David Voas

Religion in Britain: Neither Believing nor Belonging.

‘Believing without belonging’ has become the catchphrase of much European work on religion in the past decade. The thesis that religious belief is fairly robust even if churchgoing is declining is examined using data from the British Household Panel Survey and the British Social Attitudes surveys. The evidence suggests that belief has in fact eroded in Britain at the same rate as two key aspects of belonging: religious affiliation and attendance. Levels of belief are lower than those of nominal belonging. The roles of period, cohort and age effects on religious change are considered; the conclusion is that decline is generational. In relation to the rates at which religion is transmitted from parents to children, the results suggest that only about half of parental religiosity is successfully transmitted, while absence of religion is almost always passed on. Transmission is just as weak for believing as for belonging.

Religious pluralism and participation: Why previous research is wrong

Does religious pluralism undermine or promote religious involvement?. Some secularization theories contend that diversity breeds loss of belief and lower participation. The religious economies model counters that involvement is boosted by the availability of alternative religious suppliers and the competition that results, with each group working harder to gain adherents. The issue is sufficiently important that a recent review found 193 tests of this question in 26 published articles. Almost all of these findings (both positive arid negative) should be abandoned. The associations reported do not reflect the effects of pluralism but a previously overlooked mathematical relationship between measures of religious participation and the index of pluralism. Even when pluralism has no effect on participation, the correlation between these two variables is likely to be non zero. The sign and magnitude of this expected correlation depends on the nature of the size distributions of the religious groups across the areas studied. Results from several frequently cited studies closely atch what would be expected from chance alone. Various alternative methods for studying pluralism in future research are examined, but currently there is no compelling evidence that religious pluralism has any effect on religious involvement.

Intermarriage and the demography of secularization

One way of measuring religious affiliation is to look at rites of initiation such as baptism. English statistics show that for the first time since the Church of England was founded, less than half the nation is Anglican on this criterion. The pattern of formal religious transmission changed during the Second World War. Previously christening was quasi-universal, and the Church of England was the preferred provider. By the end of the war baptism was evidently optional, and chosen principally by parents whose religious identities matched. Further analysis suggests that affiliation now tends to be lost following marriage to someone from a different religious background, though the USA differs from Europe in this respect. A demographic theory of advanced secularization is outlined that specifies a proximal cause for declining religious affiliation, and provides tools for predicting the changes to be expected over future decades. The theory also helps to explain why affiliation may fall most quickly where there is most religious diversity.

Research note: The 2001 census and christian identification in Britain

Results from the 2001 population census suggest that nearly 72% of people in England and Wales may be identified as Christian. This figure is substantially higher than the proportion found by the British Social Attitudes survey and other national studies. Comparing the census with sample surveys and examining different parts of the UK raises two interesting questions. Why does the census produce a higher figure than recurrent surveys for nominal Christian identification? Why, when church attendance is higher in Scotland than in England and Wales, does the census show a higher proportion of nominal identifiers in the latter? It is argued that the answer to both questions is the same: anxiety about national identity. While the census results might be taken to mean that there are more Christians than expected, such an interpretation is probably mistaken.

Is the United States a Counterexample to the Secularization Thesis

Virtually every discussion of secularization asserts that high levels of religiosity in the United States make it a decisive counterexample to the claim that modern societies are prone to secularization. Focusing on trends rather than levels, the authors maintain that, for two straightforward empirical reasons, the United States should no longer be considered a counterexample. First, it has recently become clear that American religiosity has been declining for decades. Second, this decline has been produced by the generational patterns underlying religious decline elsewhere in the West: each successive cohort is less religious than the preceding one. America is not an exception. These findings change the theoretical import of the United States for debates about secularization.

