David R. Mapel

Traditions of international ethics

1. Ethical traditions in international affairs Terry Nardin 2. The tradition of international law Murray Forsyth 3. The declaratory tradition in modern international law Dorothy V. Jones 4. Classical realism Steven Forde 5. Twentieth century realism Jack Donnelly 6. Natural law and international ethics Joseph Boyle 7. Kants global rationalism Thomas Donaldson 8. Utilitarianism and international ethics Anthony Ellis 9. The contractarian tradition and international ethics David R. Mapel 10. Liberalism and international reform Michael Joseph Smith 11. Marxism and international ethics Chris Brown 12. The idea of rights in international ethics R. J. Vincent 13. Biblical argument in international ethics Michael G. Cartwright 14. Convergence and divergence in international ethics David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin.

Fairness, Political Obligation, and Benefits Across Borders

The fairness theory of political obligation holds that individuals who receive public goods produced by the cooperative efforts of their fellow citizens have a prima facie obligation to do their fair share in return by obeying the law. However, what happens when public benefits cross borders? In an interdependent world, have political obligations begun to extend across borders? According to some critics, fairness theory leads to the conclusion that citizens who receive benefits across borders acquire political obligations to obey foreign states. In response, this article argues that fairness theorists and their critics have confused transnational moral obligations based on fairness with political obligations, which still largely coincide with the territorial boundaries of states. There are two key steps in this argument: reformulating the fairness theory of political obligation so that it focuses on the distinctive benefits provided by the rule of law; distinguishing between fairness as a basis of political obligation and fairness as a requirement of justice.

Democratic Voluntarism & the Problem of Justifying Political Bonds

Is there a moral basis for political obligation? Recent democratic theorists have raised powerful objections to the very idea of a nonvoluntary duty to obey the state. Yet, this article contends, a satisfactory account of our political bonds must include the idea of voluntarily acquired obligations, as well as the idea of a rationally grounded, nonvoluntary moral duty to comply with just institutions. These duties, the author argues, are neither as unpolitical nor as demanding as recent democrats suggest, and he concludes that many of the fears that democrats and liberals have about a rationally justified duty to obey will be relieved by a fuller understanding of democratic voluntarism.