Denis Fisette

Husserl's Logical investigations reconsidered

Introduction. Section I: The Thetic Role of Consciousness D. Follesdal. The Unity of the Logical Investigations: Then and Now D. Woodruff Smith. Husserl and the Program of a Wissenschaftslehre D. Fisette. Section II: Husserl Reader of Bolzano J. Sebestik. Husserl and Bolzano on Questions W. Kunne. Bolzano and the Problem of Psychologism R. George. Section III: Johannes Daubert und die Logischen Untersuchungen K. Schuhmann. Names, Statements, and their Corresponding Acts in Husserls Logical Investigations R. Rollinger. Husserls Theory of Judgment: A Critique of Brentano and Frege R. Cobb-Stevens. Section IV: The Theory of Wholes and Parts and Husserls Explication of the Possibility of Knowledge in the Logical Investigations D. Willard. The Many Facets of Formal Ontology R. Poli. Real and Ideal Determination in Husserls Sixth Logical Investigation J. Mensch. References. Index.

Consciousness and intentionality : models and modalities of attribution

Preface. Part 1: Intentionality and Consciousness. Introduction P. Poirier. State Consciousness Revisited P. Jacob. Conscious Intentionality W. Seager. Intentionality, Consciousness and the Systems Perspective J. Proust. Consciousness as valued procedural model of apprehension P. Livet. Part 2: Qualia and Perception. Introduction L. Faucher. The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences D.M. Rosenthal. Qualia and Representations E. Pacherie. Filling-in: Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perception E. Thompson. Perception, Particulars and Predicates K. Mulligan. Part 3: Content Ascription. Introduction M. Montminy. Pretense in Prediction: Simulation and Understanding Minds S. Nichols, S. Stich. Pragmatic Aspects of Content Determination F. Egan. On the Principle of Charity and the Sources of Indeterminacy D. Laurier. Davidson, Indeterminacy and Measurement D. Davis. Part 4: Intentional Causation and Content Individuation. Introduction P. Bernier. Davidson on Intentional Causation A. Marras. Externalism, De Dicto Beliefs, Proper Names and Reference Determination S. Davis. Two Concepts of Belief M. Seymour. References.

Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences: Husserl’s early Criticism of Brentano

In defining his phenomenology as descriptive psychology in the introduction to the first edition of his Logical Investigations 1, Husserl suggests that the field study of his phenomenology as his methodology are very close to that of Brentano’s psychology, and that the research in the book somehow contributes to Brentano’s philosophical program, one of whose main axes is psychology or philosophy of mind.

Husserl’s Programme of a Wissenschaftslehre in the Logical Investigations

What features of the Logical Investigations insure their cohesion and unity? Is there such a thing as a programme to which the exceptionally diverse investigations of this monumental work contributes? This question is important for anyone who acknowledges that there is a tension between the logical theme, which concerns namely the objective and ideal character of meaning and reference, and the psychological theme which touches upon the subjective dimension of mental acts. The case of logical psychologism is paradigmatic of this tension. In the Prolegomena, the arguments against this form of psychologism concern the practical and normative conception of logic as well as the foundational claims of empirical psychology. This tension thus bears witness to Husserl’s double exertion. On the one hand, the logical struggle he leads opposes him to the tenants of the practico-normative logic, and thus to the empiricists as well as to the Kantians, and what is at stake in this struggle is the idea of a pure logic as it is sketched in the last part of the Prolegomeana. On the other hand, Husserl develops a theory of knowledge whose central theme is the justification of knowledge. This part of the struggle sets him up against philosophical naturalism, that is, against the psychologistic doctrines of John Stuart Mill and Ernst Mach which have this in common that they seek on ground logic on natural sciences such as psychology or biology.

Philosophy from an Empirical Standpoint: Essays on Carl Stumpf

The volume aims at a critical assessment of Carl Stumpf’s philosophy and an evaluation of his place in the School of Brentano and in the phenomenological movement. The book contains 15 original essays, unpublished writings by Stumpf and a complete bibliography.

Fenomenologia e fenomenismo em Husserl e Mach

Como conciliar as repetidas criticas ao fenomenismo de Mach, um pouco por toda a obra de Husserl, com o papel proeminente que Husserl parece nele reconhecer em seus ultimos trabalhos, quanto a genese de sua propria fenomenologia? Para responder a essa questao, examinaremos, primeiramente, a relacao estreita que Husserl estabelece entre o metodo fenomenologico e o descritivismo de Mach a luz do debate que opoe nativismo e empirismo sobre a origem da percepcao do espaco. Em seguida, examinaremos dois aspectos da critica que Husserl faz ao positivismo de Mach: o primeiro se refere ao fenomenismo e sua doutrina dos elementos, enquanto o segundo, ao principio de economia de pensamento, que Husserl associa a uma forma de psicologismo em Prolegomenos. A hipotese que nos guiara nesse estudo e que as opinioes aparentemente contraditorias de Husserl sobre o positivismo de Mach se explicam em parte pelo estatuto duplo que a fenomenologia recebe em seus ultimos trabalhos: enquanto programa filosofico, ela se opoe explicitamente ao positivismo; enquanto metodo, ela se aparenta ao descritivismo de Mach. Concluiremos com a ideia de que esses dois filosofos de origem checa perseguiam o objetivo comum de apreender o sentido originario de positividade.

