Denis Forest

In Search of Normal Functions: BST, Cummins Functions, and Hempel’s Problem

One key element of Boorse’s view on health and disease is its definition of Normal Functions. In this paper, we question his reference to survival and reproduction both in this definition and within the general framework of BST. We suggest that, beyond the naturalistic stance of BST, this reference is motivated by what we may call Hempel’s problem, that is, the necessity to make explicit the background of functional ascriptions in scientific contexts. We offer reasons to doubt that Boorse’s solution of Hempel’s problem coincides with standard medical thought and we suggest an alternative.

Neuroconstructivism: A Developmental Turn in Cognitive Neuroscience?

Since its birth, brain science has been for the most part the study of the structure and functioning of an already formed brain, the study of the endpoint of a process. Brodmann areas, for instance, are cortical areas of the adult brain (Brodmann 1909). In his authoritative Neurobiology, Shepherd devotes only one chapter (out of thirty) to developmental neurobiology (Shepherd 1994). From early attempts at functional localization by Gall or Broca to recent neurocognitive models like the model of visual cognition proposed by Milner and Goodale (Milner & Goodale 2006), functional decomposition of the brain has essentially remained the decomposition of the brain of the adult. Neuroconstructivism, then, as it has been recently vindicated (Mareschal et al. 2007; Sirois et al. 2008) could be understood, first, as the idea that we should take brain development more seriously. This suggestion comes at a time when in many fields of biology, ontogenetic development has become the object of both fascinating discoveries and intense speculation. But there is more to neuroconstructivism than a developmental perspective on the brain, as it can be understood as a view of cognition: it is this view of cognition that motivates a specific, renewed approach to the human brain. What neuroconstructivism is challenging, in fact, is a view of cognitive explanation, and of cognitive development.

Is an Anatomy of Melancholia Possible? Brain Processes, Depression, and Mood Regulation

Neurobiological models of depression aim to explain its conditions through a description of the underlying neurocircuitry. The present paper analyses the skeptical doubts that may be raised in response to neurobiological accounts of depression and the conditions under which these models may shed some light on the corresponding phenomena. Far from excluding other kinds of enquiries, neurobiological models may greatly benefit from a philosophical enquiry on our affective life, and especially from closer attention paid to ill-defined phenomena like moods. I suggest that what is crucial to depression is defective affective regulation, and that it is with this perspective that we may make sense of neurophysiological data.

Comments on William Bechtel's “Looking down, around, and up: Mechanistic explanation in psychology”

The first part of this paper deals with the relations between mechanistic explanation and reduction. It is argued that there is no insuperable conflict between the two, but that the mechanistic framework adds requirements that are not acknowledged in the model of property reduction. The second part concerns the relations between organization and environmental factors. Internal organization may be so tightly linked to external context that both have to be considered together.