Deborah Tollefsen

Let’s Pretend! Children and Joint Action

According to many, joint intentional action must be understood in terms of joint intentions. Most accounts of joint intention appeal to a set of sophisticated individual intentional states. The author argues that standard accounts of joint intention exclude the possibility of joint action in young children because they presuppose that the participants have a robust theory of mind, something young children lack. But young children do engage in joint action. The author offers a revision of Michael Bratman’s analysis of joint intention that reflects the socio-cognitive abilities young children do have. This revision makes sense of joint action among young children and equally well explains simple joint actions involving adults.

Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences

In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group. Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that there are significant reasons for social scientists and philosophers of social science to acknowledge the adequacy of macro-level explanations that involve the attribution of intentional states to groups. In section 5, the author considers and responds to some criticisms of the thesis she defends.

Naturalizing joint action: A process-based approach

Numerous philosophical theories of joint agency and its intentional structure have been developed in the past few decades. These theories have offered accounts of joint agency that appeal to higher-level states (such as goals, commitments, and intentions) that are “shared” in some way. These accounts have enhanced our understanding of joint agency, yet there are a number of lower-level cognitive phenomena involved in joint action that philosophers rarely acknowledge. In particular, empirical research in cognitive science has revealed that when individuals engage in a joint activity such as conversation or joint problem solving, they become aligned at multiple levels (e.g., behaviors, or cognitive states). We argue that this phenomenon of alignment is crucial to understanding joint actions and should be integrated with philosophical approaches. In this paper, we sketch a possible integration, and draw out its implications for understanding of joint agency and collective intentionality. The result is a process-based, dynamic account of joint action that integrates both low-level and high-level states, and seeks to capture the separate processes of how a joint action is initiated and sustained.

Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility

Abstract The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in “Freedom and Resentment” (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudes – attitudes like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness and so on – provide the justification for holding individuals morally responsible. I argue that the framework of the reactive attitudes extends to collectives and provides the justification for holding collectives morally responsible.Abstract The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in “Freedom and Resentment” (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudes – attitudes like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness and so on – provide the justification for holding individuals morally responsible. I argue that the framework of the reactive attitudes extends to collectives and provides the justification for holding collectives morally responsible.

Wikipedia and the Epistemology of Testimony

In “Group Testimony” (2007) I argued that the testimony of a group cannot be understood (or at least cannot always be understood) in a summative fashion; as the testimony of some or all of the group members. In some cases, it is the group itself that testifies. I also argued that one could extend standard reductionist accounts of the justification of testimonial belief to the case of testimonial belief formed on the basis of group testimony. In this paper, I explore the issue of group testimony in greater detail by focusing on one putative source of testimony, that of Wikipedia . My aim is to the answer the following questions: Is Wikipedia a source of testimony? And if so, what is the nature of that source? Are we to understand Wikipedia entries as a collection of testimonial statements made by individuals, some subset of individuals, or is Wikipedia itself (the organization or the Wikipedia community) the entity that testifies? If Wikipedia itself is a source of testimony, what resources do we have for assessing the trustworthiness of such an unusual epistemic source? In answering these questions I hope to further elucidate the nature of collective epistemic agency (Tollefsen 2006), of which group testimony is a paradigm example. When a mans Discourse begineth…at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; and the Resolution is called Beleefe, and Faith: Faith in the man . (1651/1991, Ch. 7; p. 48)

Group Deliberation, Social Cohesion, and Scientific Teamwork: Is There Room for Dissent?

