David Szakonyi

Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace

The authors explore how modern autocrats win elections by inducing employers to mobilize their employees to vote for the regime and thereby subvert the electoral process. Using two original surveys of employers and workers conducted around the 2011 parliamentary elections in Russia, they find that just under one-quarter of employers engaged in some form of political mobilization. They then develop a simple framework for identifying which firms engage in voter mobilization and which workers are targeted for mobilization. Firms that are vulnerable to state pressure—financially dependent firms and those in sectors characterized by asset immobility—are among the most common sites of workplace-based electoral subversion. The authors also find that workers who are especially dependent on their employer are more likely to be targeted for mobilization. By identifying the conditions under which workplace mobilization occurs in authoritarian regimes, the authors contribute to the long-standing debate about the economic bases of democratization. In addition, they explore an understudied means of subverting elections in contemporary autocracies: the use of economic coercion to mobilize voters. Moreover, their research finds that clientelist exchange can thrive in industrial settings and in the absence of deeply embedded political parties.

Veto Players and the Value of Political Control A Theory With Evidence From Energy Privatization

We examine how veto players and the government’s valuation of political control of economic activity affect the likelihood of privatization. When the government ascribes a high value to political control, veto players impede privatization because they would have to be compensated for their losses. When the value of political control is low, the government prefers to privatize enterprises that become difficult to control with multiple veto players. We test the theory against data on energy privatizations in developing countries, 1988-2008. Oil prices offer a quantitative measure of the government’s valuation of controlling the energy sector. When oil prices are high, the government has a keen interest in controlling the energy sector. Accordingly, additional veto players reduce (increase) the likelihood of privatization in times of high (low) oil prices. Beyond illuminating the politics of privatization, the results inform debates on the role of veto players in government policy.

Hitting Them with Carrots: Voter Intimidation and Vote Buying in Russia

From robocalls to vote buying scholars have identified many ways that politicians mobilize voters to the polls. One mobilization tactic that has received less attention, however, is electoral intimidation. We use survey experiments and crowd-sourced electoral violation reports from the 2011-12 election cycle in Russia to explore this understudied phenomenon. We develop a simple argument about the conditions under which voter intimidation is likely to occur. Consistent with arguments about the decline of vote buying in middle-income countries, we find little evidence that vote buying was practiced on a large scale in this election. Voter intimidation, however, was widespread, especially among employed voters and in Russia’s many single company towns where employers have considerable leverage over employees. In these single company towns, the consequences of job loss are so grave that employer intimidation may often be sufficient to induce compliance even without direct monitoring of voter behavior. Outside of company towns where employers have less leverage, active forms of monitoring may supplement intimidation in order to encourage compliance. These results suggest that employers can be reliable vote brokers; that voter intimidation can persist in a middle-income country; and that, under some conditions intimidation may be employed without the need for active monitoring.

Who Benefits From Economic Reform? Firms and Distributive Politics

While the distributional consequences of economic reform have captivated political scientists, few studies have investigated the ability of different firms to reap gains from policy change. Reforms indeed create winners and losers, but there is scant evidence on specifically which firms benefit and which firms lose out. We propose that the benefits from liberalizing reform accrue mostly to firms that are not vulnerable to extortion by the state and that have past experience with lobbying through a business association. This theory goes against the common intuition that liberalization reduces the importance of the state in the distribution of gains from economic activity. To test the theory, we examine how India’s national electricity reform in 2003 changed the quality of power supply for 1,094 manufacturing firms between 2002 and 2005. We find that liberalization produced highly skewed benefits and identify the politically salient characteristics that drive firm-level distributional inequality.

Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Political Selection: Evidence from Russia

Cracking down on corruption has become a key tool for politicians to build popular support. But we know surprisingly little about whether these campaigns actually affect the behavior of current and future officials. This paper evaluates the electoral effects of a common anti-corruption measure -- mandating that officials submit financial disclosures -- using data on 25,992 municipal elections in Putin-era Russia. Using a quasi-experimental design, I first find that incumbents are much less likely to seek re-election if they later will have to reveal their income and assets. Financial disclosures increase the risk that any illicit rents they accrued in office will be exposed. Moreover, this type of ethics law also reduces the number of candidacies among individuals likely to have engaged in tax evasion. I argue that financial disclosure laws operate as a personal audit, which generates public information for authorities to prosecute crimes committed both inside and outside of office. I show that where enforcement capacity is high, anticorruption campaigns can change the incentives to serve in government, even in regimes where many suspect other political motives are at play.

Elite Defection Under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

Elite cohesion is one of the fundamental pillars of authoritarian regime stability. Defections from the ruling coalition can signal regime weakness, embolden the opposition, and, sometimes, lead to regime collapse. Using a unique dataset on 4,313 regional legislative candidates from Russias ruling party, United Russia, this paper examines the determinants of elite defections in one prominent electoral autocracy. We believe this to be the first study to use quantitative, micro-level data to test hypotheses about the integrity of elite coalitions under autocracy. Our theoretical framework predicts that elites will be more likely to defect when there is increased uncertainty about the willingness and/or ability of the regime to provide electoral benefits, spoils, and career advancement. Regimes that limit points of access to spoils, share power with the opposition, and lack strong formal institutions see higher rates of defection. While opposition co-optation may help the regime assuage threats from outside the regime, it may also leave regime insiders disgruntled and prone to defect. Finally, elites with personal followings and private business connections are most likely to defect, since they are better equipped to pursue their political goals independently of the regime. This result suggests that allowing elites to accumulate autonomous resources can undermine an authoritarian regimes hold on power.

Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Russia and Venezuela

Modern clientelist exchange is typically carried out by intermediaries—party activists, employers, local strongmen, traditional leaders, and the like. Politicians use such brokers to mobilize voters, yet little about their relative effectiveness is known. The authors argue that broker effectiveness depends on their leverage over clients and their ability to monitor voters. They apply their theoretical framework to compare two of the most common brokers worldwide, party activists and employers, arguing the latter enjoy numerous advantages along both dimensions. Using survey-based framing experiments in Venezuela and Russia, the authors find voters respond more strongly to turnout appeals from employers than from party activists. To demonstrate mechanisms, the article shows that vulnerability to job loss and embeddedness in workplace social networks make voters more responsive to clientelist mobilization by their bosses. The results shed light on the conditions most conducive to effective clientelism and highlight broker type as important for understanding why clientelism is prevalent in some countries but not others.

Solar Power for Street Vendors? Problems with Centralized Charging Stations in Urban Markets

While energy poverty is a particularly large problem in rural areas, rapid urbanization in developing countries is also raising concerns about energy access in urban areas. How can policymakers improve energy access for the urban poor? We address this question by investigating the use of solar power for improved lighting for urban street vendors. We conduct a field study of the centralized charging station model in Patna, Bihar, India. A solar panel is installed in a marketplace and vendors can rent and charge lights for a daily fee. Our findings reveal many problems with the approach. Key issues include opposition by local strongmen who operate diesel generators, the difficulty of finding local entrepreneurs to operate the system, vendor misuse of the lights, and physical barriers such as land availability. These problems increase the cost of the approach to an unacceptable level. Policy recommendations include considering the sales of standalone devices and relying on the urban electricity grid for connections.