David R. Law

Kierkegaard as negative theologian

Dialectics epistemology truth the stages of existence God Christology Keikegaard as negative theologian.

Kierkegaard's Anti-Ecclesiology: the Attack on Christendom, 1854-55

Abstract This article examines Kierkegaards attack on the Danish state church in 1854–1855, beginning with Kierkegaards rejection of Martensens application of the term ‘witness to the truth’ to the recently deceased primate of the Danish church, J. P. Mynster. For Kierkegaard a witness to the truth is the person who emulates Christs life of suffering and lives in poverty and abasement. It is an insult to the memory of the ‘glorious ones’ of the past to apply this term to the worldly, self-serving Mynster. The article goes on to consider Kierkegaards conception of the heterogeneity of Christianity with the world, before considering Kierkegaards rejection of the state church as a confusion of church and state which eliminates the Imitatio Christi essential for genuine Christian existence. The failure of the state church and its clergy to live according to the New Testament means that they are an abomination, and public worship is a blasphemous insult to God. The paper concludes by considering what lessons can be learned from Kierkegaards radical anti-ecclesiology.

Christian Discipleship in Kierkegaard, Hirsch, and Bonhoeffer

La. sinterroge sur la signification de lexpression suivre le Christ chez Kierkegaard et chez deux theologiens allemands aux options radicalement differentes durant les IIIeme Reich : Emanuel Hirsch et Dietrich Bonhoeffer.

Frank Weston, the Kikuyu Controversy, and the necessity of episcopacy

This article provides a historical and theological account of the controversy that erupted in 1913 when Frank Weston, Bishop of Zanzibar, appealed to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Randall Davidson, to try W.G. Peel, the Bishop of Mombasa, and J.J. Willis, the Bishop of Uganda, for ‘heresy and schism’ for their having participated in an interdenominational conference in Kikuyu in British East Africa. By agreeing to a Scheme of Federation with non-episcopal churches and holding a joint communion service at which non-conformists received communion from an Anglican Bishop, Peel and Willis had undermined the principle of episcopacy, thereby endangering the status of the Church of England as the English Section of the universal, Catholic Church. This article considers the theological arguments Weston advances for his condemnation of the Kikuyu Conference and examines his grounds for holding that episcopacy is an indispensable doctrine of the Christian faith.

Key Theological Thinkers: From Modern to Postmodern

Jung, given the reality of evil as it is experienced in the world. Jung failed to grasp the privatio boni as a grammatical elucidation of the metaphysics of evil, and this was seen in his friendship with the Dominican priest Fr Victor White. Acknowledging that it is here that Jungian–Catholic dialogue has often floundered, Oglesby offers a brilliant way forward in the Cross. In what is the high point of the book, both scholarly and creatively, Oglesby offers an exploration of God’s involvement in evil in the death of Christ on the cross and his descent into hell. Both thinkers see the cross and descensus as healing the wound of the conflict of good and evil: Balthasar theodramatically, Jung psychologically. For Balthasar, Oglesby argues that Christ’s cross and descent to the dead are the response, theologically, to the question of God’s involvement with evil. In the revelation of God’s kenotic love, evil is met with love. For Jung, it is, psychologically, about the opposition of good and evil and the challenge of its resolution in the crucifixion of the ego and the descent into the unconscious. In both Jung and Balthasar new possibilities emerge: wholeness and resurrection. Oglesby concludes with the suggestion of ‘a cruciform model of God’s involvement with evil (198), holding together Balthasar’s ‘vertical’ approach (the polarity of contradiction between God and humanity) and Jung’s ‘horizontal’ approach (the polarity of good and evil) as complementary truths in creative tension. Regarding the limitations of his imagined encounter, Oglesby is remarkably honest. He often acknowledges ‘very few options’ for dialogue, missed opportunities, and failures. He is unafraid to highlight ‘their theological incompatibility’ (142). And yet, despite the limitations, Oglesby has opened up tremendous possibilities for Jung and Catholic theology on the question of evil by shifting the focus to the Cross. In many ways this splendid book lays the challenge for other ‘imagined dialogues’ which might also make a contribution to the ongoing dialogue between analytical psychology and Catholic theology.

