Deborah F. Minehart
Boston University
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Publication
Featured researches published by Deborah F. Minehart.
The RAND Journal of Economics | 2000
Rachel E. Kranton; Deborah F. Minehart
We construct a theory to compare vertically integrated firms to networks of manufacturers and suppliers. Vertically integrated firms make their own specialized inputs. In networks, manufacturers procure specialized inputs from suppliers that, in turn, sell to several manufacturers. The analysis shows that networks can yield greater social welfare when manufacturers experience large idiosyncratic demand shocks. Individual firms may also have the incentive to form networks, despite the lack of long-term contracts. The analysis is supported by existing evidence and provides predictions as to the shape of different industries.
Review of Economic Design | 2000
Rachel E. Kranton; Deborah F. Minehart
This paper studies competition in a network and how a network structure determines agents’ individual payoffs. It constructs a general model of competition that can serve as a reduced form for specific models. The paper shows how agents’ outside options, and hence their shares of surplus, derive from “opportunity paths” connecting them to direct and indirect alternative exchanges. Analyzing these paths, results show how third parties’ links affect different agents’ bargaining power. Even distant links may have large effects on agents’ earnings. These payoff results, and the identification of the paths themselves, should prove useful to further analysis of network structure.
Mathematical Social Sciences | 1997
Deborah F. Minehart
Debreu (1970) proved that for smooth finite exchange economies, the set of endowment assignments which result in a finite number of price equilibria is large in the sense that it has null closed complement. We show that if the individual endowment space of each agent does not include all the commodities, then this conclusion need not hold. In particular, we consider the case where each agents endowment space includes only one good. We construct a class of examples in which every economy in an open subset of the constrained endowment space gives rise to a continuum of equilibria.
The American Economic Review | 2001
Rachel E. Kranton; Deborah F. Minehart
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | 2002
Deborah F. Minehart; Zvika Neeman
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy | 1999
Deborah F. Minehart; Zvika Neeman
Review of Economic Design | 2000
Deborah F. Minehart; Rachel E. Kranton
Games and Economic Behavior | 1999
Deborah F. Minehart; Suzanne Scotchmer
Archive | 1999
Rachel E. Kranton; Deborah F. Minehart
Archive | 2002
Rachel E. Kranton; Deborah F. Minehart