Deborah G. Kemler Nelson

Clauses Are Perceptual Units For Young Infants

Abstract Most theories of language acquisition implicitly assume that the language learner is able to arrive at a segmentation of speech into clausal units. The present studies employed a preference procedure to examine the sensitivity of 7-10-month-old infants to acoustic correlates of clausal units in English. From a recording of a mother speaking to her child, matched samples were constructed by inserting pauses either at clause boundaries or at within-clause locations. The infants oriented longer to the samples segmented at the clause boundary. A second experiment confirmed that these preferences depended on where the pauses were inserted in the samples. These findings have important implications for understanding how language is learnable. The prelinguistic infant apparently possesses the means to detect important units such as clauses, within which grammatical rules apply.

The head-turn preference procedure for testing auditory perception

Abstract The Head-Turn Preference Procedure (HPP) is valuable for testing perception of sustained auditory materials, particularly speech. This article presents a detailed description of the current version of HPP, new evidence of the objectivity of measurements within it, and an account of recent modifications.

The effect of intention on what concepts are acquired

Categories that have a strong family-resemblance structure should be learned more easily than categories based on a selected criterial attribute under conditions that promote non-analytic processing (that is guided by overall similarity). Two studies of artificial category learning by adults test the hypothesis that incidental conditions, more than intentional learning conditions, favor the acquisition of family-resemblance categories as opposed to categories based on criterial attributes. A third experiment confirms that this relation is mediated by the increased use of holistic processing under incidental conditions: exemplar encoding and sensitivity to overall similarity relations. A final study shows a parallel effect of developmental status. Under intentional learning conditions, 5-year olds, but not 10-year olds, have more difficulty learning criterial-attribute-based categories than categories organized by family resemblances. Thus, both characteristics of the task and characteristics of the learner affect the structural nature of the concept that is learned, and both effects underline the importance of overall similarity relations under more “primitive” conditions. These findings have implications for the understanding of natural concepts and natural category learning, where the role of overall similarity may have been underestimated.

The prosodic bootstrapping of phrases: Evidence from prelinguistic infants

Abstract The current study explores infants’ use of prosodic cues coincident with phrases in processing fluent speech. After familiarization with two versions of the same word sequence, both 6- and 9-month-olds showed a preference for a passage containing the sequence as a noun phrase over a passage with the same sequence as a syntactic non-unit. However, this result was found only in one of the two groups, the group exposed to a stronger prosodic difference between the syntactic and non-syntactic sequences. Six month olds were tested in the same way on passages containing verb phrases. In this case, both groups preferred the passage with the verb phrase to the passage with the same word sequence as a syntactic non-unit. These results provide the first evidence that infants as young as 6 months old are sensitive to prosodic markers of syntactic units smaller than the clause, and, in addition, that they use this sensitivity to recognize phrasal units, both noun and verb phrases, in fluent speech. This ability to use phrase-level prosodic cues is variable, however, and appears to depend on the strength or number of cues associated with these syntactic units.

Young children's use of functional information to categorize artifacts: three factors that matter

Three experiments addressed factors that might influence whether or not young children take into account function, as opposed to overall appearance or shape, when they extend the names of novel artifacts. Experiment 1 showed that 4-year-olds more often extend a name on the basis of a demonstrated function when that function provides a plausible causal account of perceptible object structure. Experiment 2 showed that they more often extend a name by function when they respond slowly, and hence thoughtfully. Experiment 3 demonstrated that they are more likely to take function into account when they extend names than when they judge similarities. Comparisons of lexical and non-lexical conditions in younger children failed to show any differences. Overall, the findings suggest that by 4 years of age, children may learn names as labels for novel artifact kinds rather than perceptual classes, and that the processes by which they categorize may be mindful and reflective, as in adults.

What Do Children Want to Know About Animals and Artifacts?: Domain-Specific Requests for Information

Childrens questions may reveal a great deal about the characteristics of objects they consider to be conceptually important. Thirty-two preschool children were given opportunities to ask questions about unfamiliar artifacts and animals. The children asked ambiguous questions such as “What is it?” about artifacts and animals alike. However, they were more likely to ask about the functions of artifacts, but about category membership, food choices, and typical locations of animals. They never asked questions about either artifacts or animals that would be considered inappropriate by adults. The results indicate that children hold different expectations about the types of information important for categorizing living and artifact kinds. Young children conceive of artifacts in terms of functions, but conceive of animals in terms of biologically appropriate characteristics. Such results speak to debates about the role of function in childrens biological reasoning and to accounts of childrens artifact concepts.