Redeeming the penultimate: discipleship and Church in the thought of Søren Kierkegaard and Dietrich Bonhoeffer

There are striking parallels between the theologies of discipleship advanced by the Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard and the German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffers notion of ‘costly grace’ closely resembles Kierkegaards critique of the misuse of the Pauline-Lutheran doctrine of justification by grace through faith alone. After the publication of Cost of Discipleship, however, Bonhoeffers view of discipleship moves in a different direction from that of Kierkegaard. Whereas Kierkegaard takes discipleship to mean that the Christian must be in irrevocable conflict with the world, Bonhoeffer sees discipleship as living in the world and cultivating a ‘worldly holiness’. This article tracks the reasons why their initially similar theologies of discipleship result in Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer developing different understandings of Christian discipleship and church. The discussion is organised around the distinction Bonhoeffer makes in his Ethics between the ‘ultimate’ and the ‘penultimate’. Kierkegaard emphasises the ultimate to such an extent that the penultimate is virtually eliminated and the Christian disciple is called upon to live in a state of constant eschatological opposition to the world. For Bonhoeffer on the other hand the penultimate is not to be condemned but to be transformed in the light of the ultimate. The article argues that the differing notions of discipleship advanced by Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer arise from the different political contexts in which they were living and writing. Whereas Kierkegaards historical situation prompted him to affirm the ultimate by confronting his contemporaries with New Testament Christianitys radical opposition to the world, Bonhoeffers resistance to the Nazi régime prompted him to reflect on how the ultimate can be integrated into the penultimate and how the Christian disciple can engage with the world without being of the world.

The Existential Chalcedonian Christology of Kierkegaard's Practice in Christianity

This essay attempts to show that the Christology of Practice in Christianity can be read as a reworking of the Chalcedonian Definition that Christ is truly divine and truly human. In contrast to many of his contemporaries, however, Anti-Climacus treats this doctrine not as a problem to be explained but as a paradox that confronts each human being with the choice between offence and faith. This means that Anti-Climacus reformulates the Chalcedonian Definition so as to heighten its paradoxicality and bring out the existential claim this doctrine makes upon the would-be follower of Christ. To speak of the ÍChristologyÌ of Practice in Christianity might seem to impose a clearer structure on the work than its contents warrant. Kierkegaard, or rather his pseudonym Anti-Climacus, is not concerned to speculate on the person of Christ or to offer a coherent Christology that addresses all the problems raised by the doctrine of the Incarnation. On the contrary, Anti-Climacus seems to believe that to reflect on ChristÌs nature is to adopt the incorrect relation to Christ, which should be not one of understanding but of discipleship. He complains, ÍIn an inadmissible and illicit way we have become “knowing” about Christ – for the admissible way is to become believingÌ. We should take Anti-ClimacusÌs admonitions, however, with a pinch of salt. It is, after all, surely necessary to have some knowledge of what it is that we should believe and what it is that we should worship if we are to avoid believing in and worshipping what is unworthy of worship, and thereby fall into idolatry. Furthermore, in the three discourses that comprise Practice in Christianity, Anti-Climacus frequently touches on many of the Christological issues that have troubled theologians ever since Peter confessed Jesus as the Christ at Caesarea Philippi (Mk 8:27–33). There are two further considerations that allow us to speak of a Christology of Practice in Christianity. Firstly,

Book Review: Saved from Sacrifice: A Theology of the CrossSaved from Sacrifice: A theology of the cross, HeimS. Mark (Eerdmans2006), 360 pp, US

