David Whetham

Killer Drones: the Moral Ups and Downs

The use of drones has increased exponentially in recent years, causing a mounting wave of concern amongst the media and public about the implications of using unmanned systems – often misunderstood in their nature – above all in terms of accountability, legitimacy and ‘fairness’. David Whetham explores the many facets of this question, delving into the often-overlooked nuances of the use of remote-controlled systems and its practical as well as moral implications.

Drones to protect

While the more contentious use of drones to carry out targeted killings is often focused upon, very little attention has been paid to the potential benefits that their unarmed variants can offer in preventing the mass violation of human rights in conflict areas. Drones have already been employed with some success to support UN peacekeepers. This paper looks at their use in monitoring and deterring deliberate acts of harm against civilian populations in situations where the international community is unwilling or unable to deploy a peacekeeping force on the ground. With an appropriate command, control and dissemination arrangement in place, the use of surveillance drones could provide a viable option between doing nothing and committing to full-scale military intervention. Combined with clear signalling of intent to prosecute such crimes as soon as circumstances allow, knowing that one’s actions might be observed and recorded could potentially curb and restrain the perpetrators of human rights atrocities.

The Challenge of Ethical Relativism in a Coalition Environment

Abstract This paper explores the practical ethical challenges faced by a military commander in a coalition environment when that partner does not appear to share the same ethical values. Should one intervene? If one accepts that ethical standards are not absolute, does one have any kind of justification in interfering in such a situation? The implications and validity of ethical relativism are explored and challenged and then a framework is proposed to allow a structured approach to decision-making in such situations that balances considerations of the specific act against the implications in a broader context. Such a framework can be used whether or not ethical relativism is accepted as a valid explanation.

Killing Within the Rules

It is generally accepted that rules are important, even in war, and that the adherence to them is one of the ways that the West differentiates itself from the terrorists it seeks to destroy. However, what exactly are the rules and how have they changed? In the light of high profile rulings by the UK Law Lords on the applicability of human rights legislation in theatres of military operations, some are claiming that the British military is under legal siege and is increasingly unable to do its job due to new rules, interference from lawyers and the fear of looking over ones shoulder. Is this view accurate?

A report of the findings of the Defence Academy warbow trials Part 1 Summer 2005

Abstract In 1992, Peter Jones established a scientific benchmark for the discussion about the effectiveness of the medieval longbow. Since then it has often been employed as the basis for those seeking to demonstrate, compare or contrast or re-evaluate the historical role played by this weapon system. While the authors of this paper acknowledge the importance of Joness tests in establishing a foundation for the scientific analysis of the effectiveness of the medieval longbow, it must also be acknowledged that some of the assumptions in the tests made by Jones are now considered flawed or have otherwise been called into question by shifts and developments in historical opinion. The aim of these tests was to complete a series of trials repeating the work done by Jones to a standard that is satisfactory to traditional archery experts, historians, blacksmiths and academics alike, allowing a new evaluation of the power and effectiveness of the longbow and its performance against armoured targets concurrent with current historical opinions from a range of disciplines. Once the tests were completed, the team would try and recreate the results in the laboratory to provide a basis for future testing.

‘Saying No’: Command Responsibility and the Ethics of Selective Conscientious Objection

Pleading conscientious objection (CO) as a general means of avoiding conscription into military service has, of course, been with us for centuries. Latterly, and following the growing importance and influence of the human rights movement, the ‘right to refuse’ has become codified in many countries, particularly in Europe (in 2001 the Council for Europe Parliamentary Assembly recommended that the right of conscientious objection of those ‘who for reasons of conscience or profound conviction, arising from religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian, philosophical or similar motives, refuse to perform armed service’ should be incorporated into the European Convention on Human Rights). What is relatively recent is the development and application of the notion of selective conscientious objection (SCO). SCO is not about whether blindly following orders in any circumstances is the right or wrong thing to do that debate, while still running in some unenlightened quarters, was settled as long ago as the Nuremberg Trials of 1945 46; there is a broad consensus that there are some orders that should not be obeyed no matter who gives the order. However, SCO is far more challenging than this, as it does not refer to a specific act that would ‘shock the conscience of mankind’ but rather to whether participation in a particular war can be justified or not. While of immense contemporary relevance, there is nothing intrinsically novel about the SCO question as such. As George Lucas reminds us in his paper, the early modern Spanish writer Francisco de Vitoria (c1483 1546) addressed it in remarkably sophisticated detail almost 500 years ago at a time, perhaps not just coincidentally, when the first recorded instances of CO were being pleaded as a valid ground for (general) exemption from conscripted military service. What is new is the increasing willingness of volunteer servicemen, as well as conscripts, to adopt SCO, reject the precept ‘My

