with minimax. Our analysis suggests that teams could profit from more clustered play selections, which switch play type less frequently. Our results are consistent with the explanation that teams excessively switch play types in order to not be perceived as predictable.

Social learning about environmental innovations : experimental analysis of adoption timing

Laboratory experiments were conducted to investigate how private and public information affect the selection of an innovation and the timing of adoption. The results shed light on the behavioral anomaly called the “energy-efficiency gap” in which consumers and firms delay adoption of cost-effective energy and environmental innovations. The subjects chose between competing innovations with freedom to select the timing of their adoption, relying on private signals and possibly observation of their peers. When deciding whether to make an irreversible choice between safe and risky technologies, roughly half the subjects delayed adoption beyond the time indicated by equilibrium behavior -- confirming the behavioral anomaly found for environmental innovations. When they did adopt, the subjects gave proportionately more weight to their private signals than to the actions of their peers, implying they do not ‘herd’ on the latter. Nevertheless, when the subjects observed their peers’ decisions, they did accelerate the timing of their adoption despite not necessarily imitating their peers. This result occurred even when the payoffs were statistically independent, as if observing prior adoptions exerted ‘peer pressure’ on the subjects to act. The experimental results suggest that rapid dissemination of information about peer actions can speed up the diffusion of environmental innovations and improve selection among competing technologies.