David Ramiro Troitiño

Winston Churchill And The European Union

Abstract Given Winston Churchill’s influence and achievement as a writer, historian, adventurer, soldier, artist, and politician, his participation in the European integration process is crucial to understanding the entire scope of the project in its origins. Churchill was a fundamental voice promoting the Franco-British Union, a promoter of the European Communities, and an active participant of the Congress of Europe, embryo of the Council of Europe. This article analyzes Churchill’s view of European integration through his political speeches, in particular those delivered in Zurich and in The Hague, his ideas about the League of Nations and the United Nations, his understanding of the British Empire, and the special relations between the UK and the USA. His participation in the process of uniting Europe in its early stages provides us with essential information about the original plans for the creation of a united Europe and understanding the traditional British approach to the EU, including the current position of the conservative government led by Cameron.

De Gaulle and the British Membership in the European Communities

While de Gaulle has been comprehensively studied on the EU level, this is—to a large degree—not the case for his influence on the British involvement in the European integration process. As this influence will cease to apply once the UK is no longer a member of the Union, the Brexit will cause essential challenges for the British, especially for the rural areas and for the EU-British future relations.

The First European Community and the British Position

This chapter traces the role of the United Kingdom (UK) in the European integration process, from the founding of the European Communities to its eventual membership in 1973. It considers several key factors leading to the UK’s exclusion from the European Communities in the 1950s and 1960s, including economic factors related to its coal and steel industries, its relationship with the Commonwealth, as well as diplomatic concerns within the realm of ‘high politics.’ The chapter also considers the UK’s role in creating alternative integration arrangements, namely the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA). The chapter provides a historical foundation to understanding the UK’s relationship to the European Community as an ‘awkward partner,’ shedding light on its eventual exit from the EU four decades after joining.

The First Attempts to Unify Europe for Specific Purposes and British Flexibility

This chapter describes the initial effort of Briand, who presented his proposal for the creation of the United States of Europe through memorandum. This organization had to be based on peace like the League of Nation and had to create European market, which meant criticism from the UK as a protagonist of liberalization of trade and the main reason this attempt failed. Second part of the chapter is about Anglo-French Union, which had as a goal the protection of France against defeating by Germany and it was the only possibility how to keep France in the war. This proposal of Anglo-French Union had many similarities with the previous proposal of Briand.

Cooperation or Integration? Churchill’s Attitude Towards Organization of Europe

This chapter analyzes Churchill’s regard on European integration mainly through his political speeches, especially one in The Hague Congress and one in the University of Zurich. First part provides historical context, political ideas of Churchill, his attitude to European integration and the process of integration itself. The chapter also shows us the original plans for creating of European Union, Churchill’s support of League of Nations, and his scepticism about integration. Through his participation in the process of European integration, we can see obvious British influence and we can understand the traditional British approach to the EU.

Enlargement to the UK, the Referendum of 1975 and Position of Margaret Thatcher

The negotiations for the British accession were successful in the early 1970s only after de Gaulle left his position as President of France. The French blockade to the British accession was removed only after the British Premier had reassured his French colleagues about the British commitment to Europe and secured concessions on specific French concerns. The enlargement of the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway had become a difficult challenge for all the parties involved. The financial contribution to the European Budget was also a major issue during the negotiations. The official reason for the referendum of 1975 was that the UK citizens needed to express their opinion and decide about such an important issue linked with their individual and collective freedoms. Margaret Thatcher’s vision about European Communities covered such diverse areas as Europe and the EU; the Cold war, the USA, and the EU; the European Communities belonging to all its members; the Community not being an end in itself; national power against supranational constructions; weak bureaucracy; policies of the EU; European Market; European defence and relations between Europe and the USA.

The British Role in the Emergence of Multi-Speed Europe and Enhanced Cooperation

The idea of the European Union as a lasting association of European democracies warranting a stable yet constantly evolving institutional framework was formulated in the Schuman Declaration and has remained the political corner-stone of the Union. Although the EU has enlarged through successive waves, this has also generated new tensions between its members, including among those willing to move towards closer integration and those determined to preserve the intactness of national sovereignty in core areas. Here, a multi-speed Europe, or at least a double-speed Europe, has the potential to advance further integration among only interested members. Also, institutionalizing a multispeed Europe would in fact simply recognize the existing working system in the EU.

First European and Pan-European Integration Efforts and British Reluctance

The following chapter is about coherence between European countries during centuries and first proposals how to unify whole Europe in one big project as a cultural, political, and historical community. These tendencies were strong during First World War, when Europe had to face military conflict. This chapter therefore returns to Jean Monnet, the father of Europe, who was active in integration process together with Robert Schuman, who adopted the integration proposal, today known as the Schuman declaration. Second part of submitted chapter is dedicated to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s pan-European movement, which organized first Pan European Congress with the aim to unify all European nations together to avoid war conflict. In this part, we can find also the attitude of UK towards the European organization and its reluctance to be one part of supranational organization.

The British Rebate and the Single European Act: Political Ramifications of an Economic Reform

The UK rebate in the early days was largely devised and negotiated by Margaret Thatcher, yet its acceptance by the EC and the challenges that it posed to the union throughout the coming decades—or so this chapter will argue—have indirectly contributed to political reforms and new treaties that have in fact accelerated European political integration. Similarly, Thatcher’s support for what she thought and advocated should remain a merely economic single market has had unforeseen political ramifications, mainly advancing elements of European federalism that she vehemently opposed. This article maps the role of economic integration in advancing political integration and traces both of their successes back to some at first seemingly unsuccessful visions to formulate a more integrated Europe.

The Eastern Partnership Programme: Is Pragmatic Regional Functionalism Working for a Contemporary Political Empire?

Focusing on the Eastern Partnership Programme (EPP), this paper ponders on discerning a principal reason because of which the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was not able to help the EU in establishing and running a proper strategic framework where the entity could feel confident and secure, comfortably ‘communicating’ with its immediate neighbourhood in the European East. The article represents an interpretational type of theoretical analysis and argues that pure political driving forces of desirable cooperational or confrontational activities dramatically affect the outcome. This paper claims that the EPP’s ‘innate’ functional nature has been clashing with the EU’s status of a de facto contemporary political empire, and the situation has eventually resulted in the self-admitted necessity for the EU to comprehensively revise the ENP/EPP. The argument here is as follows: being a function-driven entity presumes relative freedom in making choices; being an empire leaves an entity with no other choice but to ‘behave’ like an empire in terms of expanding further into its periphery.