Debbie M. Warman

Stigma, social function and symptoms in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder: Associations across 6 months

Research suggests stigma is a barrier to self-esteem and the attainment of resources in schizophrenia. Less clear is the association of stigma experiences with symptoms and social function both concurrently and prospectively. To assess this, symptoms were measured using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale, social function was measured using the Quality of Life Scale and stigma experience was assessed using the Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness Scale among 36 persons with schizophrenia at two points, 6 months apart. Correlations found stigma was associated with concurrent levels of positive and emotional discomfort symptoms and degree of social contact. When initial stigma levels were controlled for, stigma at 6 months was predicted by baseline levels of positive symptoms. Greater initial stigma predicted greater emotional discomfort at follow-up. Results suggest internalized stigma is linked with social function and symptoms. Positive symptoms may make some persons with schizophrenia more vulnerable to ongoing stigma experience.

Metacognition in schizophrenia: associations with multiple assessments of executive function.

Deficits in metacognitive capacity, or the abilities to think about thinking, are thought to be a key barrier to functioning in schizophrenia. Although metacognitive function may be linked to executive function, it is unclear how the different domains of each phenomenon are related to one another. Accordingly, we assessed 4 domains of metacognition on the basis of a self-generated narrative using the Metacognition Assessment Scale. These were correlated with subtests of the Delis Kaplan Executive Function System which assessed 2 domains of executive function: mental flexibility and inhibition. Participants were 49 men with schizophrenia spectrum disorders in a postacute phase of illness. Spearman Rho correlations revealed awareness of ones thoughts and feelings were more closely linked to performance on tests which required mental flexibility while recognizing others’ needs, and independent relationships were more closely linked to performance on tasks which required inhibitory control. Results suggest different domains of metacognition may be influenced by and influence different neurocognitive processes.

Cognitive insight and psychotic disorder: the impact of active delusions.

While several studies have determined the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS; [Beck, A.T., Baruch, E., Balter, J.M., Steer, R.A., Warman, D.M., 2004. A new instrument for measuring insight: The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale. Schizophr. Res. 68, 319-329] is a useful measure of cognitive insight, a number of questions have remained unanswered. While individuals with psychotic disorders have been shown to have impaired cognitive insight compared to a psychiatric comparison group, it has remained unclear how the cognitive insight of individuals with psychotic disorders compares to healthy individuals. Further, as previous studies have classified participants based on diagnostic classification, it has remained unknown if individuals with delusions and individuals with psychotic disorders without active delusions score differently on this measure. To examine these questions, we assessed the cognitive insight of healthy individuals and individuals with psychotic disorders, both with and without active delusions. Results indicated that individuals with psychotic disorders had impaired cognitive insight relative to healthy controls (p=.005), though individuals with active delusions and individuals with psychotic disorders without delusions had impairments in different domains. Individuals with delusions were overly confident in their own judgment relative to healthy controls and those without delusions (p=.011), though their self-reflectiveness was the same as normal controls. Individuals without delusions reported low self-reflectiveness relative to healthy controls and individuals with delusions (p=.004), though they were not overconfident in their judgment. These results are discussed in terms of existing research on cognitive insight, decision making, and psychosis.

Metacognition in schizophrenia: Correlates and stability of deficits in theory of mind and self-reflectivity

Research suggests that many with schizophrenia experience a range of deficits in metacognition including difficulties recognizing the emotions and intentions of others as well as reflecting upon and questioning their own thinking. Unclear, however, is the extent to which these deficits are stable over time, how closely related they are to one another and whether their associations with core aspects of the disorder such as disorganization symptoms are stable over time. To explore this issue, we administered three assessments of Theory of Mind (ToM), the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS), and the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale at baseline and 6 months to 36 participants with schizophrenia. Correlations revealed the ToM and BCIS scores were stable across the two test administrations and that the ToM tests were closely linked to each other but not to the BCIS. Poorer baseline performance on the ToM tests and the Self-Certainty scale of the BCIS were linked to greater cognitive symptoms at baseline and follow-up, while greater Self-Reflectivity on the BCIS was linked to greater levels of emotional distress at both baseline and 6-month follow-up. Results are consistent with assertions that deficits in metacognition are a stable feature of schizophrenia.

Cognitive insight and delusion proneness: An investigation using the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale

The present study investigated the relationship between delusion proneness, as assessed using the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory [Peters, E.R., Joseph, S.A., Garety, P.A., 1999. The measurement of delusional ideation in the normal population: Introducing the PDI (Peters et al. Delusions Inventory). Schizophr. Bull. 25 553-576], and cognitive insight, as assessed using the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS; [Beck, A.T., Baruch, E., Balter, J.M., Steer, R.A., Warman, D.M., 2004. A new instrument for measuring insight: The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale. Schizophr. Res. 68, 319-329]. Two hundred undergraduate students with no history of psychotic disorder participated. Results indicated that, consistent with hypotheses, those higher in delusion proneness endorsed more certainty in their beliefs and judgment than those who were lower in delusion proneness (Self-Certainty subscale of the BCIS; p = .007). Contrary to hypotheses, however, those who were higher in delusion proneness were more open to external feedback and were more willing to acknowledge fallibility than those who were lower in delusion proneness (Self-Reflectiveness subscale of the BCIS; p = .002). The results are discussed in relation to theories of delusion formation.