The Horizon of the Self: Husserl on Indexicals

One of the questions raised by the conference’s topic, in particular the relationship between the self and the other, a matter much discussed since Merleau-Ponty’s death, is the question of husserlian phenomenology’s cartesianism. Some believe that despite his reservations towards cartesianism, Husserl never disavowed his commitment to the Cartesian program of a first philosophy.1 In his postscript to Ideas I, he defines phenomenology as die universale und im radikalen Sinne “strenge” Wissenschaft. Als das ist sie Wissenschaft aus letzter Begrundung, oder, was gleich gilt, aus letzter Sebstverantwortung, in der also keine pradikative oder vorpradikative Selbstverstandlichkeit als unbefragter Erkenntnisboden fungiert (Hua V, 139).

A Phenomenology Without Phenomena? Carl Stumpf’s Critical Remarks on Husserl’s Phenomenology

This study is a commentary on Carl Stumpf’s evaluation of Husserl’s phenomenology as presented in the Logical Investigations and the first book of Ideas. I first examine Stumpf’s reception of the version of phenomenology that Husserl presented in the Logical Investigations and I then look at §§ 85-86 of Ideas I, in which Husserl seeks to demarcate his “pure” phenomenology from that of Stumpf. In the third section, I analyze the criticism that Stumpf, in § 13 of his book Erkenntnislehre, directs toward to the new version of phenomenology that Husserl develops in Ideas I, and in the fourth, I summarize the Spinozist interpretation of the noetico-noematical correlations that Stumpf proposes in his two studies on Spinoza. The last section addresses Husserl’s self-criticism regarding the Cartesian aproach to the reduction in Ideas I and the parallelism that the late Husserl establishes between intentional psychology and transcendental phenomenology. I try to show that the version of phenomenology that Husserl develops during the Freiburg period anticipates in many respects Stumpf’s criticism and partly confirms the latter’s diagnosis of the version of phenomenology advocated in Ideas I. One hundred years after the publication of the first book of Husserl’s Ideas, we are still far from having reached a consensus regarding the philosophical implications of this work and its contribution to the philosophical program of the founder of contemporary phenomenology. Soon after its publication in 1913, this book received a mitigated reception (to say the least) from Husserl’s first students (the Munich phenomenologists); it gave rise to many controversies on the ins and outs of Husserl’s phenomenology and on the book’s central theme, that is, intentionality. It is in this book that Husserl introduced the concept of noema, which represents the heart of his theory of intentionality, and we know that since the 1960s the reception of Ideas I has been the subject of a vigorous debate which still arouses a great deal of interest from Husserl’s commentators even today. But the

Austrian Philosophy and its Institutions: Remarks on the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna (1888–1938)

This study examines the place of the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna (1888–1938) in the evolution of the history of philosophy in Austria, up to the establishment of the Vienna Circle in 1929. I will examine three aspects of the relationship between the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle and the Philosophical Society which has been emphasized by several historians of the Vienna Circle: The first aspect concerns the theory of a first Vienna Circle formed mainly by H. Hahn, P. Frank, and O. Neurath; the second aspect is the contention that the missing link between the Vienna Circle and the Bolzano tradition in Austria is Alois Hofler, a student of Brentano and Meinong; I will finally examine the link they established between the annexation of the Philosophical Society to the Kant-Gesellschaft in 1927 and the founding of the Vienna Circle in 1929. I will argue that this institution played a key role in the history of philosophy in Austria and is partly responsible for the formation of the Vienna Circle.

La teoria dei segni locali. Stumpf, critico di Lotze

L’articolo offre un’analisi della teoria dei segni locali sviluppata da H. Lotze e delle critiche avanzate da C. Stumpf. L’autore mostra inoltre come tale critica della nozione di segno locale sia strettamente legata a una messa in discussione da parte di Stumpf degli assunti metafisici di origine kantiana sullo spazio. Infine, l’autore rileva come questa critica del paradigma kantiano allora dominante sia decisiva per il perfezionamento da parte di Stumpf della distinzione brentaniana fra contenuti psichici indipendenti e dipendenti.