Derek Parfit
University of Oxford
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Archive | 2004
Derek Parfit
The width of the blocks shows the number of people living; the height shows how well off these people are. Compared with outcome A, outcome B would have twice as many people, who would all be worse off. To avoid irrelevant complications, I assume that in each outcome there would be no inequality: no one would be worse off than anyone else. I also assume that everyones life would be well worth living. There are various ways in which, because there would be twice as many people in outcome B, these people might be all worse off than the people in A. There might be worse housing, overcrowded schools, more pollution, less unspoilt
Philosophy | 2012
Derek Parfit
We can start with some science fiction. Here on Earth, I enter the Teletransporter . When I press some button, a machine destroys my body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. This information is sent by radio to Mars, where another machine makes, out of organic materials, a perfect copy of my body. The person who wakes up on Mars seems to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed the button, and is in every other way just like me.
Utilitas | 2012
Derek Parfit
This article discusses the relation between prioritarian and egalitarian principles, whether and why we need to appeal to both kinds of principle, how prioritarians can answer various objections, especially those put forward by Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve, the moral difference between cases in which our acts could affect only one person or two or more people, veil of ignorance contractualism and utilitarianism, what prioritarians should claim about cases in which the effects of our acts are uncertain, the relative moral importance of actual and expectable benefits, whether people should sometimes be given various chances of receiving benefits, and principles that appeal to competing claims.
Archive | 2006
Derek Parfit
In this passage, Kant declares that there are only two kinds of claim about what is practically necessary, or what we ought to do. Imperatives are hypothetical if they claim that we ought to do something as a means of achieving one of our ends. Imperatives are categorical if they claim that we ought to do something not as a means of achieving any end, but, as we can say, for its own sake only. These are not, as Kant declares, the only two kinds of imperative. Kant’s remarks involve, not one, but two distinctions, which combine to give us four possibilities. An imperative might tell us to act in some way
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research | 1986
Joseph Margolis; Derek Parfit
This book challenges, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity. The author claims that we have a false view of our own nature; that it is often rational to act against our own best interests; that most of us have moral views that are directly self-defeating; and that, when we consider future generations the conclusions will often be disturbing. He concludes that moral non-religious moral philosophy is a young subject, with a promising but unpredictable future.
Archive | 1984
Derek Parfit
Archive | 2011
Derek Parfit; Samuel Scheffler
Ratio | 1997
Derek Parfit
Archive | 1991
Derek Parfit
Archive | 1982
Derek Parfit