Derek Averre

Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the ‘Shared Neighbourhood’

They conclude that, with Russia having taken a different path from the liberaldemocratic evolution chosen by Central and Eastern European countries, it is not clear what model of relations Moscow and Brussels should be aiming for (Karaganov & Yurgens 2008, p. 4). Their diverging positions are manifested not only in the increasing difficulties in their bilateral relationship but also in their approaches to the shared neighbourhood. In particular, the conflict between Russia and Georgia over the separatist region of South Ossetia in August 2008—and the criticism by the EU and many of its member states of Moscow’s disproportionate reaction and its recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence—only indicated the shallowness of the putative ‘strategic partnership’. Indeed, it led to the conclusion in Brussels that ‘relations between the EU and Russia have reached a crossroads’. The term ‘shared neighbourhood’ has primarily been used to denote the Soviet successor states covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and now by the recently launched Eastern Partnership—Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the countries of the South Caucasus. However, with the adoption by Brussels of the Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia in June 2007—which ‘strengthens the perception of the EU as a political and even strategic actor in the region’ (Kassenova 2008, p. 2)—and the appointment of an EU Special Representative with

Russia and the European Union: Convergence or Divergence?

Abstract European Union enlargement has left Russia on the margins of European political processes and led to widespread suspicion in the Moscow foreign policy establishment of European motives. This has resulted in, first, increasing resistance to the imposition of European norms and, second, a more assertive policy, particularly in the EUs and Russias ‘overlapping neighbourhoods’. Although Moscow is likely to continue the strategy of engagement initiated under Putin, Brussels must radically rethink the nature and extent of Russias ‘Europeanisation’. Russias drive for modernisation will coexist with the strengthening of sovereignty and the power of the state, seen by the Putin administration as key to external and internal security. The EU will have to limit its ambition and work within this ‘window’—wider or narrower depending on state of play—of policy possibilities.

Russian Foreign Policy and the Global Political Environment

Russias necessary engagement with the international system requires external adaptations and influences internal developments.

Russia, humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: the case of Syria

Western analysis perceives Russian approaches to issues of humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as running counter to western-inspired international norms. This debate has surfaced with some vigour over Russias policy in the Syria conflict where, in order to protect its strategic interests in Syria, an obstructionist Moscow has been accused of ignoring humanitarian considerations and allowing time for the Assad regime to crush the opposition by vetoing a resolution threatening to impose sanctions. While Russian approaches are undoubtedly explained by a desire to maximize its growing political influence and trade advantages to serve its legitimate foreign policy interests, and while Moscows attitudes to intervention and R2P exhibit important differences from those of the major western liberal democracies, its arguments are in fact framed within a largely rational argument rooted in ‘traditional’ state-centred international law. This article first highlights key arguments in the scholarly literature on intervention and R2P before going on to examine the evolution of Russian views on these issues. The analysis then focuses on the extent to which Moscows arguments impact on international legal debates on the Libya and Syria conflicts. The article then seeks to explore how Russian approaches to intervention/R2P reflect fundamental trends in its foreign policy thinking and its quest for legitimacy in a negotiated international order. Finally, it attempts to raise some important questions regarding Russias role in the future direction of the intervention/R2P debates.

The Ukraine conflict: Russia’s challenge to European security governance

Abstract This essay uses the concept of security governance to explore the implications of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine for the rules-based security order in Europe. It outlines key ideas in the literature about the post-Cold War European security order with respect to Russia’s role and examines Russian debates on the Ukraine conflict. It then investigates European institutions’ reaction to the conflict in order to understand to what extent Russia’s exclusion (as a result of the West’s policy of containment and deterrence) or self-exclusion now constitutes a structural factor in the security politics of the wider Europe. The essay concludes with the analysis of the challenges facing both Europe and Russia and considers the prospects for re-shaping this order to give meaning to partnership and shared security governance.

NATO expansion and Russian national interests

The article centres on the debate in Russia about NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and how expansion affects re‐emergent Russian national interests post‐Madrid. The author examines official Russian arguments against expansion as well as the views of policy‐makers and political commentators, assesses the impact of NATOs plans on Russian‐Western Security and disarmament arrangements and analyses Russias relations with her neighbours in CEE, the CIS and Asia.