by the editors seek to place the discussion of the relationship between philosophy and theology against the backdrop of current debates. Section 1 offers a range of perspectives on ‘Reason, Rationality and Traditions of Rationality’. Section 2 considers issues in ‘Meaning, Language and Interpretation’. Section 3 considers issues related to ‘Experience, Imagination and Mysticism’. The range of themes offered suggests something of the diverse interests of the contributors. For example, the reflection on reason and rationality relates most closely to the concerns of analytic philosophy, but this does not mean that the essays presented in this section are uncritical of such a perspective. In particular, the section’s contributors seek to challenge the claim that notions of transcendence are inevitably to be excluded if reason is allowed to shape one’s engagement with religion. Perhaps the most interesting – and challenging – essays are to be found here. Charles Taylor considers the nature of secularity, showing effectively the way in which there is a tendency to ‘naturalise’ a secular perspective, which leads to a corresponding failure by theorists to take seriously issues of transcendence. Chris Firestone’s essay on Kant, also in this section, is perhaps the best of the volume. Scholarly and fascinating, he argues that ‘rational religious faith, for Kant is rooted in the transcendental needs of reason’ (p. 90), and this necessitates understanding the role that the Christian faith plays in securing Kant’s moral theory of religion. But the exploration of reason is not the only focus for the volume: Nicholas Lash makes a strong case for considering the relationship between imagination and reason through a discussion of the language used of God, and he challenges religious believers to become more theologically sophisticated and articulate in their use of God-language. This is a demanding volume of essays and some of the pieces presented will be more satisfying for the general reader than others. But the attempt to consider the relationship between philosophy and theology in a new way is to be commended: for this reason it deserves the kind of careful reading demanded by its contents.

28.00/£15.99 pbk

Of all the doctrines of the Christian faith, descent into hell and ascension into heaven are arguably the most implausible to the modern Western mind. We no longer live in the three-decker universe where such doctrines could make sense. Consequently, if these doctrines are to be a resource for current theology, we need to get beyond their mythological garb to whatever theological insights they might contain. At face value, the two doctrines of descent into hell and ascension seem to affirm Christs absence. Regardless of how we interpret descent into hell whether it is a circumlocution for death or a mythical portrayal of Christs ministry to the damned the initial meaning is that Christ had (temporarily) departed from the world of the living. Between Good Friday and Easter Sunday Christ lies in the grave, leaving his abandoned, despairing disciples to mourn his absence. Christs absence also seems to be the underlying meaning of the doctrine of the ascension. If we follow Lukes Gospel (Luke 24.1-53), Jesus ascended to his Father on the evening of Easter Sunday. According to the account of the Acts of the Apostles (Acts 1.1-11), however, Christ ascended into heaven after 40 days, leaving the disciples alone until their reception of the Spirit. Whichever version of the ascension we favour, the fact remains that the disciples are left without Christ. Descent into hell and ascension thus share a common emphasis on Jesus absence. Whereas the absence in the case of the descent into hell is three days, however, with the ascension it is, as Acts 1.11 makes clear, an absence until the parousia. The disciples, then, are situated on an axis between the two points of Christs presence, namely his earthly presence and his return to usher in the Kingdom. Christ has still not yet returned and thus we, like the disciples, continue to live in the ongoing period of Jesus absence. This absence raises the question: how are Christians to live lives of discipleship in view of Christs absence? To put it another way, does Christs ascension entail his abandonment of the earthly or does it constitute a new mode of presence in the world? It is precisely such questions that underlie the controversy between Luther, Zwingli and Oecolampadius concerning the nature of the Eucharist.

Descent into Hell, Ascension, and Luther's Doctrine of Ubiquitarianism

context that two problems arise with Sarkar’s exposition. Firstly, he makes it part of his programme to ’look neither backward nor forward to what [Kierkegaard] will eventually say in his subsequent works’ (p. 2). Sarkar thereby ignores the significant treatments of understanding that appear elsewhere in the Kierkegaardian corpus, notably in Concluding Scienti fic Postscript. Secondly, Sarkar fails to provide us’with definitions of and distinctions between such terms as understanding, reason, and reflection, nor does he define any other of the Kierkegaardian terms he employs. On the contrary, he disdains the ’commonplace philosophical task: to ferret out those properties from which the others would follow. Kierkegaard understandably does not do so, nor will I’ (p. 47). This refusal to define his or Kierkegaard’s terms, however, means that Sarkar’s critique of Kierkegaard’s conception of understanding and his attempts to correct and improve it,