Dietmar Braun

Taking ‘Galton's Problem’ Seriously Towards a Theory of Policy Diffusion

This article builds on the recent policy diffusion literature and attempts to overcome one of its major problems, namely the lack of a coherent theoretical framework. The literature defines policy diffusion as a process where policy choices are interdependent, and identifies several diffusion mechanisms that specify the link between the policy choices of the various actors. As these mechanisms are grounded in different theories, theoretical accounts of diffusion currently have little internal coherence. In this article we put forward an expected-utility model of policy change that is able to subsume all the diffusion mechanisms. We argue that the expected utility of a policy depends on both its effectiveness and the payoffs it yields, and we show that the various diffusion mechanisms operate by altering these two parameters. Each mechanism affects one of the two parameters, and does so in distinct ways. To account for aggregate patterns of diffusion, we embed our model in a simple threshold model of diffusion. Given the high complexity of the process that results, strong analytical conclusions on aggregate patterns cannot be drawn without more extensive analysis which is beyond the scope of this article. However, preliminary considerations indicate that a wide range of diffusion processes may exist and that convergence is only one possible outcome.

The role of funding agencies in the cognitive development of science

Abstract The influence of the policies of funding agencies on cognitive developments in science has never been systematically evaluated. In this paper it is endeavoured to gather the knowledge we have on this subject and to answer two questions: by what means and processes is the distribution of funding resources transformed into scientific information and knowledge processes? Who is deciding on the distribution of funds within funding agencies and how is this related to incremental or innovative cognitive developments in science? The major argument is that because funding resources contribute significantly to the chances of doing research and, therefore, to the maintenance or contesting of existing power relations in the scientific field, the policy-making in funding agencies is the focus of diverse interests. The structure, norms and interests within funding agencies explain both the divergence in policy output, and the often conservative implications with regard to cognitive scientific developments.

Lasting tensions in research policy-making — a delegation problem

A basic paradox in funding policy is that policy-makers want to guarantee maximum welfare benefits without violating the independence of scientists and their organisations. This article contends that this problem can be adequately conceptualised in terms of delegation and principal-agent theory. In the past, blind delegation and incentives were used to resolve the tension: more recently, efforts have been in quite a different direction. The ‘steady state’ succeeds in realising more society-oriented research but fails to reduce the tensions. ‘Delegation by contract’ and ‘delegation to networks’ attack the estimation of costs by scientists linked to the efforts in politically or user-inspired research and can thus reduce the likelihood of moral hazard by scientists. They are ‘opening up’ the scientific system to user systems by changing the functioning of the basic structures of science whilst embodying two very different solutions. ‘Delegation by contract’ maintains a strong belief in the rationalisation of funding policy and in political guidance, while ‘delegation to networks’ makes the state a ‘facilitator’ helping scientists and their institutions to self-organise networks of co-operation with user systems. Copyright , Beech Tree Publishing.

Principal-agent theory and research policy: An introduction

The rational choice perspective is prominent in many sociological, economic and political science literature but has been undervalued until now in the field of science studies. This special issue attempts to revalorise this perspective by introducing the principal-agent theory with relation to research policy-making. The introduction presents the basic features of the model of principal-agent and reviews the theoretical development and applications in research policy. It summarises the main findings of the articles in this issue and concludes that the studies in the framework of principal-agent demonstrate the willingness of combining theoretical rigour and ‘requisite variety’ by applying the theory to a large number of different fields linked to research policy-making. Copyright , Beech Tree Publishing.

Policy learning in Swiss research policy--the case of the National Centres of Competence in Research

Abstract The article treats the problem of “rationality” in learning processes in research policies. The underlying hypothesis is that there are contemporary efforts in research policy-making, which, against views in organisational sociology like “bounded rationality” or “garbage-can”, endeavour to “rationalise” the process of decision-making in research policies. This hypothesis is worked out by taking one example, the setting-up of the “National Centres of Competence in Research” (NCCR) in Switzerland and analyse the processes that have contributed to the acceptance of this funding measure. Our finding is that Switzerland has introduced some “rationalising devices” but that these devices are still insufficiently institutionalised and can be further elaborated. In addition, it is made clear that goal-oriented problem-solving and interests are closely intertwined and cannot be dissociated from another. This may have distorting effects on the rationality of the learning process. It is, nevertheless, a necessary condition in order to learn at all.

