Derk Pereboom

The metaphysics of irreducibility

ConclusionWe do not believe that the reasons which have been offered of late for rejecting non-reductive materialism should be accepted. The reasons for which reductive accounts were largely abandoned remain good ones, and non-reductive materialism remains the most satisfying and sensible account of the relationship among the special sciences.

Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument

I have presented a Frankfurt-style argument (Pereboom 2000, 2001, 2003) against the requirement of robust alternative possibilities for moral responsibility that features an example, Tax Evasion, in which an agent is intuitively morally responsible for a decision, has no robust alternative possibilities, and is clearly not causally determined to make the decision. Here I revise the criterion for robustness in response to suggestions by Dana Nelkin, Jonathan Vance, and Kevin Timpe, and I respond to objections to the argument by Carlos Moya and David Widerker, in the process of which I refine the Tax Evasion example.

Kant on intentionality

If we construe Kants theory of mental representations as a theory of intentionality, we will discover a striking contrast between Kants views and those of his predecessors. Whereas there is an important sense in which Hume and much of the tradition preceding him extensionalizes intentional relations, Kant does not. Reflection on how Kant manages to avoid extensionalism, and on his theory of intentionality in general, provides us with an unusual and illuminating perspective on Kants metaphysical and epistemological project.

ON ALFRED MELE'S FREE WILL AND LUCK

I argue that agent-causal libertarianism has a strong initial rejoinder to Meles luck argument against it, but that his claim that it has yet to be explained how agent-causation yields responsibility-conferring control has significant force. I suggest an avenue of response. Subsequently, I raise objections to Meles criticisms of my four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism.

Self-understanding in Kant's Transcendental Deduction

I argue that §§15–20 of the B-Deduction contain two independent arguments for the applicability of a priori concepts, the first an argument from above, the second an argument from below. The core of the first argument is §16s explanation of our consciousness of subject-identity across self-attributions, while the focus of the second is §18s account of universality and necessity in our experience. I conclude that the B-Deduction comprises powerful strategies for establishing its intended conclusion, and that some assistance from empirical psychology might well have produced a completely successful argument.

Kant on justification in transcendental philosophy

Kants claim that the justification of transcendental philosophy is a priori is puzzling because it should be consistent with (1) his general restriction on the justification of knowledge, that intuitions must play a role in the justification of all nondegenerate knowledge, with (2) the implausibility of a priori intuitions being the only ones on which transcendental philosophy is founded, and with (3) his professed view that transcendental philosophy is not analytic. I argue that this puzzle can be solved, that according to Kant transcendental philosophy is justified a priori in the sense that the only empirical information required for its justification can be derived from any possible human experience. Transcendental justification does not rely on any more particular or special observations or experiments. Philip Kitchers general account of apriority in Kant captures this aspect of a priori knowledge. Nevertheless, I argue that Kitchers account goes wrong in the link it specifies between apriority and certainty.

The Phenomenology of Agency and Deterministic Agent Causation

On one widespread conception, in any situation in which I am deliberating about what to do, I will have a number of distinct options for action or refraining from acting, and these options are genuinely available to me in a sense that requires the absence of causal determination by factors beyond my control. This libertarian conception reflects a core sense of freedom of the will. Some have argued that this ability is reflected in the phenomenology of many of our actions, and thus that the phenomenology of agency might be taken to support the view that we have free will in a libertarian sense. Others have suggested in addition that the phenomenology of agency at least prima facie conflicts with the influential state- or event-causal theory of action, championed by Donald Davidson (J Philos 60:685–700, 1963), among others. The phenomenology appears to reveal that in paradigm cases, actions are caused not solely by events or states, but are rather actively caused by agents themselves. The conclusion one might draw is that the phenomenology supports agent-causal libertarianism. I will argue that the phenomenology does not strongly support a libertarian conception of agency, but that together with further theoretical considerations it does substantiate agent-causation by contrast with state-causation or non-causation of action in paradigm cases of action. In accord with these claims, I explore the sort of compatibilist or determinist agent-causal theory defended by Ned Markosian (Pacific Philos Q 80:257–277, 1999, Philos Stud 157:383–398, 2010) and Dana Nelkin (Making sense of freedom and responsibility. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011).

Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist

According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the consequence that at least some mental state types consist not merely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states, but also in nonrelational properties that play a role in explaining functional relations. Consequently, a scientific realist of the sort I describe must reject functionalism.

Anti-Reductionism, Anti-Rationalism, and the Material Constitution of the Mental

I’ve set out and defended an account of the vertical relations between the mental and more fundamental levels in terms of a theory of material constitution (Pereboom 2002, 2011). A controversial feature of this account is that it rejects identity as the distinctive interlevel relation, by contrast with standard reductive positions and, perhaps surprisingly, with the rival nonreductive subset view. Instead, it appeals to a fundamental made-up-of relation. The criticism that this relation and the theory are obscure is diagnosed as presupposing the unfounded rationalist claim that accounts of this sort can only appeal to conceptual analysis and logical relations such as identity.

Honderich on Freedom, Determinism, and Meaning in Life

Ted Honderich has made a very significant contribution to the debate about free will and determinism, in particular in his important book, A Theory of Determinism (Honderich, A Theory of Determinism, Oxford University Press, 1988). I share his general perspective on this issue, which, like mine, is in the Spinozist camp (Spinoza, The Collected Works of Spinoza, Princeton University Press, 1677/1985), and I also agree with many of its specific features. His account of the aspects of our practice of holding moral responsibility that would have to be given up and which can be retained is nuanced and powerful. This is the part of the project that I have addressed in past works (Pereboom, Living without Free Will, Cambridge University Press, 2001; Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Oxford University Press, 2014). Here, I will recount and expand on what I said there.