Derek Edyvane

The Passion for Civility

This article challenges and clarifies everyday thought about the idea of civility in society and politics by subjecting it to theoretical analysis. It contributes to research on citizenship, toleration and social cohesion by developing a new synthesis of the presently fragmented literature in contemporary political theory on the concept of civility and its place in liberal democratic politics. It first considers the meaning of civility, identifying some difficulties of definition and elaborating a distinction between civility in conduct and civility in attitude. It then assesses the most prominent debates around civility’s value by contrasting arguments that civility serves a vital function in the moderation of democratic conflict with arguments that it threatens the basic values upon which democracy is founded. The article finds that the debate about civility is misconceived and that the literature is diminished by its failure to engage directly with the problem of incivility. In so doing, it establishes the parameters for a new agenda of civility research.

The Varieties of Cultural Perception: Multiculturalism after Recognition

Doubts about the enterprise of cultural recognition have helped to fuel a backlash against the politics of multiculturalism in Europe during the last decade. Such doubts are well-founded. Charles Taylors seminal discussion of the politics of recognition neglects serious difficulties that arise for the activity of recognition when the objective and subjective dimensions of cultural identity diverge. Narratives of cultural “passing” help to highlight these difficulties and demonstrate that recognition can sometimes contribute to identity-based oppression. However, this conclusion does not commit us to a politics of cultural indifference or assimilation: the rejection of recognition does not entail the rejection of perception in general. Iris Murdochs notion of “attention” provides a corrective to our understanding of recognition and thereby supplies a potentially superior ethical and perceptual basis for European multiculturalism in the twenty-first century.

What is the Point of a Public Morality

The recent revival of popular interest in the idea of public morality has involved a striking divergence of opinion: there is widespread agreement that we must recover a language of civic virtue, but disagreement about the point of so doing. Some suppose that public morality should promote the good society, while others suppose that it should facilitate the prevention of catastrophe. While on the face of it this disagreement constitutes nothing more remarkable than a difference of temperament between optimists and pessimists, it reflects in fact a fundamental rift in the structure of political action, the denial of which has led to considerable confusion. The denial of a rift depends on the assumption of symmetry between the positive and negative political agendas of individuals and groups. This assumption in turn presupposes a dubious monistic model of political action that is unable to make sense of certain forms of tragic disappointment that are a familiar feature of political experience. Better sense can be made of these experiences by adopting instead a dualistic model of political action which conceives of the positive–negative distinction as being cut across by a more fundamental distinction between aspirational politics and preventive politics. Acknowledging this distinction illuminates debates about ‘non-ideal’ political theory and about the possibilities for a politics of hope in conditions of democratic pluralism. It also highlights an essential ambivalence as to the point of a public morality, which may undermine the enterprise of salvaging civic virtue as conventionally understood.

Introduction: Toleration re-examined

This introduction considers recent work in toleration; the nature and definition of toleration; and the relationship between toleration and broader questions of political philosophy.

Tolerance and pain

It is often thought that tolerance must be painful; the absence of pain is taken as an indication of indifference, an indication that the agent does not really disapprove of the object of her professed tolerance. This article challenges that view by arguing that the association of tolerance and pain depends ultimately upon the contentious assumption that inner conflict is a form of dysfunction. By unsettling that assumption, it is possible to unsettle the idea that one’s tolerance of others must be painful. More positively, coming to recognize the normality of inner conflict might actually serve to reinforce the disposition to tolerate, as the agent realizes that she must strive to contain and perpetuate the conflicts and tensions which form a necessary feature of her life. If this is right, then the emphasis often placed upon the etymological association of tolerance with patience and suffering could be unhelpful. It might be fruitful to devote more attention to the neglected notion of calmly abiding the behaviour of those of whom we disapprove.