Lessons on the political coordination of knowledge and innovation policies

The article takes up the main questions developed in the introduction and endeavours to give a synthetic account of the findings in the various country studies in this special issue of SPP. In a nutshell, one can see an impressive account of reform activities concerning the improvement of the political coordination of knowledge and innovation policies. It turns out that internal coordination by way of a superministry might not be the optimal solution for coordination problems. External coordination under the influence of ‘moral contracts’ at the top-level of decision-making on the ministerial level and newly designed and delegated coordinating bodies at the agency level might be better ways to proceed. Policy-makers have to pay attention though to keep the balance between the pressing need for better political coordination and the need for an autonomous development of basic research, higher education, professional education, and technological application. Copyright , Beech Tree Publishing.

Ex Pluribus Unum: Integrating the Different Strands of Policy Diffusion Theory

Policy diffusion can be defined as a process in which policy choices are interdependent, that is, in which a choice made by one decision-maker influences the choices made by other decision-makers, and is in turn influenced by them. So defined, diffusion is both an old and a new phenomenon. It is old because interdependencies have always existed. The famous “Galton’s problem”, which points to the importance of interdependencies and the analytical problems following inaccurate assumptions about the independence of cases, was formulated in 1889 when Sir Francis Galton discussed a paper by Edward Tylor, a fellow anthropologist (Ross/Homer 1976: 1–2). Tylor showed a correlation between marriage laws and descent patterns, but Galton retorted that the analysis neglected the possibility of cultural diffusion among tribes. From then on, “Galton’s problem” has been discussed in all textbooks on the comparative method, though the issue has usually been neglected in empirical work.

How Centralized Federations Avoid Over-centralization

The focus of this article is centralized types of federations that have been neglected both in the economic literature on federalism and in comparative federal studies. The starting point is that countries with centralized institutional solutions are subject to encroaching behaviour by the central government and are threatened with shifting further towards ‘over-centralization’. ‘Over-centralization’ reduces federal member states to pure ‘agents’ of central government. By comparing four federal countries subject to centralization trends (Australia, Austria, Germany and Switzerland) and combinations of causal factors, an attempt is made to ascertain why some federations are locked in ‘over-centralized’ institutional solutions while others are able to ward off such an outcome.

Federal dynamics in times of economic and financial crisis

The global economic and financial crisis is a challenge for all governments but in particular for federal states, as divided and/or shared territorial powers make federations susceptible to coordination problems in fiscal policy-making. This article is interested in the effects of the on-going crisis on federal relations. Three kinds of problems are evoked, which may become the cause of federal tensions and conflicts – opportunism of subgovernments, centralisation, and erosion of solidarity amongst members of the federation. Our analysis of fiscal policies and federal conflicts of eleven federations between 2007 and today reveals three kinds of coordination problems: shirking in the use of federal government grants, rent-seeking in equalisation payments, over-borrowing and over-spending. Our results show that shirking remained limited to few cases and occurred only in the first part of the crisis. However, rent-seeking and over-borrowing and -spending led to a reduction of solidarity amongst subgovernments, and increased regulation of fiscal discretion of the members of the federation. Subsequently, tensions in federal relations increased, though only in one case, this has challenged the federal order as such.

The influence of federalism on fiscal policy making

Abstract. This article attempts to refine the statement that federal states face difficulties in fiscal policy making because of the territorial division of powers by comparing two federal countries, Canada and Germany. These two countries differ in terms of their type of federalism: Canada displaying a power-separation system and Germany corresponding to a power-sharing type. According to the authors, the territorial factor influences fiscal policy making through the distribution of taxing and spending powers as well as through patterns of intergovernmental relations. The use of fiscal policy instruments and the likely effects on conflict and cooperation in those two countries is discussed with empirical evidence. The authors come to the conclusion that federalism is indeed a constraint on fiscal policy making, but that the two types of power division face different obstacles and deal differently with fiscal problems. In the power-separation system of Canada, the federal government has encompassing competencies to use fiscal policy instruments unilaterally and without restraint, but faces a lack of concerted action with the provinces which reduces its scope of action in fiscal policy making. In the power-sharing system in Germany, concerted action facilitates macroeconomic stabilisation strategies but the compulsory negotiation system distorts the use of fiscal policy instruments by distributive bargaining.