Deborah Zaitchik

The Use of Body Movements and Gestures as Cues to Emotions in Younger and Older Adults

Eighty-two younger and older adults participated in a two-part study of the decoding of emotion through body movements and gestures. In the first part, younger and older adults identified emotions depicted in brief videotaped displays of young adult actors portraying emotional situations. In each display, the actors were silent and their faces were electronically blurred in order to isolate the body cues to emotion. Although both groups made accurate emotion identifications well above chance levels, older adults made more overall errors, and this was especially true for negative emotions. Moreover, their errors were more likely to reflect the misidentification of emotional displays as neutral in content. In the second part, younger and older adults rated the videotaped displays using scales reflecting several movement dimensions (e.g., form, tempo, force, and movement). The ratings of both age groups were in high agreement and provided reliable information about particular body cues to emotion. The errors made by older adults were linked to reactions to exaggerated or ambiguous body cues.

Emotion processing in the visual and auditory domains by patients with Alzheimer's disease

The ability to process emotional information was assessed in 42 individuals: 23 patients with Alzheimers disease (AD) and 19 healthy elderly controls. Four tasks assessed the ability to recognize emotion in audiotaped voices, in drawings of emotional situations, and in videotaped vignettes displaying emotions in facial expression, gestures, and body movements. Hemispheric dominance for processing facial expressions of emotions was also examined. There were no consistent group differences in the ability to process emotion presented via the auditory domain (i.e., nonverbal sounds, such as crying or shrieking, and speech prosody). Controls were, however, significantly better than the AD patients in identifying emotions depicted in drawings of emotional situations and in videotaped scenes displaying faces, gestures, and body movements. These differences were maintained after statistically adjusting for the visuospatial abilities of the participants. After a statistical adjustment for abstraction ability, some of the tasks continued to differentiate the groups (e.g., the emotional drawings task, the videotaped displays of faces), but others did not. These results confirm and extend previous results indicating that AD patients do not have a primary deficit in the processing of emotion. They suggest that the difficulties of the AD patients in perceiving emotion are secondary to the cognitive impairments associated with AD.

Inference of mental states in patients with Alzheimer's disease

Introduction. The ability to determine what someone thinks or knows often requires an individual to infer the mental state of another person, an ability typi cally referred to as ones “theory of mind”. The present study tests this ability in patients with mild‐to‐moderate Alzheimers disease (AD). Methods. Three theory of mind tests and three standardised neuropsychological tests were presented to a group of patients with AD (n = 25) and a group of healthy elderly controls (n = 15). Results. On the first two theory of mind tasks, the performance of the AD patients was nearly perfect and did not differ from that of the controls: AD patients showed no difficulties in either attributing a false belief to another person, or in recognising their own previous false beliefs. On the third theory of mind task, where the key information was embedded in a story narrative, AD patients per formed significantly worse than controls. However, their performance on this task was similar to the control condition, which used a similar story but which did not involve beliefs. Conclusions. These results, as well as those involving correlations between the neuropsychological tests and performance on the third task, suggest that the AD patients’ difficulty may be secondary to their cognitive impairments, rather than a primary impairment in theory of mind.

Mental state attribution and the temporoparietal junction: an fMRI study comparing belief, emotion, and perception.

By age 2, children attribute referential mental states such as perceptions and emotions to themselves and others, yet it is not until age 4 that they attribute representational mental states such as beliefs. This raises an interesting question: is attribution of beliefs different from attribution of perceptions and emotions in terms of its neural substrate? To address this question with a high degree of anatomic specificity, we partitioned the TPJ, a broad area often found to be recruited in theory of mind tasks, into 2 neuroanatomically specific regions of interest: Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS) and Inferior Parietal Lobule (IPL). To maximize behavioral specificity, we designed a tightly controlled verbal task comprised of sets of single sentences--sentences identical except for the type of mental state specified in the verb (belief, emotion, perception, syntax control). Results indicated that attribution of beliefs more strongly recruited both regions of interest than did emotions or perceptions. This is especially surprising with respect to STS, since it is widely reported in the literature to mediate the detection of referential states--among them emotions and perceptions--rather than the inference of beliefs. An explanation is offered that focuses on the differences between verbal stimuli and visual stimuli, and between a process of sentence comprehension and a process of visual detection.

Animist thinking in the elderly and in patients with Alzheimer's disease

Some patients with Alzheimers disease (AD) reveal low-level impairment in their concepts of living things (i.e., forgetting that zebras are striped). To test for more profound impairment, we investigated the concept alive—a “higher order” concept spanning every member of the domain. Many elderly controls were animists, attributing life to inanimates capable of self-generated activity (the sun, fire). Most AD patients were animists, with half even attributing life to inanimates whose activity is not self-generated (cars, lamps). Adult animists, like young children who have not yet acquired biological concepts, overattributed life to active inanimates. We believe this reflects an innate disposition to view active entities as agents, and that agency interferes with the biological concept alive. This interference, we suggest, reflects degradation of biological concepts in the face of spared perception of agents. It sheds light on the nature of fundamental questions concerning conceptual organization, innate endowment, and conceptual change.