Three Puzzles of Non-religion in Britain

Non-religious people tend to be male rather than female, to be better educated than average, and to live in particular areas. Each of these findings contains a puzzle that we address using data from Great Britain. Male infants are slightly more likely than female infants to be described by their parents as having no religion. To explain this phenomenon, we show that there is an association between the religious labels attached to girls and boys and the characteristics of their mothers and fathers, respectively. A positive correlation between education and non-religion is often taken for granted. Among young adults in Britain, however, the relationship is reversed. The reason lies in the former religious polarisation of the graduate population. The final puzzle is why so much local variation in secularity is evident. We examine the extent to which these contrasts are the result of demographic and socio-economic differences.

‘A Divergence of Views: Attitude change and the religious crisis over homosexuality’:

British attitudes towards homosexuality have changed with astonishing rapidity over recent decades. Society has managed to assimilate these shifts with relative ease. The Christian churches, however, as repositories of tradition and defenders of inherited values, have been finding it increasingly difficult to adjust to the new environment. The Church of England is internally divided in the face of an external crisis: the Archbishop of Canterbury acknowledges that the global Anglican Communion could split over the issue, and the church faces similar pressures domestically. These events raise important questions about how religious institutions come to terms with modernity. The rapidity of social change, the decline in deference to authority, the increase in tolerance of anything that seems a private matter, and the sense that sexuality is fundamental to the free expression of personal identity, all make it difficult for a church to declare that sexual orientation might disqualify one from ministry or even membership. This paper analyses empirical evidence covering two decades from the British Social Attitudes and British Household Panel surveys. It is apparent that no real consensus yet exists on basic issues of sexual morality. Society as a whole is highly polarised over the question of whether same-sex unions are wrong, with significant and increasing divisions between young and old, women and men, and religious and non-religious. Far from being better placed than others to avoid disputes, Christian churches suffer from compounded problems. The attitudes of lay Christians are starkly and increasingly polarised along the dimensions of ideology and religious practice. This gulf presents a particular problem for churches with both liberal and evangelical wings, notably the Church of England.

Does Religion Belong in Population Studies

Religion has survived a period of comparative neglect in social science to become a topic of keen interest. Questions on religion are now often included in censuses and surveys. It does not follow from the perceived importance of the topic, however, that these questions yield useful data. The difficulties and limitations of using survey responses on religion, and the purposes that such information might nevertheless serve, are examined in this paper. The effects of religion may relate either to religious identity or to the degree of religious commitment (religiosity). Neither of these characteristics is easy to measure. The potential importance of religion means that demand for data on the topic is unlikely to disappear, however. Religion can affect age at marriage, marital stability, attitudes to family planning and desired family size, health and morbidity, and propensity to move, that is, fertility, mortality, and migration, the main topics of formal demography. It can also be relevant in various areas of applied population studies, including education, economic activity, social equality, crime, alcohol use, social attitudes, and social capital, making it a factor in public-policy debates.

Vicarious Religion: An Examination and Critique

The Christian churches have considerably declined in popularity, power, and prestige over the twentieth century in Britain and Europe. This decline has stimulated many attempts to characterise the attitudes towards religion of people who are neither involved with organised religion nor consciously opposed to it. Grace Davie has founded one such effort on the concept of ‘vicarious religion’. The idea of vicarious religion rests on two principles: that a minority of people are religious on behalf of a silent majority and that those in the majority appreciate their efforts. We agree that examples of the phenomenon can be found, but we question whether popular sympathy for religion provides evidence for this conjecture. We review the various illustrations provided by Davie and offer alternative readings that seem more plausible. We also argue that the trajectory of change in marginal religious involvement seriously weakens its ability to diminish the evidence of secularisation.

The Maintenance and Transformation of Ethnicity: Evidence on Mixed Partnerships in Britain

Statistics from the 2001 census of population in England and Wales reveal the extent of ethnic and religious mixing among married and cohabiting couples. Non-marital cohabitation and mixed marriages are infrequent in the South Asian (Hindu, Sikh and Muslim) groups; they are common among the Black and especially the mixed ethnicity subpopulations. Mixed partnerships influence the future ethnic composition of the country, and there are signs that the Black Caribbean group is merging into the general population.