Principle-based inferences in young children's categorization: Revisiting the impact of function on the naming of artifacts

Abstract Three parallel studies investigated the influence of principle-based inferences and unprincipled similarity relations on new category learning by 3- to 6-year-old children. One of two possible functions of a single novel artifact (which differed between studies) was modeled for and practiced by children, who then judged which test objects got the same name as the original. Test objects, either globally similar or dissimilar in appearance from the original, were designed such that each could be inferred to afford only one of the two possible functions. (Actual functions of the test objects were not directly observed.) Patterns of categorization depended systematically on which original function had been experienced, indicating that the children used a common-function principle to guide their extension of the name. Therefore, categorization into newly learned categories may activate self-initiated, principle-based reasoning in young children. The conditions that prompt such categorization processes in young children are discussed, although a role for unprincipled similarity relations is not denied.

Processing integral dimensions: The whole view.

In the traditional view, integral dimensions are said to be processed as unitary whole and only occasionally analyzed. Converging operations establish that (a) pitch and loudness and (b) hue, saturation, and brightness are true psychological dimensions and yet constitute integral dimensions in just this sense. Recent challenges provided by R. D. Melara, L. E. Marks, and their colleagues are shown to be based on narrow and faulty interpretations of evidence for privileged axes. They are also undermined by strong evidence of the holistic processing of pitch and loudness and of the dimensions of color that emerge within both their own data and the larger literature. The traditional view--including the strong claim that integrality entails mandatory holistic processing--continues to fare very well as an account of a substantial and varied set of findings.

How Children and Adults Name Broken Objects: Inferences and Reasoning About Design Intentions in the Categorization of Artifacts

If inferences about the functions intended by object designers guide the way artifacts are categorized, a broken object should still be considered a member of its original category even though it is currently dysfunctional; however, an object that appears to be dysfunctional by design should not be. Such a comparison was arranged in four studies of lexical categorization. Even with novel categories, 10-year-olds and adults preferentially included broken objects, and they did so spontaneously (Study 1). Younger children did not (Studies 1 and 2). However, when probed about the design intentions behind novel objects, 6-year-olds often inferred them correctly and then took intentions into account to categorize (Study 3). In fact, when 4-year-olds named objects derived from familiar categories, even they spontaneously used design intentions to categorize (Study 4). Accordingly, even young children provided some evidence of categorizing artifacts by inferring and reasoning about intended functions.

When category learning is holistic: A reply to Ward and Scott

A reply is presented to Ward and Scott’s (1987) recent reservations about the evidence for Kemler Nelson’s (1984) claims about when category learning is likely to be holistic. Focusing on the effect of intention, this paper suggests that: (1) contrary to Ward and Scott’s contention, a reanalysis of a critical set of original data continues to support Kemler Nelson’s claim of more holistic learning under unintentional conditions; (2) there is converging evidence for that claim; (3) Ward and Scott’s incidental learning data may diverge because of the inclusion of many weak learners; (4) Ward and Scott’s counterproposal makes some implausible and unsupported predictions; and (5) some of Ward and Scott’s reaction-time data are difficult to interpret. Still, a final discussion identifies some significant points of agreement with Ward and Scott.A reply is presented to Ward and Scott’s (1987) recent reservations about the evidence for Kemler Nelson’s (1984) claims about when category learning is likely to be holistic. Focusing on the effect of intention, this paper suggests that: (1) contrary to Ward and Scott’s contention, a reanalysis of a critical set of original data continues to support Kemler Nelson’s claim of more holistic learning under unintentional conditions; (2) there is converging evidence for that claim; (3) Ward and Scott’s incidental learning data may diverge because of the inclusion of many weak learners; (4) Ward and Scott’s counterproposal makes some implausible and unsupported predictions; and (5) some of Ward and Scott’s reaction-time data are difficult to interpret. Still, a final discussion identifies some significant points of agreement with Ward and Scott.