An Introduction and Review: The King’s College London Centre for Military Ethics

As many readers of the Journal of Military Ethics will be aware, there is a growing acknowledgment that military ethics and a genuine, deep appreciation of human rights issues are crucial component of the education of every member of the armed forces, wherever they may serve. There is a clear linkage between ethical behaviour within armed forces and conduct in operations. Fostering ethical awareness and moral decision-making in military personnel is a proven way of reducing harm and suffering in conflict situations (Warner et al. 2011). Thinking about and understanding the moral foundation of what one does is also an important part of military professional identity. Therefore, there is substantial benefit for everyone in promoting and supporting this area as widely as possible. Due to regular international interventions at military institutions in multiple countries and substantial research into the approaches adopted in different contexts, I am very aware that there is a large and growing demand for military ethics education worldwide. I am also aware that this demand is not being satisfied. For the last five years I have therefore been seeking new ways to deliver military ethics education in a way that can make it accessible as widely as possible. That was the motivation for convincing King’s College London to set up the King’s Centre for Military Ethics (KCME) in 2015, and the following remarks aim to introduce and review this work. King’s has long had an interest in military affairs, having been awarded its Royal Charter by King George IV with the support of the victor of the Battle of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington (then Prime Minister), in 1829. It is now the home of the worldfamous Department of War Studies, dedicated to the multi-disciplinary study of war and diplomacy, and also its sister department of Defence Studies, based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC), part of the UK’s Defence Academy in Shrivenham. Defence Studies has provided academic support to staff and military students at JSCSC since 1997, where King’s intimate and long-term relationship with military practitioners continues today. As one would expect, the provision of military ethics education at the JSCSC has evolved over time in response to the changing character of war and the perceived demands of the military institutions and professionals it serves (see, e.g., Whetham 2009, 2017). What has remained consistent is the fact that for every course that is taught at the Staff College, whether for relatively junior officers with only one or two appointments under their belt, or Brigadier Generals being equipped for the very top jobs in the Armed Forces, there is a requirement that military ethics is covered in some way. Sharing this subject and supporting its development overseas is also often

Responsibilities to Protect

Following the humanitarian horrors of the 1990s, the international community began to seek consensus on a new norm to help address the tension between upholding the sovereign right of states to administer their own internal affairs, and the pressing need for civilian populations to be protected from their own government in certain situations. The result was the responsibility to protect initiative from the UN, accepted as an emerging norm and based on existing legal structures although not itself necessarily accepted as law. This volume looks not only at the humanitarian-inspired interventions of the past 15 years, such as those that took place under the Force for Good banner of the UK Government under New Labour, but also looks at what this has meant for the people actually involved in doing them. What responsibilities do states have towards their own soldiers when sending them to protect ‘other’ people? Should that responsibility extend to moral and psychological protection as well as physical protection, and if so, how? How far does the duty go when considering the protection of one’s own citizens who have deliberately placed themselves in harm’s way, such as journalists who have chosen to leave the safety of a protected area? What happens when institutions are faced with the choice of protecting their people or their reputation? What does it feel like for the inhabitants of a state who become ‘protected’ by the international community?

Morality and War: Can War Be Just in the Twenty-first Century?

Having originally studied moral philosophy before embarking on a long and successful career at the heart of UK Government, this book is the product of Fisher’s PhD thesis undertaken in what would have been a time of well-deserved retirement for most people. Fisher remains at King’s College London as a Visiting Senior Fellow with the Department of War Studies. Given his background having served in senior positions in the UK Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and in the Cabinet Office where he advised the Prime Minister on matters of defence it is hardly surprising that this work is well supported with a thoroughly practical appreciation of the realities of international relations. To start the book, Fisher addresses the questions posed by moral realism and also the insidious moral scepticism that pervades liberal discourse on all things normative. He challenges the view that moral relativism is the only intellectually honest approach in order to demonstrate that it is possible to ground the Just War Tradition on a foundation that is a good deal more solid (and indeed universal) than many critics might suggest. Fisher clearly feels meeting this challenge is essential: ‘If we are to defend liberal society . . . We need to be able to explain and defend the liberal vision of the good life and the values that underpin liberal society’ (page 36). One of the ways he seeks to do this is by drawing on other traditions of moral thinking and demonstrating how they can be recognised as implicit within the centuries of Just War discourse and engagement with the real world that has resulted in the key ad bellum and in bello principles that we are so familiar with today. The third chapter explores various forms of consequentialist thinking before the strengths and limitations of a more virtue-based approach are introduced. The conclusion here sets up the theme that the book returns to later, itself unsurprising given the very practical experience of the author: each approach needs to ‘learn from the other’ if we are to account satisfactorily for the ‘full complexity and richness of our moral lives (page 62). By working together, they can combine in a form of ‘Virtuous Consequentialism’. Having set up this robust foundation, the fourth chapter lays out the familiar principles that make up the Just War Tradition. As one would expect, ad bellum and in bello are explored and explained clearly and with an economy of expression that is very engaging and easy to follow. Post bellum issues are nodded to, but Fisher argues that they are already implicit in the extant formulation. However, he also accepts that it does no harm to raise awareness of the long-term nature of many of those considerations. On very practical grounds the recent challenges posed by David Rodin and others to the traditional assumption of the moral equality of combatants is rejected, while at the same time Fisher acknowledges that such moral parity does not extend to those actually responsible for the war the politicians on the ‘wrong’ side. So how does one know which side is the most just?