Recent discussions of rational deliberation in science present us with two extremes: unbounded optimism and sober pessimism. Helen Longino (1990) sees rational deliberation as the foundation of scientifi c objectivity. Miriam Solomon (1991) thinks it is overrated. Indeed, she has recently argued (2006) that group deliberation is detrimental to empirical success because it oft en involves groupthink and the suppression of dissent. But we need not embrace either extreme. To determine the value of rational deliberation we need to look more closely at the practice and practitioners of science. I off er a closer look here by exploring the joint agency of small research teams. Although there are factors that contribute to the suppression of dissent in group contexts, a closer look at the literature on group dynamics suggests that there are ways to mitigate the eff ects of groupthink. Th us, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic about the value of rational deliberation within certain scientifi c contexts. Rational deliberation either by individuals or groups is widely assumed to be a valuable tool for arriving at good decisions and, in the context of science, a valuable tool for empirical success. But a recent paper by Miriam Solomon (2006) challenges this widely held assumption. She argues that group deliberation in scientifi c contexts is oft en detrimental to the success of science. Relying on recent work by James Surowiecki (2004), Solomon suggests that aggregation of individual decisions, rather than deliberation to reach a consensus, can produce better decisions. Aggregation of individual decisions will allow for the input of every participant and hence would include dissenting opinions. Th is line of reasoning is in keeping with Solomon’s social empiricism (2001) which emphasizes that the rationality of the individual scientist is not what matters to empirical success and which makes a central virtue of dissent. As Solomon puts it: “What matters is not how individual scientists reason—it’s not the thought that counts—but what the aggregate community of scientists does” (2005, 9). Empirical success, according to Solomon, comes from evaluation and change at the “systems” level and change may come in the form of dissent rather than consensus. Aggregation of individual decisions is just another way in which a systems level approach can be implemented to make room for dissent. As Solomon herself admits, this approach to rational deliberation, and to group deliberation in particular, appears to be rather pessimistic about the value of rational deliberation. Contrast her view with Helen Longino’s critical contextual empiricism (1990). According to Longino, rational deliberation between individuals and within Episteme3_1_04_Tollefsen.indd 37 29/11/06 11:14:04 38 E P I S T E M E 2 0 0 6 Deborah Perron Tollefsen groups is the foundation of scientifi c objectivity. Although individual scientists are biased in a variety of ways, these biases can be overcome by promoting critical dialogue between scientists. As long as the scientifi c community adheres to the norms of critical contextual empiricism, scientifi c objectivity can be achieved. Compared to Solomon, Longino appears to be positively optimistic about the role of rational deliberation in science. Th ere is room for a middle ground here between the naïve optimism of Longino and the bleak pessimism of Solomon. If we are going to capture the conditions for objectivity in science as Longino attempts to do, and I think we ought to do, we need to look much more closely at the way in which rational deliberation takes place in science and, in the case of group deliberation, the types of groups engaged in it. Although research groups are ubiquitous across the sciences, they vary widely in their size and organizational structure. Th e norms of scientifi c objectivity will have to be more fi ne-grained to refl ect the variety in scientifi c practice and practitioners. And if we agree with Solomon, as I do, that dissent is an epistemic virtue, we need to look more closely at the context of deliberation in order to uncover the structures that inhibit and promote dissent. I provide a closer look in this paper. My focus is on small research groups and the deliberation that takes place within them. Although Solomon is correct—there are ineliminable factors that contribute to the suppression of dissent in group contexts— the literature on group dynamics suggests that there are ways to mitigate the eff ects of groupthink. Th us there is reason to be more optimistic about the role of group deliberation in science. In section I, I begin with a discussion of groupthink and the nature of social cohesion. As Janis (1972) pointed out one of the major causes of groupthink and the resulting failure of group deliberation is social cohesion. What is social cohesion? Unfortunately, the social psychological literature is less than helpful in answering this question. I fi nd Janis’ defi nition of social cohesion and subsequent attempts to clarify the term wanting. I suggest that social cohesion is, in part, a function of the normative and intentional structure of joint action. Th is normative and intentional structure has been analyzed by a variety of action theorists over the past decade, but I will focus my attention on Michael Bratman’s account of shared cooperative activity. Th is account provides some interesting resources with which to consider the nature of scientifi c teamwork. In section II, I explore the possibilities for dissent within the context of scientifi c teams. Viewing social cohesion as a function of the intentional and normative structure of teamwork provides us a better understanding of why small groups such as scientifi c research teams are subject to the eff ects of groupthink. Further, I shall argue that, although