Denis McManus

Wittgenstein and scepticism

Wittgenstein is arguably the greatest philosopher of the last hundred years and scepticism is one of the central problems that modern philosophy faces. This collection is the first to be devoted to an examination of how that great philosophers work bears on this fundamental philosophical problem. Wittgensteins reaction to scepticism is complex, articulating both a sense that sceptical problems are ultimately unreal and a sense that scepticism teaches us something about the fundamental character of the human predicament. The essays, specially written for this collection by distinguished philosophers and commentators on Wittgenstein, explore that reaction, addressing, in particular, scepticism about the existence of the external world and of other minds. In doing so, it explores issues not only in theory of knowledge but also in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, language, perception and literature, as well as raising questions about the nature of philosophy itself. Several of the papers address the work of Stanley Cavell, perhaps the most influential commentator on the work of Wittgenstein, and Cavell replies in the final pieces to four of those papers. This collection is essential reading for students and scholars of Wittgenstein and anyone interested in the debate surrounding scepticism.

Ontological Pluralism and the Being and Time Project

This paper identifies a problem which the project that Heidegger set himself in Being and Time aimed to solve. The problem concerns the unity of the concept of “Being in general,” the integrity of the very notion of “Dasein,” and the possibility of a perspective from which the philosopher can do her work. Heidegger’s own attempt to solve this problem turns on the claim that time is “the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being” (Sein und Zeit 1), time supposedly thereby ‘mak[ing] ontology possible” (Basic Problems of Phenomenology 228). I elucidate the problem by discussing how it emerges also in Russell (in reflecting on types) and Aristotle (in discussing whether Being is ‘said in many ways’), by identifying challenges that attempted solutions to it face, and by juxtaposing the issues it raises with ones faced by McDaniel’s and Turner’s recent attempts to defend what they call “ontological pluralism.”

Heidegger, Wittgenstein and St Paul on the Last Judgement: On the Roots and Significance of ‘The Theoretical Attitude’

The article examines Heideggers lectures on St Paul and provides, in particular, a reading of their discussion of the remarks on the parousia in the letters to the Thessalonians. This reading serves a number of purposes. First, it makes clear how Heideggers appropriation of a certain ‘anti-theological’ tradition helped first give a sense to his notion of ‘the theoretical attitude’, a problematic notion that plays a central role in his mature early philosophy. Second, it illustrates, and thus helps to refine the identity of, a particular kind of recognizably ‘phenomenological’ reflection that attempts to distance itself precisely from that ‘attitude’; and third, it points to a new perspective on some central and problematic themes in Heideggers better known early writings and, in particular, their discussion of assertions. An identification of some remarkable similarities between Heideggers remarks on the Last Judgement and remarks of Wittgensteins help identify this perspective.

Reviews - Revolutionary Saints: Heidegger, National Socialism, and Antinomian Politics , By C. Rickey The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. £46.95

harder to understand how it is that – as was mentioned earlier – top-lit objects are typically so much easier for us to see and recognize than bottom-lit ones. Their shadows are much more important than their outlines or colours in this regard. In fact, it is perfectly possible to depict a visually recognizable object by depicting only its shadows – for example, in a charcoal sketch of a human face, or in a grey-tone painting of a white cloth with many folds and creases in it. Curiously enough, Sorensen denies that we can feel shadows – so that talk of ‘feeling a cool shade’ cannot, according to him, be construed as literally being true – on the grounds that temperature is possessed only by things containing molecules in motion, being ‘defined’ as their average kinetic energy (118). This, as far as I can tell, is one of Sorensen’s few slips of a purely scientific nature, since modern physics apparently allows that even the vacuum has a temperature. Sorensen also denies that shadows can have any colour other than black, contending that we need to distinguish shadows themselves from the ‘light pollution’ that may sometimes penetrate and fill them, rather as extraneous matter may sometimes penetrate and fill a hole in a material object. Sorensen coins a snappy new word, ‘filtow’, for the kind of body of coloured light, produced by a filter, that may, according to him, overlap or even coincide with a shadow. Sorensen’s book is certainly fascinating and richly thoughtprovoking. It discusses many intriguing topics that I have not even been able to touch upon. Much of what he says may well induce doubt and even incredulity, at least on a first reading. But he argues carefully and clearly in favour of his key claims, all of which merit very serious consideration, even if they sometimes provoke one to construct and defend alternative views. That, however, is surely the hallmark of the very best kind of philosophy writing. Seeing Dark Things is a model of this kind.