David T. Robinson

Industry Concentration and Average Stock Returns

Firms in more concentrated industries earn lower returns, even after controlling for size, book-to-market, momentum, and other return determinants. Explanations based on chance, measurement error, capital structure, and persistent in-sample cash flow shocks do not explain this finding. Drawing on work in industrial organization, we posit that either barriers to entry in highly concentrated industries insulate firms from undiversifiable distress risk, or firms in highly concentrated industries are less risky because they engage in less innovation, and thereby command lower expected returns. Additional time-series tests support these risk-based interpretations. Copyright 2006 by The American Finance Association.

The Market for Mergers and the Boundaries of the Firm

We relate the property rights theory of the firm to empirical regularities in the market for mergers and acquisitions. We first show that high market‐to‐book acquirers typically do not purchase low market‐to‐book targets. Instead, mergers pair together firms with similar ratios. We then build a continuous‐time model of investment and merger activity combining search, scarcity, and asset complementarity to explain this like buys like result. We test the model by relating like‐buys‐like to search frictions. Search frictions and assortative matching vary inversely, supporting the model over standard explanations.

Financial Contracting in Biotech Strategic Alliances

We analyze 125 strategic alliance contracts, all of which concern early-stage research at small biotechnology research and development companies. Staged investment is ubiquitous, but solutions to agency problems vary. The cycle of equity participation in alliances resembles what we observe in venture capital contracts: they involve convertible equity and sometimes contain antidilution provisions, warrants, and board seats. Contracts rights vary explicitly with the size of the equity stake. Contracts contain explicit provisions linking equity participation to subsequent initial public offerings and contain clauses designed to insulate both parties from multitasking problems. Contracts often specify provisions that are unobservable or difficult to verify, which suggests a role for expected litigation as an enforcement tool in contract design.

What Does Financial Literacy Training Teach Us

The authors use data from a finance-related theme park to explore how financial education changes investment, financing, and consumer behavior. Students were assigned fictitious life situations and asked to create household budgets. Some students received a 19-hour financial literacy curriculum before going to the park, and some did not. After controlling for demographic variables, the authors show that the treatment effects of the financial literacy program are strong. Students were more frugal, delayed gratification, paid off debt faster, and relied less on credit financing after training. Students who attended training showed greater uptake of decision support that was offered in the park, which indicates that decision support and financial literacy training are complements, not substitutes.

What is the Business of Business

This paper develops a simple framework for understanding the emergence of new organizational forms, such as socially responsible firms and social entrepreneurs, that embody the private sector’s efforts to resolve problems that typically have been within the purview of government and traditional public charities. We consider organizations that can generate both financial and social returns. Differences in the technologies between the for-profit sector and the social sector give rise to comparative advantages and play a key part in the analysis. This allows us to analyze the conditions under which hybrid organizations emerge in place of traditional charities and profit-maximizers.

Do Private Equity Fund Managers Earn Their Fees? Compensation, Ownership, and Cash Flow Performance

We study the relations between management contract terms and performance in private equity using new data for 837 funds from 1984--2010. We find no evidence that higher fees or lower managerial ownership are associated with lower net-of-fee performance. Nevertheless, compensation rises and shifts to performance-insensitive components during fundraising booms. Further, the behavior of distributions around contractual fee triggers is consistent with an underlying agency conflict between investors and fund managers. Our evidence suggests that managers with higher fees deliver higher gross performance, and highlights that agency costs are an inevitable consequence of the information frictions endemic to agency relationships. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

The Economic Psychology of Entrepreneurship and Family Business

This paper studies the attitudes of entrepreneurs, both how they differ as a group from others in the economy, as well as how they differ from one another according to the mode of entry into entrepreneurship and whether or not the firm is a family business. We use data from the Survey of Consumer Finance to measure and isolate the enjoyment of private benefits, attitudes toward risk, and optimism for these groups. Entrepreneurs are more optimistic and enjoy the nonpecuniary benefits of work more than wage earners. They embrace risk, but perhaps less so than commonly believed, as their risk‐bearing is tempered by longer planning horizons. Family business owners share optimism and nonpecuniary benefits with other entrepreneurs; their tolerance for risk is not different than wage earners. In contrast, those who inherit businesses are significantly less risk tolerant than nonentrepreneurs, are no more optimistic than nonentrepreneurs, but seem to derive more nonpecuniary benefits from work than others. Simply possessing these entrepreneurial traits translate into actions, increasing the amount of time spent at work, even among those who are not entrepreneurs.

Market Structure, Internal Capital Markets, and the Boundaries of the Firm

We study how the creation of an internal capital market (ICM) can invite strategic responses in product markets that, in turn, shape firm boundaries. ICMs provide ex post resource flexibility, but come with ex ante commitment costs. Alternatively, stand‐alones possess commitment ability but lack flexibility. By creating flexibility, integration can sometimes deter a rivals entry, but commitment problems can also invite predatory capital raising. These forces drive different organizational equilibria depending on the integrators relation to the product market. Hybrid organizational forms like strategic alliances can sometimes dominate integration by offering some of its benefits with fewer strategic costs.

EFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

We characterize incentive-efficient merger outcomes when payments can be made both in cash and stock. Each firm has private information about both its stand-alone value and a component of the (possibly negative) potential synergies. We study two cases: when transfers can, and cannot, be made contingent on the value of any new firm. When they can, we show that redistributing shares of any nonmerging firm generates information rents and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementability of efficient merger rules. When they cannot, private information undermines efficiency more when it concerns stand-alone values than synergies. Here, acquisitions emerge as optimal mechanisms. Copyright 2007 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Firm Age, Investment Opportunities, and Job Creation

This paper asks whether startups react more to changing investment opportunities than more mature firms do. We use the fact that a regions pre-existing industrial structure creates exogenous variation in the severity of its exposure to nation-wide manufacturing shocks to develop an instrument for changing investment opportunities, and examine employment creation in the non-tradable sector as a response to those opportunities. Startups are much more responsive to changing local economic conditions than older firms. Moreover, their responsiveness doubles in areas with better access to small business finance, suggesting that financing constraints are an important brake on job creation in the startup sector. Although we focus mostly on the non-tradable sector for empirical identification, our results extend to other sectors of the economy, indicating that the mechanisms we uncover are economically pervasive. This suggests that factors like organizational flexibility and innovativeness may be important drivers of job creation among startups.