Dimitris Andriosopoulos

Insider Purchases Talk and Buybacks Whisper

With daily trades of directors’ purchases and share repurchase we find that the former is preceded by larger share price drops and trigger a better short- and long-term market performance. Further, when directors purchase shares with their own wealth they time the market by buying shares at a discount of 1.9% and 6.7% over the two and twelve months, respectively, surrounding these trades. In contrast, directors repurchase shares at a premium of 0.5% which reverts to zero over the two and twelve months, respectively, surrounding these trades, corroborating the price support hypothesis. Even when both trades occur within two days directors still purchase shares at a larger discount of 3% over the twelve months surrounding these trades. Finally, directors’ long-term incentive plans (accumulated shares) increase the likelihood of share repurchasing (directors’ purchasing) but are inversely related to the market valuation of these trades.

The short-term impact of director trading in UK closed-end funds

Most closed-end funds are transparent entities that hold securities that are actively traded in liquid markets. In such a setting, the argument that director transactions mitigate information asymmetry has very limited applicability. Our results provide support for the theory of Barber and Odean [2008. “All that Glitters: The Effect of Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors.” Review of Financial Studies 21: 785–818]: retail investor decision-making is influenced by attention-grabbing events. Director purchases are one such attention-grabbing event and are associated with significant positive price returns – the magnitudes of which are linked to the size of the purchase, the size of the fund, and the investment mandate. Trading volumes increase at the time of the purchase but most of the initial price responses and trading volumes dissipate over the following 15 days.

The Market Valuation of Share Repurchases in Europe. A Cross Country Analysis

We analyse a uniquely constructed data set of share repurchases in France, Germany and the UK. We find significant differences across the three countries in the popularity of this strategy, in the market reaction and its determinants, and in the likelihood of subsequent share repurchase announcements. We show that in the UK, fundamental factors such as initial announcement, size, past returns, ownership concentration, and changes in regulations during our sample period explain the market reaction to the announcement of intention to repurchase shares. In the remaining countries, the excess returns are not persistent in the post-event period, and the fundamental factors do not consistently explain the market reaction and the probability of subsequent repurchases announcements. Our results suggest that institutional settings affect the value creation of share repurchases.

Information Content of Aggregate and Individual Insider Trading

We examine the impact of aggregate insider trading on market returns in the UK. We find that, on aggregate, insiders are contrarians, but their trades are not informative, contrary to previous US evidence. We suggest that this discrepancy is related to the regulatory setting in the UK where insiders have to report their trades within six days. Then we analyse the short-run market reaction to insider trades and find that the information content of insider trading is limited to the period surrounding the announcement dates. We show that market-to-book, company size, stock volatility and market volatility have a significant impact on reporting period returns. In addition, we find that the market reaction is much weaker after controlling M/B and size. Finally, we show that insiders time in high volatile stocks, and following high market volatility.

Overpayment, Financial Distress, and Investor Horizons

Firms that follow excessive payout policies (over-payers) are higher on the financial distress spectrum and have lower survival rates than under-payers. In addition, over-payers endure lower future sales and asset growth than under-payers. Exogenous import tariff reductions, which increase product market competition and impact negatively on cash flows, reduce the likelihood of overpayment. We interpret this as evidence consistent with a financial flexibility channel explaining the relation between excessive payouts and financial distress, rather than a risk-shifting mechanism. Our finding of a positive association between excessive payouts and financial distress risk is robust to using different definitions of overpayment and financial distress, various empirical specifications and tests mitigating the impact of confounding effects.

Information Disclosure, CEO Traits and Share Buyback Completion Rates

Open market buybacks are not firm commitments and there is limited evidence on whether firms repurchase the intended shares. We employ a comprehensive set of hand-collected data on information disclosure on open market share buyback announcements and the respective buyback trades in UK. We assess whether CEO traits can affect the buyback completion rates. We show that information disclosure is one of the major determinants of buyback completion rates. Like previous studies, we find that large and widely held firms, firms conducting subsequent buyback programmes, and firms which complete their previous programmes, have higher completion rates. Finally, we find that firms with senior CEOs, who hold external directorships and have received a business education, are more likely to complete their buyback programs. Our results suggest there is clear relationship between information disclosure, CEO traits and buyback completion rates.