Davide Gaeta

Wine and web marketing strategies. The case study of Italian speciality wineries

Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the level of internet marketing in use and the web marketing strategies models implemented by the Italian Speciality Wineries (ISWs).Design/methodology/approach – The paper surveyed a sample of 272 high quality wineries. The analysis of the existing web sites has been conducted through an adapted 7Cs model. The 7Cs model data analysis has been developed both at a univariate and a multivariate level. The entrepreneurs perception of internet marketing has been analysed through a market research questionnaire.Findings – The use of internet marketing by the ISWs is at an initial stage. “Show‐case” is the main purpose while functionality is the most important web site characteristic. Five groups of wineries have been identified through cluster analysis. The web marketing approaches implemented revolve around the choice to effect online sales. The web marketing strategies map highlights that the future development of the ISWs web marketing models goes in two different d...

Economics, Governance, and Politics in the Wine Market

1. The Political Scenarios and the Choices System 1.1 The Decision-Making Process: An Analysis of EU Agriculture Bodies 1.2 From the Common Agricultural Policy to the Single Common Market Organization 1.3 The Developments of European Wine Policies 1.4 An Analysis of How Wine CMO Resources Are Allocated between the Member States 2. Toward Market Equilibrium? 2.1 Economics and Market Instruments in a Few Examples 2.2 Production, Prices, and Supply Management 2.3 Wine Consumption and the Policy Paradox 2.4 The Stumbling Blocks Facing the International Wine Trade 3. Policy Bargaining: Lobby and Pressure Groups 3.1 Public and Private Interest to Lead the Choice: The Public Choice Approach 3.2 The Influence of Pressure Groups on Wine Sector Policies and Intervention Areas 3.3 Lobbying in the Wine Sector

Public choice theory as a tool for CMO wine reform analysis

The purpose of this paper is a partial reconstruction of the role of agricultural lobbyist and national alliances, determining the effort of re-opening the Common Market Organisation (CMO) of wine Reg. 479/2008. The case considered is the liberalisation of replanting rights chosen as a tool of public choice (PC) analysis. The paper is divided into three parts. The first is a brief summary of PC literature and methodological applications. The second is a study of the structure, behaviour and the relationship of the main actors involved in the policy genesis of the CMO. Third analyses the effects that lobbyist actions have generated in the case of vineyard liberalisation. The methodological approach is the PC model derived from Pokrivcak et al. (2006). This is partially used in this discussion, to explain the general idea and concept of bargaining and trade-offs in wine policy by the major actors in a simplified scenario.

Le opportunità delle politiche territoriali alla luce della nuova OCM vino

One of the most important expectation of the new Common Market Organization for Wine was the strengthening of territorial policy as the main instrument to protect the marketing policies of traditional wine areas. The territorial entity, which is nearly always conceived as a micro-zone in the Old World rather than as a large geographic district as in the New World, is turned to an active subject of collective marketing strategies. The Regulation (EC) No. 479/2008 doesn’t seems to completely meet these aims, as well as the instruments of economic policy of the second pillar seem to be inadequately improved. The provided measures and the financial allocation in the new CMO and the past and actual Rural Development Programmes of Veneto, where wine industry has a very important role, still focus on market support and on modernization of production structures, rather than on implementation of new marketing models. This study closes with some possible advices in order to retrieve competitiveness of the territorial identities.

European Wine Policies and their consequences on the global wine trade

Over the years the EU wine policy has introduced a number of instruments with the principal goal of addressing the problems of the internal market and price stability, controlling supply and farmers’ incomes. Regarding trade policy, it has acted to improve its competitiveness against growing competition from Third Countries, by building both tariffs and non-tariff measures for trade policy. While continuing on the path of reform which started in the early 1990s, it was only with the 2008 and 2013 reforms that wine policy changed significantly from a policy Based on subsidising production and the protection of domestic markets from non-European producers, to a policy that aims to stimulate quality production and the competitiveness of the wine sector on the international scene. The Common Agricultural Policy and the EU domestic and international contexts have (probably) played an important role in the design of strategies for wine interventions. What is going on in the EU wine sector and what are the consequences of the wine policies on the market? This paper follows the evolution of EU wine policies through three main phases that, according to the authors’ point of view, have characterised the EU’s aims and strategies during the years of the reforms. Specifically, the authors focus their analysis on the budget expenditures of each phase (from 1970 to 2015) and the market response in the domestic and international scenario. The thread which runs through this paper is that the controversial aspects of the wine sector are urgent requests from wine farms to both policymakers to intervene with market laws and rules, and to the policy itself which aims to correct its own failings. EU policy has arrived late (too late) to understand the increasing threat posed by the competitive growth of third countries. After 46 years of implementation, the ‘classic dilemma’ between policymakers and markets, the tradeoffs between markets and policy, are still the drivers of EU wine policy.

Policy Bargaining: Lobby and Pressure Groups

When placed in a specific context such as the wine sector, the public choice (PC) model approach can prove to be a useful instrument for focusing attention on the processes and interactions between agricultural policies and associations. Applying economic theory to political science, or the economic study of nonmarket decision-making, is the usual definition of the public choice approach. The subjects involved are so-called pressure groups or lobbies, which participate in the political process with the aim of targeting and influencing decision-makers to guide political action.

The Political Scenarios and the Choices System

The European Union’s institutional design and mechanisms for agriculture provide us with a key to understanding the evolution of the common agricultural policy (CAP). The EU scenario or troika is made up of the European Commission (EC), representing the general interests of the Union, the European Parliament (EP), which speaks on behalf of EU citizens, and the Council of the European Union, which represents the member states (MS). Together, these three institutions set policy guidelines and approve legislative acts that are subsequently applied throughout the EU. The treaties govern the powers and responsibilities of these institutions, as well as the rules and processes they follow. According to the rules and decision-making procedures laid down in the treaties, European institutions adopt the legal acts necessary for the implementation of EU policies.

Toward Market Equilibrium

Clearly all market economies provide for a certain amount of public intervention and are therefore defined as mixed economies. Whether they are adopted at international or local level, public policies are powerful instruments capable of generating both positive and negative effects on the system as a whole. Agricultural policy literature from authors such as Gardner (1987), Alston et al. (1990, 2002), and De Gorter et al. (1991) has demonstrated that when the market is uncertain, prices are fluctuating and income is unstable, adopting certain agricultural policies can attenuate the negative effects to different extents. Although neoclassical economic theory shows that in the long term liberalist policies are preferable to interventionist policies, the reality of the public support facet of agricultural policy demonstrates the exact opposite. Liberalism has political and social costs, which can prove to be very costly in the short term. There are different types of impact that public intervention can have on the agricultural sector. It can affect production and consumption structures through rules, standards, and institutions that regulate agricultural production, trade, and even consumption across the world. Public intervention regulations have taken several different forms and have helped to attenuate volatility on the market.