Deborah K. W. Modrak

Desires and Faculties in Plato and Aristotle

In Goodness and Justice: Plato, Aristotle, and the Moderns, Gerasimos Santas offers a wonderfully comprehensive interpretation of Platonic and Aristotelian theories of the good.1 Central to this interpretation is the distinction between desire satisfaction theories of the good and functional/perfectionist theories of the good. Plato rejects the former and defends the latter; Aristotle subscribes to both. Santas’ emphasis on the difference between the two types of theories of the good and the way these are dealt with in Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts of the human good has many implications for the interpretation of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. In this paper, I shall look at only one of the many subjects Santas addresses—Plato’s and Aristotle’s conception of desire.

Aristotle on the Difference between Mathematics and Physics and First Philosophy

One might ask this question too, why a boy can become a mathematician, but not a philosopher or a physicist. Is it because the objects of mathematics are abstractions while the first principles of these other subjects come from experience, and young men have not conviction about the latter but merely use the proper language, while the essence of mathematical objects is plain enough to them? (N E VI 8, 1142al6-19; trans, follows Ross)

Forms and Compounds

Lewis raises two problems concerning Aristotle’s conception of predication in the central books of the Metaphysics. The central problem of the paper is drawn from texts describing two kinds of metaphysical predication, viz., the predication of accidents of concrete individuals and the predication of forms of matter. Lewis then asks whether this notion of predication can accommodate sentences which predicate membership in a kind of concrete individuals. Lewis’s discussion of this question suggests several different problems which I propose to separate. The first, which I shall label the metaphysical problem, is whether the acceptance of ‘Socrates is a man’ as a well-formed sentence involves a commitment to a third type of metaphysical predication, the predication of a species or a form of a concrete individual. The second, which I shall call the linguistic problem, concerns the relationship between linguistic predication and metaphysical predication. Can the metaphysical theory of predication serve as the basis for a linguistic theory of predication?

Aristotle The First Cognitivist

Michael Wedins Mind and Imagination in Aristotle^ is an ambitious attempt to establish Aristotles place as the first cognitivist psychologist. Its greatest strength is the internal cohesiveness of the argument Wedin makes. Starting from Aristotles conception of psychology, he systematically builds the case for a cognitivist conception of mind in Aristotle. Representational structures are needed and Wedin finds them in Aristotles notion of imagination; a functional account of mind is also required and discovered by Wedin in de Anima III 4-5. He also discusses and disposes of many of the texts that appear problematic from a cognitivist perspective and interpretations that conflict with his reading. As an extended philosophical argument the book is quite impressive; as an interpretation of Aristotles conception of imagination and thought, it is less compelling. The problem lies with the fit between todays cognitivism and Aristotles philosophy of mind. There are important and illuminating parallels to be drawn between the two and provocative analogies well worth exploring further, but similarity should not be confused with identity. However, even if Wedins central thesis strikes the reader as hopelessly anachronistic, he or she should not lose heart, for along the way Wedin makes a number of acute observations about Aristotles positions which even the most sceptical reader will welcome. Moreover, many of Wedins insights are persuasive and may prompt the sceptic to further reflection on the demonstrable parallels between Aristotles psychology and cognitivism.