Desha M. Girod

Do Migrants Improve Their Hometowns? Remittances and Access to Public Services in Mexico, 1995-2000

How do citizens in developing countries access public services? Scholars study this question by emphasizing the role of government, measuring government performance as household access to public services, such as clean water and sanitation. However, the authors argue that the state does not hold a monopoly on provision of such utilities: Citizens in developing countries often turn to nonstate providers for basic utilities. In Mexico, the authors find that direct money transfers from migrants, known as remittances, are used to provide household access to public services. The statistical analysis across Mexico’s 2,438 municipalities demonstrates that citizens improve their own access. The results also contribute new evidence to the literature on remittances and development by offering a micro-level explanation for how remittances affect both the availability and the source of basic utilities. The findings suggest that the measures scholars typically associate with government performance may in fact capture nonstate provision of basic utilities.

Take the Money and Run: The Determinants of Compliance with Aid Agreements

Conditions on aid agreements aim to increase aid effectiveness, and are, therefore, an important component of aid agreements. Yet little is known about why aid-recipient governments comply with these conditions. Some scholars have suggested a strategic-importance hypothesis: recipients comply when donors enforce conditions—and donors enforce conditions when recipients are not strategically important. However, there are many cases where strategically important countries comply with conditions and strategically unimportant countries fail to do so. We argue that to explain compliance, we must also understand how the desire to maximize revenue from major income sources, such as FDI and natural resource rents, changes the recipients incentive to comply. Using data on World Bank records of compliance from 1964 to 2010, we find strong support for our hypotheses even after accounting for different model specifications and potential endogeneity. Paradoxically, donors can secure compliance from recipients for reasons unrelated to the promise of additional aid.

Indigenous Origins of Colonial Institutions

What are the origins of colonial forced labor? While extensive research investigates the effects of colonial forced labor on contemporary political and economic development, little is known about the origins of colonial forced labor. Based on historical accounts, we offer a simple formal model that emphasizes constraints facing profit-maximizing colonists. The model provides a novel explanation for colonial forced labor by demonstrating that local and foreign forced labor depended on different factors. Colonists used local, indigenous forced labor when they encountered an indigenous political administration that was already coercing labor. However, colonists used foreign forced labor, like African slavery in the Americas, when indigenous labor was not already organized and natural resources were present. Original data from 439 subnational territories covering the Americas support the hypotheses across a variety of model specifications. This study implies that differences in political and economic development today may predate European colonialism.

Elite-led democratisation in aid-dependent states: the case of Mauritania

Why did Mauritania, an Arab League member, undergo a short-lived democratic transition after a successful coup in 2005? Mauritanias democratisation is puzzling because it occurred despite the presence of two conditions that are thought to hinder the prospects of democracy: poverty and strategic importance to the West. We trace the democratisation process undertaken by Mauritanias successful coup leaders in 2005 by focusing on the regimes foreign aid sources. We find that because coup leaders overthrew a Western ally, they feared aid flows would decline. The coup leaders therefore calculated that democratisation would shore up ties by signalling that the new regime was committed to maintaining a strong relationship with Western donors. Our findings have important implications for top-down democratisation in North Africa and the Middle East. Strategic importance appears to be a matter of degree, and states with modest importance to donors, such as Mauritania, may use democratisation as a means to posture themselves as valuable to powerful external actors. Democratic reforms, however, can have sticking power and trap future aid-dependent elites who attempt to strategically manipulate domestic reforms.

Reducing postconflict coup risk: The low windfall coup-proofing hypothesis

Reducing coup risk is imperative and expensive for postconflict leaders. A theoretical framework is therefore needed to explain the subset of leaders who spend on development following civil war. The low-windfall coup-proofing hypothesis proposed here suggests that only postconflict leaders who lack natural resources and offer no strategic importance to donors choose to reduce coup risk by using nonstrategic aid for development. A nested research design with data on postconflict coups (1970–2009) and a case study based on fieldwork are used to test the hypothesis. The hypothesis is supported across robustness checks, indicating that development from aid reduces coup risk for postconflict leaders with low windfall.

Mass protests and the resource curse: The politics of demobilization in rentier autocracies

Why are some dictators more successful at demobilizing protest movements than others? Repression sometimes stamps out protest movements (Bahrain in 2011) but can also cause a backlash (Egypt and Tunisia in 2011), leading to regime change. This article argues that the effectiveness of repression in quelling protests varies depending upon the income sources of authoritarian regimes. Oil-rich autocracies are well equipped to contend with domestic and international criticism, and this gives them a greater capacity to quell protests through force. Because oil-poor dictators lack such ability to deal with criticism, repression is more likely to trigger a backlash of increased protests. The argument is supported by analysis of newly available data on mass protests from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0) dataset, which covers all countries (1945–2006). This article implies that publics respond strategically to repression, and tend to demobilize when the government is capable of continually employing repression with impunity.