Dawn Walsh

Religion and democratization in Northern Ireland: is religion actually ethnicity in disguise?

Few parts of Europe see as much religious observance as Northern Ireland, and fewer places in Europe have religion as one of the major cleavages on which politics seems to rest. In this article we argue that although religion is an important identifier, it acts as a reinforcer of ethno-national differences rather than as an intrinsically important difference itself. Religious differences while often symbolically important rarely emerge as points of real conflict in Northern Irish politics. It has had little impact on the ongoing process of democratization in Northern Ireland. We review an array of evidence which supports this conclusion. However, we find that religion still has a power to divide and so makes a political settlement less likely than an accommodation.

Northern Ireland and the Independent Parades Commission: Delegation and Legitimacy

Abstract The issue of parades remains contentious and retains the potential to lead to violence on the streets of Northern Ireland. This article uses delegation theory to examine the accusations of illegitimacy which have been made against the Independent Parades Commission (IPC). It finds that only a small number of these accusations stem from the traditional concerns that delegated bodies are unelected and unaccountable. The claim that delegated bodies lead to superior outcomes (output legitimacy) is made by some actors but contested by the Loyal Orders and unionist politicians. The argument that delegated bodies enjoy legitimacy as a result of their superior process (procedural legitimacy) is made frequently. However, the IPC processes are also a source of accusations of illegitimacy. Finally, the ethnonational conflict context raises particular issues with the legitimacy of the delegated body.

External Actors in Consociational Settlements: A Re-examination of Lijphart’s Negative Assumptions

Abstract This article examines the role played by five independent commissions which managed contentious issues in post-Good Friday Agreement Northern Ireland. It finds that external or international actors can play a very useful role during the implementation of consociational arrangements. The commissions were most successful when they combined international involvement with local composition in keeping with consociational principles. Weak or non-existence international input and behaviours which were not in keeping with consociational principles undermined the commissions and resulted in the failure of the commissions to resolve their respective issues.

Theories of international relations and Northern Ireland

resulted in less autonomy for public servants and critically they point to continued dysfunction in human resources; hiring, firing and promotion. Brigid Laffan also picks up on changes in the public service and she praises the professionalism of senior public servants dealing with what she describes as a deeply asymmetrical decision-making structure between Ireland and the Troika. Laffan unpacks EU decision-making during the crisis and is prescient in her critique of the EU and the Eurozone for its denial and slow-learning during the crisis. She considers the bailout in some detail and points to a growing EU criticism which must be attributed to the ‘toxic legacy’ of the double bailouts of the banks and the state. Some books on the crisis have followed specific ideological lines while others have tended toward a narrow focus on banking or the public finances, but the combination of disciplinary approaches allows this book to interrogate the crisis and recovery in a much broader and intellectually engaging manner. The only limitation that can be attributed is that it lacks a chapter on the media landscape. It would have added to the analysis and reinforced some points on the drift into the crisis. Overall though, this is a small point. This book will stand the test of time as one of the most significant, thorough and thoughtful evaluations of the crisis and the recovery.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Entities in a Multi-ethnic State? Instability and Disputed Interpretations of the State

This chapter outlines how the collapse of Yugoslavia led to the outbreak of a vicious war in Bosnian Herzegovina and how the 1995 Dayton peace agreement attempted to end the violence by establishing a strongly decentralised federation with two entities, the Federation and the Republika Srpska. It finds that the agreement provided for two competing understanding of the nature of the state and this inhibited the effectiveness of domestic guarantees. Furthermore, it argues that despite the international community’s initial success in preventing the re-emergence of violence in the longer-term legitimacy concerns, the focus on other international crises and growing international divisions has limited effectiveness of international guarantees.

Moldova: Weak Autonomy, Central Government Neglect, and Mixed International Impact

This chapter outlines how autonomy has been used to manage a low-level conflict between the Gagauz and central Moldovan state. It shows how the other conflict in Moldova, between the central state and Transniestria encouraged moderation to ensure the Gagauz conflict did not escalate. However, it also argues that the weak capacities and small size of the autonomy coupled with a failure of the central government to consider the autonomy’s rights and needs have undermined the TSG institutions role as a conflict management tool. The analysis shows that kin and regional states have a mixed impact. Turkey has provided helpful assistance to the Gagauz. Yet discussion about a Moldovan–Romanian union and Russia’s links to the Gagauz have been destabilising.

Introduction: Guaranteeing Territorial Self-Government as a Conflict Management Tool

This chapter introduces a theory of territorial self-government as a conflict management tool, focusing on its ability to meet the needs of both groups seeking autonomy and the central state but also how instability is inherent in the compromise nature of the arrangements and the low level of trust between conflict groups. It then moves on to outline how guarantee mechanisms, both domestic and international, may be included in territorial self-government peace agreements to ensure their stability. The ability of international actors to maintain and support the TSG arrangements is explored, the role of international military and transitional authorities, as well as policy conditionality, are outlined. Finally, the chapter briefly addresses research design, discussing case selection, data collection, and data analysis.

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Enhanced Local Government and Ethnic Conflict

This chapter explores how enhanced local government, a weaker form of TSG, was used as part of a conflict management practise after the outbreak of inter-ethnic violence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001. It highlights how these institutions were specifically designed to avoid explicitly ethnising territorial arrangements. It finds that despite a history of domestic inter-ethnic cooperation and the international communities’ success in quickly acting to end the violence domestic and international guarantees have at times struggle to protect the TSG arrangements. Furthermore, it shows how both NATO and the EU allowed the name dispute between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece to prevent Euro-Atlantic integration undermining the potential of such integration to stabilise the TSG and improve inter-ethnic relations.

Northern Ireland: Autonomy as a Conflict Management Tool in a Stable State, Ethnonational Guarantors, and Low-Level International Assistance

This chapter examines the use of territorial self-government in Northern Ireland. It provides a concise overview of the conflict, focused on the role of territorial self-government. It then addresses how the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement provided for TSG to meet the needs of nationalists in Northern Ireland to have a strong connection to Ireland while respecting unionist desires to maintain the link with Great Britain. However, it also highlights that these arrangements were an uneasy compromise and that the British and Irish governments, and friendly states particularly the US, had to provide reassurance that the institutions would be faithfully implemented. It finds that the relationship between the guarantee provider and guarantee seeker, rather than the theoretical strength, of a guarantee determines whether it is effective.

Iraq: Iraqi Kurdistan, Unresolved Issues, and Changing International Priorities

Chapter six examines how federacy has been used in post-2003 Iraq to convince the Kurds to remain part of Iraq. It highlights that after over a decade of de facto independence from the rest of Iraq the Kurds were wary post-Saddam recentralisation. It shows that constitutional ambiguity around hydrocarbon management and the disputed territories weakened the ability of the domestic infrastructure to stabilise the TSG institutions. It argues that international actors, notably the US and Turkey, attempted to discourage Kurdish secession. However it also finds that economic self-interest and the grave security threat posed by ISIS led to policies which did not always prioritise this aim strongly underlining how wider determinants of policy can encourage secessionist momentum.