David Soskice

Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage

The article presents a review of the book “Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage,” edited by Peter Hall and David Soskice.

Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others

Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies. We develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions, hence redistribution. Our argument implies (1) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, whereas center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems; and (2) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies.

Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems

The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkans seminal work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR—minimum winning coalitions versus consensus—we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.

Distribution and Redistribution: The Shadow of the Nineteenth Century

The authors present an alternative to power resource theory as an approach to the study of distribution and redistribution. While they agree that partisanship and union power are important, they argue that both are endogenous to more fundamental differences in the organization of capitalist democracies. Specifically, center-left governments result from PR consensus political systems (as opposed to majoritarian systems), while strong unions have their origins in coordinated (as opposed to liberal) capitalism. These differences in political representation and in the organization of production developed jointly in the early twentieth century and explain the cross-national pattern of distribution and redistribution. The clusters have their origins in two distinct political economic conditions in the second half of the nineteenth century: one in which locally coordinated economies were coupled with strong guild traditions and heavy investment in cospecific assets and one in which market-based economies were coupled with liberal states and more mobile assets.

German technology policy, innovation, and national institutional frameworks

This paper examines the patterns of technological innovation in Germany, and compares them with those prevalent in the US and UK economies. The paper argues that the institutional features of the German system of innovation lend it comparative advantage in innovation. The paper discusses these issues in a framework of the economics of organisation in industry; it closes by discussing some of the limitations of the German system in regard to newly emergent technologies.

Can High-technology Industries Prosper in Germany? Institutional Frameworks and the Evolution of the German Software and Biotechnology Industries

The paper explores the influence of institutional frameworks on the evolution of the German software and biotechnology sectors. It links institutional constraints to poor performance of German firms in high volume market niches characterized by turbulent technological change and substantial financial risk. However, German firms are prospering in software services and “platform technologies” in biotechnology. The company organizational structures and investment strategies needed to excel in these market segments provide a close “fit” with incentives created within the German economy.

Inequality in developed countries and Latin America: coordinated, liberal and hierarchical systems

Abstract The first half of this article explains the enduring disparities in inequality and welfare states across advanced economies in terms of varieties of capitalism and political systems. Where capitalism is coordinated, as in much of northern Europe, political systems are consensus-based with proportional representation (PR); consensus politics and coordinated capitalism reinforce each other in generating relatively low inequality and strong welfare states. Where capitalism is liberal – the Anglo-Saxon countries – political systems are competitive with majoritarian voting: mutual reinforcement of politics and capitalism generates relatively inegalitarian outcomes and safety-net welfare states. The second half of the article develops a model of hierarchical capitalism to show how this reinforces and is reinforced by a Latin American political system with majoritarian presidents and PR legislatures to generate high and persistent inequality and reduce development options.

Shocks to the System: the German Political Economy Under Stress:

The German economy is recovering hesitantly from the sharp post-unification boom and recession. Two features of recent West German performance are novel: there has been an unprecedented loss of jobs in industry, and manufacturing profitability has been pushed to its lowest level ever and is now low relative to other OECD economies. Serious problems with labour costs and innovation would be expected to show up in a weakening in the trend of export performance. That this has not yet happened is the consequence of the existence of an apparently robust innovation system which enables companies to pursue high quality incremental innovation strategies. However, the experiment of transferring the West German model to the East has proved extremely costly and has not so far established the basis for self-sustaining growth. Problems in profitability, investment and employment in West Ger many reflect the failure of the bargaining system-unions, employers, Bundesbank and public sector—to negotiate the sharing of the burden of unification.

The 3-Equation New Keynesian Model: A Graphical Exposition

We develop a graphical 3-equation New Keynesian model for macroeconomic analysis to replace the traditional IS-LM-AS model. The new graphical IS-PC-MR model is a simple version of the one commonly used by central banks and captures the forward-looking thinking engaged in by the policy maker. Within a common framework, we compare our model to other monetary-rule based models that are used for teaching and policy analysis. We show that the differences among the models centre on whether the central bank optimizes and on the lag structure in the IS and Phillips curve equations. We highlight the analytical and pedagogical advantages of our preferred model. The model can be used to analyze the consequences of a wide range of macroeconomic shocks, to identify the structural determinants of the coefficients of a Taylor type interest rate rule, and to explain the origin and size of inflation bias.

Informal Social Networks and Rational Voting

Classical rational choice explanations of voting participation are widely thought to have failed. This article argues that the currently dominant Group Mobilization and Ethical Agency approaches have serious shortcomings in explaining individually rational turnout. It develops an informal social network (ISN) model in which people rationally vote if their informal networks of family and friends attach enough importance to voting, because voting leads to social approval and vice versa. Using results from the social psychology literature, research on social groups in sociology and their own survey data, the authors argue that the ISN model can explain individually rational non-altruistic turnout. If group variables that affect whether voting is used as a marker of individual standing in groups are included, the likelihood of turnout rises dramatically.