Introduction: The Ukraine Crisis and Post-Post-Cold War Europe

NOBODY COULD HAVE FORESEEN THAT THE TURMOIL WHICH erupted on the streets of Kyiv in late 2013—which became known as the Euromaidan—would soon lead to what has been regarded as the collapse of the post-Cold War regional order in the wider Europe. It bears remembering that the Euromaidan was essentially a domestic affair, reflecting the rejection by most Ukrainians of their corrupt and ineffective political elites, embodied in the person of President Viktor Yanukovych. However, Yanukovych’s ignominious flight from Ukraine and the subsequent change of government in Kyiv triggered a sequence of events—the territorial annexation of Crimea by Russia and the war in the Donbas—the reverberations of which are likely to be felt in Europe and beyond for some time to come. These events have highlighted a fundamental shift, both in Ukraine’s relationship with Russia and—with unpredictable implications for the future of European security—Russia’s own relations with Europe. At this stage we can say with some certainty that the post-post-Cold War Europe is upon us but it is unclear what kind of order will emerge from the current tensions. The profound domestic and international implications of these ongoing developments present a major challenge to scholars specialising in Russia and Eastern Europe. Amidst fast-changing events we need to consider the longer-term perspective in order to contextualise developments, both in Ukraine’s domestic politics and in its relations with Russia and Russia’s relations with the EU. Like most newly independent states which emerged from the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine was largely terra incognita in the early 1990s. Apart from domestic politics, scholarly research focused on two aspects. The first was nationalism, identity and language issues (Kuzio & Wilson 1994; Arel 1996; Wilson 1996; Janmaat 1999; Kuzio 1998; Wanner 1998; Wolczuk 2000) as well as the ethnic, linguistic and regional

The EU, Russia and the shared neighbourhood: security, governance and energy

A number of leading scholars have in the recent period highlighted the apparently increasing problems in relations between the European Union and Russia, not least in their shared neighbourhood Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the countries of the South Caucasus at a time when, in contrast, increasing interdependence across political, social, economic and security issue areas binds the wider Europe together ever more closely (see, for example, Haukkala 2010, p. 1). The delay being experienced over the negotiation of a new partnership and cooperation agreement, as a result of which relations remain rooted in the four Common Spaces, means that there is continuing uncertainty over exactly what model of relationship Brussels and Moscow are working towards. Differing approaches to political and economic governance in Europe and the emergence of new security challenges have combined with domestic instability in the neighbourhood countries themselves, like Russia, seeking a viable path of modernisation to produce a shifting security landscape that challenges European and Russian policymakers alike. In particular, the conflict between Russia and Georgia over the separatist region of South Ossetia in August 2008 and the criticism by the EU and many of its member states of Moscow’s disproportionate reaction and recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia only appeared to underline the shallowness of the putative ‘strategic partnership’. It has become clear that EU Russia relations can no longer be reduced to bilateral technical negotiations over trade, visas, scientific cooperation and so on; nor can their focus be confined to the liberal-democratic ‘values agenda’. Much wider aspects of the international system and the global economy are generating political challenges, impacting on both the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy choices. Interaction between the two most influential actors in the neighbourhood what kind of security role an increasingly active EU will adopt in these regions, and what Moscow’s response will be forms the central question of much extant writing on the relationship. It has become increasingly clear over the last few years that Europe is having to adjust to new terms of reference in its relations with Moscow (see Averre 2007). Russia’s ‘integration’ into Europe about which there was much debate earlier in the decade has given way to a more sober approach based on pragmatic cooperation; relations between Moscow and the major EU member states have been stepped up. However, despite the unfavourable assessment by many scholars and commentators, the EU Russia relationship has arguably not been without its successes. The increasingly dense network of contacts at the level of technical experts and the business community where there are some Russian officials and actors with more liberal views European Security Vol. 19, No. 4, December 2010, 531 534

Chapter 2 – Looking in on fluorine chemistry in Russia and Ukraine

Publisher Summary In the Soviet period, a lot of information about R & D and production of fluorine compounds was classified because of their high-technology military-related applications. Developments in science, technology, and industry since the break-up of the USSR have had a far-reaching and largely deleterious effect on R & D and production. Due to priority accorded to the defense-related chemistry, there was relatively limited commercial development in the Soviet economy of certain areas in which fluorine chemicals are widely used in the West, and it is difficult for the Russian companies to break into well-established Western markets for a variety of reasons. In Soviet times, the Institute of Organic Chemistry (IOC) in Novosibirsk and the A. N. Nesmeyanov Institute of Organoelement Compounds (Russian acronym INEOS) in Moscow were two of the biggest centers in the world in terms of staff directly employed on organofluorine research, and the Russian Research Center (RRC) “Kurchatov Institute” is a world leader in the development of inorganic fluorine compounds. A Professor at INEOS and Major General at the S. K. Timoshenko Military Academy of Chemical Defense, Knunyants inspired generations of Russian fluorine chemists. He was interested in organofluorine chemistry. Much of his early work concentrated on probing and rationalizing the unusual chemical behavior of fluoro-olefins and his sizeable team also carried out much of the fundamental chemistry underpinning the development of fluorocarbons.

Chemical weapons in Russia: After the CWC

Official commitment to chemical disarmament in Russia appears to have signalled the end of chemical weapons development and production and has been accompanied by far‐reaching defence cuts, conversion of military‐related chemicals capabilities and government support for international nonproliferation norms. Although it appears unlikely that a large‐scale chemical weapons capability has been preserved, the industrial and scientific base for such a programme still exists and there is support for retaining a chemical weapons option among some groups in the Russian security establishment. Concern also persists about the transparency of chemical demilitarization due to secrecy in the defence establishment; questions about a Soviet/Russian binary CW programme, the existence of which is suggested by published archival documents but which is still officially denied, remain unanswered.