there is some room for dissent in these contexts, the amount of dissent and the target of dissent are constrained by the norms governing joint agency. I will explore analogies between the interpersonal and intrapersonal in order to make this case. In section III, I discuss some of Janis’s suggestions for avoiding groupthink and whether or not such suggestions could be implemented within a scientifi c research team. In the end, adopting less cohesive forms of joint agency may be a better way of facilitating group deliberation and making room for dissent. Episteme3_1_04_Tollefsen.indd 38 29/11/06 11:14:04 E P I S T E M E 2 0 0 6 Group Deliberation, Social Cohesion, and Scientific Teamwork 39 1. groupthink, social cohesion, and shared cooperative activity Janis’s theory of groupthink has produced a great deal of interest and research on group decision-making and dynamics since its publication in 1972. Groups aff ected by groupthink ignore alternatives and tend to take irrational actions that dehumanize other groups. It is likely to occur, according to Janis, when groups are “highly cohesive” and when they are under considerable pressure to make a decision. Symptoms of groupthink include: 1. Th e illusion of invulnerability: this creates excessive optimism that encourages taking extreme risks. 2. Collective rationalization: members discount warnings and do not reconsider their assumptions. 3. Belief in the inherent morality of the group: members believe in the rightness of their cause and therefore ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions. 4. Stereotyped views of out-groups: negative views of ‘enemy’ make eff ective responses to confl ict seem unnecessary. 5. Direct pressure on dissenters—members are under pressure not to express arguments against any of the group’s view. 6. Self-censorship—doubts and deviations from the perceived group consensus are not expressed. 7. Illusion of unanimity—the majority view and judgments are assumed to be unanimous. 8 Self-appointed guards—members protect the group and the leader from information that is problematic or contradictory to their view. Although there are a variety of factors that might cause a group to exhibit these symptoms, the main factor to which Janis appeals in his explanation of groupthink is social cohesion. Th e more cohesive a group is, the more likely it is to suff er from groupthink. Th e term, however, has remained rather obscure and for this reason attempts to measure and study group phenomena such as groupthink have been hindered (Mudrack, 1989). Social cohesion has been described as the “social glue” that binds groups together—the “stick togetherness.” Janis defi nes the concept in the following way: “members’ positive valuation of the group and their motivation to continue to belong to it” (1972, 4). Th ose following Janis have attempted to fl esh out the notion of “positive valuation” and “motivation” in terms of the notion of “attraction” and equated cohesion with other constructs such as “group spirit,” “bonds of impersonal attraction,” “aff ective bonds,” “sense of belonging,” and “sense of we-ness” (Mudrack, 1989; Evans and Dion 1991). What is striking about these defi nitions of cohesion is their phenomenological character. Th e focus is on the “feelings” of group members. It isn’t diffi cult to see why this might pose problems for attempts to study and measure social cohesion and its eff ects. How does one measure a “sense of we-ness?” It also seems to put the cart before the Episteme3_1_04_Tollefsen.indd 39 29/11/06 11:14:05 40 E P I S T E M E 2 0 0 6 Deborah Perron Tollefsen horse. Although there are no doubt motivational and aff ective elements that contribute to a group’s ability to engage in joint action and remain stable over time (and perhaps these elements contribute to groupthink and so on), these feelings arise in response to certain features either present in the group or the environment and develop over time as the group engages in action and deliberation. Far from providing a defi nition (or cause) of social cohesion, an individual’s feelings of belongingnes

We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency

The basic approach to understanding shared agency (or joint action) has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have some reason for continuing to participate in the joint action in the face of conflicting reasons? This is particularly pressing in cases of joint actions that unfold over long periods of time. There are a variety of ways that the problem of stability and depth of shared intention might be addressed. We review some of those ways in section 1. We do not intend to challenge these approaches. Instead, in this article, we want to suggest that narrative is an additional, perhaps in some cases a predominant, way in which stability and depth are achieved. According to some theories, narrative plays a crucial role in the development of the self. Our suggestion is that the narratives we tell about our joint projects contribute to the development of a stable and deep “we.”

French on Innocence Lost

In “Losing Innocence for the Sake of Responsibility” (1992) Peter French argues that the loss of innocence is required for moral responsibility and that adults have a responsibility to facilitate the child’s loss of innocence. Drawing on the work of Herbert Morris, French provides a compelling account of the knowledge that is acquired in the process of losing one’s innocence and the sorts of experiences required for its loss. Although I agree with French that moral maturity requires the sorts of conceptual knowledge he identifies, I do not think that the loss of innocence is where we gain such knowledge. I shall argue that the experience of losing one’s innocence provides a more fundamental knowledge on which this conceptual capacity is based.