David Rolph

Reputation, celebrity and defamation law

Contents: Introduction Part I: Post on reputation The historical foundations of the concept of reputation The basic principles of liability for defamation: meaning, publication, identification and damages. Part II: Reputation as property Reputation as honour: part I Reputation as honour: part II Reputation as dignity. Part III: Reputation as celebrity Conclusion Bibliography Index.

Looking Again at Photographs and Privacy: Theoretical Perspectives on Law’s Treatment of Photographs as Invasions of Privacy

Courts in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand are increasingly entertaining claims for invasions of privacy. Many of these cases involve the publication of photographs by a media outlet. In the United Kingdom in particular, the means of protecting personal privacy has been the adaptation of the existing, information-based cause of action for breach of confidence. This has entailed treating photographs as a form of information. This chapter analyses the imposition of liability for the publication of intrusive photographs, as it is developing in the United Kingdom. It applies critical insights from leading theorists on photography, such as Barthes, Berger and Sontag, to suggest that the judicial treatment of photography is underdeveloped.

Racial Discrimination Laws as a Means of Protecting Collective Reputation and Identity

Defamation law is intended to protect individual reputations. It is inadequate to protect collective or group aspects of identity, yet these aspects are important and integral to many people’s sense of self. Hate speech or racial vilification laws, such as the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) Pt IIA, are intended to address this lacuna in legal protection. This chapter analyses the interaction between defamation and racial vilification laws as a means of protecting individual and collective aspects of identity, through a close study of two Federal Court of Australia decisions, Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2004) 135 FCR 105 and Eatock v Bolt (2011) 197 FCR 261. The latter decision in particular is focussed upon, given the intense public debate it has generated about the intrusion of racial vilification laws on freedom of speech.