Dingmar van Eck

Mechanistic explanation, cognitive systems demarcation, and extended cognition

Abstract Approaches to the Internalism–Externalism controversy in the philosophy of mind often involve both (broadly) metaphysical and explanatory considerations. Whereas originally most emphasis seems to have been placed on metaphysical concerns, recently the explanation angle is getting more attention. Explanatory considerations promise to offer more neutral grounds for cognitive systems demarcation than (broadly) metaphysical ones. However, it has been argued that explanation-based approaches are incapable of determining the plausibility of internalist-based conceptions of cognition vis-a-vis externalist ones. On this perspective, improved metaphysics is the route along which to solve the Internalist–Externalist stalemate. In this paper we challenge this claim. Although we agree that explanation-orientated approaches have indeed so far failed to deliver solid means for cognitive system demarcation, we elaborate a more promising explanation-oriented framework to address this issue. We argue that the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, extended with the criterion of ‘fat-handedness’, is capable of plausibly addressing the cognitive systems demarcation problem, and thus able to decide on the explanatory traction of Internalist vs. Externalist conceptions, on a case-by-case basis. Our analysis also highlights why some other recent mechanistic takes on the problem of cognitive systems demarcation have been unsuccessful. We illustrate our claims with a case on gestures and learning.

In defense of coexisting engineering meanings of function

Abstract Technical function is a key concept in engineering design. Despite the centrality of the concept, a systematic, rigorous analysis of the utility of function and its different conceptualizations is missing in the engineering design literature. This paper addresses this challenge. We investigate the utility of function and its different meanings in the following engineering design contexts: malfunction explanation, innovative design, redesign, and routine design. This analysis provides theoretical justification for the current engineering practice of accepting ambiguity of functional descriptions and for methods to translate and/or convert functional descriptions across engineering design frameworks. We show that the utility of specific meanings of function is highly task dependent, identify novel roles for functional descriptions in engineering design, and present methodological implications for translation methods for functional descriptions.

Rethinking the explanatory power of dynamical models in cognitive science

ABSTRACTIn this paper I offer an interventionist perspective on the explanatory structure and explanatory power of (some) dynamical models in cognitive science: I argue that some “pure” dynamical models – ones that do not refer to mechanisms at all – in cognitive science are “contextualized causal models” and that this explanatory structure gives such models genuine explanatory power. I contrast this view with several other perspectives on the explanatory power of “pure” dynamical models. One of the main results is that dynamical models need not refer to underlying mechanisms in order to be explanatory. I defend and illustrate this position in terms of dynamical models of the A-not-B error in developmental psychology as elaborated by Thelen and colleagues, and dynamical models of unintentional interpersonal coordination developed by Richardson and colleagues.ABSTRACT In this paper I offer an interventionist perspective on the explanatory structure and explanatory power of (some) dynamical models in cognitive science: I argue that some “pure” dynamical models – ones that do not refer to mechanisms at all – in cognitive science are “contextualized causal models” and that this explanatory structure gives such models genuine explanatory power. I contrast this view with several other perspectives on the explanatory power of “pure” dynamical models. One of the main results is that dynamical models need not refer to underlying mechanisms in order to be explanatory. I defend and illustrate this position in terms of dynamical models of the A-not-B error in developmental psychology as elaborated by Thelen and colleagues, and dynamical models of unintentional interpersonal coordination developed by Richardson and colleagues.

Assessing the Explanatory Relevance of Ascriptions of Technical Functions

In this chapter we assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions by considering two explanation-seeking contexts that often figure in the philosophical literature on functions (and explanations). Applied to the technical domain, these are: (i) why was artifact x produced?, and (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to ϕ? We argue that function ascriptions are explanatorily irrelevant for the first explanation-seeking question, and are explanatorily relevant for the second one. We argue these points in terms of the desideratum that explanations should only list difference making factors.

Assessing the Roles of Design Representations: Counterfactual Understanding and Technical Advantage Predictions

In this chapter I elaborate two important roles of design representations in terms of concepts and insights from the philosophical literature on explanation: design representations as means for counterfactual understanding, and for articulating predictions concerning technical advantages. Examples from the functional modeling literature are used to illustrate these roles.

On Testing Engineering Design Methods: Explanation, Reverse Engineering, and Constitutive Relevance

In this chapter I draw on philosophical literature on (scientific) explanation to assess the goodness of engineering design methods. I focus this analysis on the engineering design practice of reverse engineering and redesign, and elaborate a constraint drawn from the mechanistic explanation literature to assess the goodness of reverse engineering practices and the content of design representations resulting from those practices. This constraint concerns the distinction between causal and constitutive relevance in mechanisms. I spell out two ways in which constitutive relevance assessments give traction to designing: reverse engineering explanation, and design optimization. I end by showing how this analysis fits within and extends recent philosophical work on the interplay between engineering design and explanation, indicating the (broader) relevance and promise of connecting philosophy of explanation and philosophy of design.