Deborah Drummond Smith

Achieving globalization of AACSB accounting programs with faculty-led study abroad education

ABSTRACT This paper is motivated by recommendations from the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), the Pathways Commission, and NAFSA: Association of International Educators to increase global exposure in the accounting curriculum. Some schools have responded to these demands by offering short-duration, faculty-led, study abroad programs. We explain how these programs play a vital role in fulfilling the educational advisory boards’ calls to internationalize the accounting curriculum and investigate the extent to which schools are incorporating these programs. This paper provides a review of the details from our hand-collected data on the short programs that are offered by AACSB-accredited institutions. We integrate the information from our collection of data on existing programs, prior literature, pronouncements from educational advisory boards, and select faculty interviews to offer an analysis of the course design and travel considerations for schools contemplating such an opportunity for students in their programs.

Auditors’ assessment of the capital market liability of foreignness

Purpose This paper aims to apply the Capital Market Liability of Foreignness (CMLOF) framework to the audit fees of a sample of foreign firms listed on US exchanges to examine whether American auditors price foreignness. Design/methodology/approach The four components of the CMLOF are institutional distance (civil versus common law system and enforcement), information asymmetry (disclosures and mandatory IFRS adoption), unfamiliarity (exports, English language and geographical distance) and cultural difference [Hofstede (1980) dimensions of culture]. These variables are examined in a regression model that explains audit fees to determine the auditor perception of risk associated with the CMLOF. Findings Examining the factors that mitigate perceived agency costs, this investigation determines that auditors price risk according to each component of the liability of foreignness. Audit fees are higher for shareholders of firms headquartered in countries exhibiting greater institutional distance, unfamiliarity and cultural distance. Audit fees are higher for firms when their home country requires additional disclosures or the adoption of IFRS to reduce information asymmetry. Practical implications CMLOF is costly for capital market participants and has implications for auditors, shareholders of foreign firms and managers considering listing in the US Auditors, and investors should carefully assess this risk for pricing and valuation, and managers should take action, to the extent possible, to reduce the firm-specific level of unfamiliarity and increase transparency. Originality/value This paper is the first to apply the CMLOF to examine whether auditors price aspects of foreignness of their non-US-headquartered clients.

Signaling Versus Free Cash Flow Theory: What Does Earnings Management Reveal About Dividend Initiation?

We examine earnings manipulation via discretionary accruals and real earnings management prior to the release of cash reserves back to shareholders. Previous research indicates that firms manage earnings upward when they increase dividends, creating a coordinated signal to the market. We study earnings management surrounding dividend initiation to determine whether management is manipulating earnings downward to avoid the discipline imposed by dividends in the years ahead or whether they are signaling to the market. We suggest that the aim of earnings management is not to reduce earnings but that earnings are more likely managed to preserve financial flexibility, create earnings reserves, and postpone shareholders’ expectations for initiating recurring dividends. Rather than signaling with upward earnings management, we find that dividend initiating firms manage earnings downward, consistent with the free cash flow theory. Our results explain findings in prior literature for the surprisingly stable earnings performance and accrual quality in the period just after dividend initiation. Furthermore, the market day stock price reaction is inversely related to earnings management, contradicting the purpose of signaling. We provide evidence that the managerial inertia for initiating dividends represents unique agency concerns compared with an increase in existing dividend payout and to the extent that downward real earnings management does not reverse, we identify a cost to shareholders for the quasi contract of recurring dividend payout.