Jumping to conclusions and delusion proneness: the impact of emotionally salient stimuli.

The present study investigated whether those who are delusion-prone demonstrate a jumping to conclusions reasoning bias similar to that demonstrated by those with active delusions in previous studies. Two hundred individuals, none of whom had a psychotic disorder, were assessed for delusion-proneness and engaged in two probabilistic reasoning tasks, one emotionally neutral and the other emotionally salient. The emotionally salient task consisted of both positively and negatively valenced personally referent stimuli. Level of delusion-proneness was positively related to jumping to conclusions when stimuli were emotionally salient, though the bias was present only when the first personally referent stimulus was negatively valenced (p < 0.01). Thus, the jumping to conclusions reasoning bias previously demonstrated by individuals who have active delusions appears to be demonstrated under certain conditions by those who are not actively delusional but score high on a measure of delusion-proneness.

The relationships between schizophrenia symptom dimensions and executive functioning components.

Research investigating the relationships between executive functioning impairments and the positive, negative, and cognitive schizophrenia symptoms has produced inconsistent results. This inconsistency may be due to the tendency to view executive functioning as a unified process as opposed to multiple fractionated processes. A fractionated model of executive functioning has been supported in several studies of various populations, but few schizophrenia studies have used the factor analytic methods of these studies to empirically determine separate executive functioning components, causing conclusions regarding the relationships between these components and schizophrenia symptoms to be unreliable. The purposes of the present study were to (1) identify separate components of executive functioning by conducting a factor analysis of the performance of individuals with schizophrenia on the Delis Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS) and (2) investigate the relationships between executive functioning components and the three schizophrenia symptom dimensions by correlating the derived factor scores with the scale scores of the Positive and Negative Symptom Scale (PANSS). An exploratory factor analysis revealed two separate components: inhibition/set shifting and mental flexibility. The results showed that the symptom dimensions were differentially related to impairments in executive functioning, with both negative and cognitive symptoms associated with the inhibition/set shifting component, cognitive symptoms alone associated with the mental flexibility component, and positive symptoms unrelated to either component.

Reasoning and Delusion Proneness : Confidence in Decisions

The present study was an investigation into the reasoning of delusion prone individuals. Seventy healthy individuals in the general population completed a measure of delusion proneness and engaged in 8 trials of difficult probabilistic reasoning tasks, 4 emotionally neutral and 4 emotionally salient, and were asked to report their level of confidence in their decisions. While delusion prone individuals did not request any fewer stimuli on reasoning tasks than did individuals who were not delusion prone, delusion prone individuals were more confident in their decisions on the neutral task than individuals who were not delusion prone and were more confident in their decision on the first trial, regardless of the type of stimuli presented. Further, despite requesting less information on neutral than salient tasks, delusion prone individuals reported equivalent confidence on both tasks. Delusion proneness and delusion onset may be related to overconfidence in decisions, particularly overconfidence in initial judgment.

The Relationship of Metacognition with Jumping to Conclusions among Persons with Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders

Background: Jumping to conclusions (JTC) is a reasoning bias in which persons arrive at conclusions with relatively little data. It is prevalent in schizophrenia and tied to outcomes. To understand the correlates and the roots of this phenomenon, this study explored whether deficits in mastery, a domain of metacognition which reflects the ability to use knowledge about oneself and others to cope with psychological problems, was linked to a heightened tendency to jump to conclusions. Sampling and Methods: Participants were 40 adults with a schizophrenia spectrum disorder in a nonacute phase being treated in an outpatient setting. JTC was assessed using the Beads Test, and mastery was measured as an element of metacognition using the Metacognition Assessment Scale. To rule out the possibility that results were the effect of impairments in memory or executive function, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and Hopkins Verbal Learning Test were included. Results: Partial correlations controlling for memory and executive function revealed that lower levels of mastery were correlated with a lower average number of beads requested before reaching a conclusion, or a greater tendency to jump to conclusions (r = 0.39, p < 0.05). Conclusions: Results are consistent with the possibility that deficits in metacognition influence or are influenced by reasoning biases.

Reasoning, delusion proneness and stress: an experimental investigation†

Previous studies have been inconsistent in demonstrating a relationship between delusion proneness and induced stress on reasoning biases. The present study was an experimental investigation of the role of stress in the form of feeling rushed, which has previously been shown to be related to the jumping-to-conclusions reasoning bias for delusion-prone individuals, on the reasoning of delusion-prone individuals. University students (n = 133) completed a measure of delusion proneness and were randomly assigned to either receive or not receive a stress induction in the form of a speeded subtraction task. All participants engaged in four trials of a probabilistic reasoning task. Delusion-prone and not delusion-prone participants performed similarly when there was no stress induction, but delusion-prone individuals demonstrated reasoning biases relative to not delusion-prone individuals when stress was induced. The reasoning of delusion-prone individuals may be particularly vulnerable when they feel rushed and in stressful conditions.